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FOREWORD
The Collapse of the National Benefit Life Insurance Company by
James B. Mitchell is an important contribution to a broad inquiry
of the life insurance business among Negroes. As this study and
the author’s unpublished master’s essay, “ The Investment Policy
of the National Benefit Life Insurance Company” (1938), carry a
step farther the investigations of the Negro as Worker and as
Business Man initiated ten years ago by us, the publication of Mr.
Mitchell’s research in the Social Science Studies is a source of par
donable pride to the members of the Department of Economics. Al
though confined to a single company, Mr. Mitchell’s study reveals
many of the problems peculiar to Negro life insurance generally.
But in a study limited to one company these general problems could
receive only incidental consideration. We therefore hope that he
will find it possible to extend his future research to the study of
Negro insurance companies as a whole.
The Department of Economics wishes to thank the William C.
Whitney Foundation and the Julius Rosenwald Fund for the grantsin-aid without which the present study could not have been made.
A b r a m L. H a r r is , Head,

Department of Economics.
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INTRODUCTION
The study of Negro business enterprises affords us some idea
of the extent to which Negroes participate in the economic life of
the United States. Such a study also reveals the faith of many
Negro leaders that through the individual accumulation of wealth
and property and the development of Negro business the economic
emancipation of the race can be achieved. While the attempt of
Negro leaders to develop a business class, and, later, to erect a
“ black economy” , ignored the facts of American economic develop
ment, it expressed the characteristically American belief that every
man could rise in the economic scale.
The largest business enterprises ever to be organized and
operated by Negroes were in the field of banking and insurance.
One of the foremost among these financial organizations was the
National Benefit Life Insurance Company organized in 1898 at
Washington, D. C. Because of its size and the conditions that gave
rise to it, this company during its life was more nearly in a position
to compete with white companies than any of the Negro financial
institutions up to its time. The history and failure of the National
Benefit are integrally related to the general problem of Negro busi
ness enterprise, which in turn cannot be disassociated from the
forces at work in the American economy as a whole. A study of
this company, the chief cause of whose failure was the problems con
nected with investment, throws considerable light on the limitations
and weaknesses of Negro business in general, especially when viewed
in the perspective of the national economy. It also affords a basis
for determining not only the chance of success of individual Negroes
as business men and financiers, but also the extent to which the
success of these individual Negro business men can contribute to
the elevation of the economic status of the race.
It was relatively late in the history of life insurance when the
Negro entered. During slavery the Negro figured in organized
insurance merely as the object under chattel contracts. It appears
that during the days of slavery many slave holders for their own
protection insured their slaves much in the same manner as horses
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and livestock are now insured. The following notice clipped from
the Richmond Enquirer will prove interesting:
Slave Insurance
The Albermarle Insurance Company
of
Charlottesville, Va.
Insures slaves for one or a term of years at as low
rates as safety will permit of.
Office: 130 Main Street, Richmond, Va.
Knowles and Walford, Agents
Dr. F. W. Hancock, Medical Examiner
Office Hours: 10 o’clock, A. M.1
However, sick-benefit and burial societies, limited, of course, by
the Negro’s meager ability to pay, existed and provided a measure
of health and burial insurance. “ The history of the Negro in insur
ance extends far beyond the days of his freedom in this country.
While there are no recorded data available, yet from reliable sources
we learn that more than seventy-five years ago there existed in every
city of any size in Virginia organizations of Negroes having as their
object the caring for the sick and the burying of the dead. In but
few instances did those societies exist openly . . . Although it
was unlawful for Negroes to assemble without the presence of a
white man and also unlawful to allow a congregation of slaves on a
plantation without the consent of the master, these organizations
existed and held their meetings on the ‘lots’ of some of the lawmakers
themselves. The general plan seems to have been to select someone
who could ‘read and write’ and make him the secretary. The meeting
place having been selected, the members would come by ‘ones and
twos’, make their payments to the secretary, and quietly withdraw.
The book of the secretary was often kept covered upon the bed. In
many of the societies each member was known by number and in
paying simply announced his number. The president of such a
society was usually a privileged slave who had the confidence of his
or her master and could go and come at will. . . In the event of
death of a member, provision was made for a decent burial, and all
the members as far as possible obtained permits to attend the
funeral. . . This was the first form of insurance known to the
Negro from which his family received a benefit. . . As soon as
the colored man became free he formed all kinds of associations
for material protection, many of which exist today though in some-1
1W. P. Burrell before the 8th Hampton Negro Conference, 1904.
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what modified forms. These organizations were founded for the
purpose of caring for the sick and furnishing decent burial at death.
No attention was paid to difference of age and very little to health
conditions. The same joining fee was charged regardless of age,
and the same monthly dues paid. The usual amounts paid for initia
tion fee in these ‘benevolent societies’ was from $2.50 to $5.00.
Monthly dues of fifty cents were generally charged. . . The amount
paid for sick dues was regulated by the by-lawrs of the various
societies and ranged from $1.50 per week to $5.00. Members were
taken in on the recommendation of friends. These organizations
were formed by the hundreds in the cities of Virginia and many of
them served a good purpose in that the people were brought together
and friendly intercourse established.” 2 Such societies, of course,
knew nothing of scientific insurance principles.
Sustained by the mutual desire of their members to provide
some security against the hazard of sickness and to provide a “ decent
burial” , they were similar to those societies which the poor of all
ages have set up for mutual aid and fraternalism. The collegias of
Rome 8 and the friendly societies of England45
*are early examples of
this type of friendly or “ insurance” society. Many of the early labor
organizations in this country and Europe began as friendly and
fraternal societies whose function was to provide for their members
during the periods of stress caused by sickness and death.3
About a decade after the Civil War the problem of insuring
Negro lives arose. In 1881 the established legal reserve companies
were still debating the rates at which Negro risks should be insured
and whether Negro risks should be taken at all. The position taken
by the Prudential Insurance Company on the subject of insuring
Negro risks became typical of the large white companies. This
company reported:
During the early part of 1881 a new problem pre
sented itself, which the company dealt with, as in all
other matters, solely on the basis of facts as they were
available. . . . Thus far Negroes had not been seriously
considered as applicants for industrial insurance, but
with the increasing extent of business, the colored popu
lation had become considerably interested in the sub2ibid.
3 Terence O’Donnell, History of Life Insurance, Book I, Ch. I, American
Conservation Co., Chicago, 1936.
4 O’Donnell, op. cit., Book IV, Ch. I.
5John R. Commons and Associates, History of Labor in the United States,
Macmillan Co., N. Y., 1921, pp. 124-25.
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ject. . . . Careful investigation, including the company’s
own experience, and data collected from a large number
of American cities, point to excessive mortality among
this element of the population, so much so that it became
apparent that unless the company adopted a restrictive
course it would soon find itself in difficulties because of
inordinate losses experienced on this class of policy
holders.6
Although this high mortality rate among Negroes was caused
by ignorance, poverty, and the effects of segregation and discrimi
nation, the adherents to the doctrine of inherent racial differences
sought to apply it in the field of life insurance. As Statistician of
the Prudential Life Insurance Company, Dr. Frederick L. Hoffman
sought scientifically to establish the thesis that the Negro’s high
mortality was due to inherited racial characteristics and traits. He
held that “ it is a fact which can and will be demonstrated by indis
putable evidence, that of all races for which statistics are obtainable,
and which enter at all into the consideration of economic problems
as factors, the Negro shows the least power of resistance in the
struggle for life.” T While the facts of Negro mortality and health
as reported by Hoffman were undeniable, later study of these facts
has given little support to his racial biology. Although it is now
generally conceded that race may have some minor influence on
group immunity or susceptibility to certain diseases, the opinion of
Dr. Louis I. Dublin, Statistician for the Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company, is now the generally credited view among impartial stu
dents of the subject. According to Dr. Dublin:
It is probably that their [the Negro’s] high death rate
is due more than anything else to ignorance, poverty, and
the lack of proper medical care. Pulmonary tuberculosis,
typhoid fever, pellagra, malaria, and puerperal conditions
are examples of such diseases in which the mortality
rates are much affected by unfavorable or insanitary en
vironment— or by low economic status— and all of them
have higher death rates among Negroes.8*1
6History of the Prudential Insurance Company, Prudential Insurance Co.,
p. 137.
1 Frederick L. Hoffman, Race Traits and Tendencies of the American Negro,
American Economic Association, Vol. XI, 1896. In this connection it is well to
see also Kelly Miller’s “ A Review of Hoffman’s Race Traits and Tendencies of
the American Negro” , American Negro Academy, 1897, and Samuel J. Holmes,
The Negro’s Struggle for Survival, University of Chicago Press, 1937.
‘ Louis I. Dublin, “ The Health of the Negro” , Metropolitan Life Insurance
Co., New York, 1938, p. 10.
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This view, however, has not uprooted the older conception that Hoff
man’s work helped to intrench. And even if the Dublin view were
more generally accepted by the large insurance companies, the facts,
not racial theory, of Negro mortality and health, would force them
to modify their policies accordingly. There is, of course, a great
difference between the modification of policy to which Dr. Dublin’s
appraisal of the facts would lead and that founded upon Dr. Hoff
man’s interpretation. While recognizing that the rates of mortality
and morbidity are higher for the Negro than for the white race,
Dr. Dublin attributes this difference to the Negro’s inferior socio
economic environment including income and medical care. From
this standpoint the type of insurance policy and the rates accorded
Negro policyholders would be based upon the company’s mortality
experience with Negro policyholders classified according to socio
economic groups. Thus if it is true that mortality and morbidity
rates of the Negroes in the higher income brackets hardly differ
from those of the white at similar income levels, there could be no
justifiable discrimination of Negro policyholders in these categories
of income. Dr. Hoffman attributed the difference in rates between
whites and blacks to the latter’s biological incapacity to survive in
the white man’s civilization. The Hoffman viewpoint leads either
to the general exclusion of Negroes as insurance risks or to the
insuring of selected Negro risks at higher rates than would be
charged white policy-holders for the same type of insurance.
Although founded upon the reluctance or the refusal of white
insurance companies to accept Negro risks, the Negro insurance
company can ignore the facts of the Negro’s mortality and health
only at its peril. At this point we shall refrain from discussing
whether the Negro insurance companies simply use the rate and
policy discrimination of white companies against Negroes as one of
its sales arguments while at the same time following the policies of
white underwriters. It is sufficient to say at this time that if white
companies had followed a non-discriminating policy in insuring
Negroes there would in all probability have been no Negro life
insurance companies, or at least only a very few. It was but
logical for those Negroes endowed with the capitalistic spirit to see
the possibility of profiting from the racial policy of white companies.
The tendency among those Negroes who thus saw the possibility of
profit was first to set up fraternal societies of which insurance was
the predominant feature. Under the circumstances the fraternal
society became the first important vehicle of organized insurance
among Negroes. They were also the means whereby the Negro
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obtained experience in the management of large enterprises and was
able to amass capital for the financing of other enterprises.
The growth of the fraternal societies in the last quarter of the
nineteenth century and the consequent growth of Negro insurance,
however, was due not alone to racial discrimination, but also to the
general impetus in the insurance business as a whole. The percent
of industrial insurance in force increased 463.4 per cent in the decade
1885-1895. The increase is shown in the following table: 9
Table I
Percentage Increases of Insurance in Force by Decades
O RD INARY

1865-75
1875-85
1885-95
1895-1905
1905-15
1915-25

230.9%
12.9
128.2
124.8
6 6 .0

220.5

IN D U ST R IA L

TO TAL

290.9%
1 2 .2

462.4%
181.4
91.7
189.6

149.4
132.9
70.4
195.7

This same decade saw “ the extensive development of the agency
system, the increase in the expense ratio, the liberalizing of the
policy contract, the wide use of the dividend system, and the in
vasion by some New York companies of foreign countries” .101 More
important to the development of Negro insurance was the fact that
this was the golden age of thrift and enterprise, and, therefore, of
fraternal and assessment insurance. The prevalence and success
at that time of both these types of insurance, each of which could
be carried on by organizations easily organized and of small capital—
was another factor which facilitated the entry of the Negro with his
meager capital and experience into the business of life insurance.
“ In 1880 no less than 236 of these business assessment insurance
organizations had been chartered in Pennsylvania alone. By 1885,
56 had been chartered in Massachusetts. By 1889, the country
over, the business assessment associations had a billion dollars more
insurance in force than did the old line companies” .11
The National Benefit Association was one of the Negro assess
ment companies organized in this period of the prosperity of assess
ment insurance. The growth and progress of this organization, like
that of larger insurance companies among whites, is to be explained
not simply on the basis of individual effort and ingenuity, but also
9James S. Elston, “ The Development of Life Insurance” , Readings in Life
Insurance, Life Office Management Association, 1936, p. 30.
” ibid., p. 30.
11Lester Z. Zartman, Yale Readings in Life Insurance, p. 92.
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on the basis of social and economic factors. By the time the National
Benefit had been organized in 1898, the institution of life insurance
had become firmly established in this country. Many of the leading
companies of today had been organized for thirty or forty years.
Prior to the formation of these companies, life insurance was a
matter of self-help conducted with little regard for business and
actuarial principles by fraternal and secret societies. Following
the Civil War period the first great impetus was given to the ad
vancement of life insurance as a business. Improved mortality
tables were introduced, openly paid agents took over the solicitation
of new business, and the public had witnessed the failure or absorp
tion of many mushroom companies organized during the “ bubble
era” just after 1857 without condemning the institution.12 Probably
more important was the fact that during this period in the develop
ment of life insurance, the insurance idea was sold to the public.
Despite failures, frauds, and mismanagement, life insurance com
panies received much favorable publicity. Even the uneducated
working man became acquainted with life insurance and was “ sold”
on the advantages of it. Therefore when the National Benefit made
its appearance the American public was already life-insurance con
scious. And the company, like others established at the time, and
subsequently was to some degree, relieved of the necessity and
expense of establishing the merit of life insurance.
” O’Donnell, op. cit., Book III, Ch. 2.
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Ch apter I

HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
As indicated above, the history of Negro insurance enterprises
is inextricably bound up with the history of Negro fraternal orders.
In all societies, programmes and organizations designed to increase
economic security, have always made a strong appeal to the poor and
disadvantaged. Thus, it is not surprising that among Negroes
mutual aid societies flourished and fraternals reached a point of
advancement second only to the Negro church. W. P. Burrell,
before the Hampton Negro Conference in 1904, said, “ Following
closely in the wake of the ‘Benevolent Society’ came the Secret
Societies. Of these the society called the Sons and Daughters of
Samaria, better known as ‘The Good Samaritans’ was probably the
most popular and widespread. This organization once numbered
more than fifty thousand members in Virginia and did much good
in a financial way. Its object was to take care of the sick and bury
the dead. It also assisted its members in times when death visited
their homes. . . . The Galilean Fisherman was another of the early
orders that had a large membership. Following in the wake of
these societies came others too numerous to mention, but all having
the one object o f caring for the sick and burying the dead. The
care of the sick has always been a sacred obligation with the colored
man and in this he has but copied after his more intelligent white
brother. . . . From paying no attention to the laws of health and
taking in persons without medical examination, many of these or
ganizations found themselves loaded down with large amounts of
money due on account of unpaid sick dues and death benefits. . . .
Not withstanding early failures the colored man has continued to
organize and improve his organizations. While many of the larger
associations are running now on practically the same plan that they
did thirty years ago, others have made changes wherever and when
ever they have been found necessary. In Virginia the societies are
almost too numerous to mention; but foremost among them we find
the Grand Fountain of the United Order of True Reformers, the
Knights of Pythias, The Independent Order of St. Luke, The Gali
lean Fishermen, The Sons and Daughter of Samaria, The Tents, The
Knights of Tabor, and the Grand United Order of Odd Fellows. . . .
As has been noted, these societies have materially assisted in abol
ishing poverty and in promoting small savings, and have formed,
in many instances, the means by which property has been acquired.”
As early as 1850 the Odd Fellows had admitted sixty-six lodges,
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forty-nine of which were virile and active. In the same year the
Masonic Order was organized. At about the turn of the century
the True Reformers had attained such influence that they attempted
to form a virtually independent economy. “ The True Reformers” ,
wrote William Taylor Thom, an investigator for the Department of
Labor, in 1902, “ constitutes probably the most remarkable Negro
organization in the country.” 13 In the first twenty years of its
existence its membership increased from 100 to over 50,000. For
the same period it paid over $606,000 in death claims and $1,500,000
in sick dues. In December of 1901 it held real estate valued at
$223,000.14 Indeed the True Reformers, through its numerous sub
sidiary enterprises beginning with farming and ending with a bank
foreshadowed the idea of an independent black economy and though
it failed, it came nearer than other Negro organizations in making
the idea a reality.
The success of Negro fratemals is attributable in large measure
to their insurance feature. The True Reformers was primarily a
mutual aid society. The same was true of the Odd Fellows, whose
object was “ . . . To provide a fund for the relief of the members
when sick, lame or disabled, and for insuring a sum of money to
assist in defraying the expenses of burials (to be paid to the widow,
legal executors, administrators, or assignees of a member deceased),
or to assist in defraying the expenses of the burial of the wife or
child of a member; also to provide necessary funds for carrying on
the business of the Order.” 15 The insurance and relief features of
the Odd Fellows are again emphasized by the Grand Secretary and
author of the early history of the society. He wrote: “ The relief
is, in the first place, restricted to members of the Order and their
families. . . . The pecuniary contributions of the members, which
consist of small monthly sums, constitute a fund for the exclusive
purpose of relieving the sick, burying the dead, educating the or
phan, and protecting and assisting the widow. In this respect our
Order is a vast mutual aid society” .16
The appeal of fraternals to the Negro, however, was not based
on economic considerations alone. To the Negro, the fraternal
order was a medium through which he might obtain individual and
group self-expression. A substitute for the social dignity and
respect denied him in everyday life was sought in the fraternals.
” U. S. Department of Labor, Bulletin, Vol. 41, p. 807.
14ibid., p. 808.
16Charles H. Brooks, A History and Manual of the Grand United Order of
Odd Fellows, Charles H. Brooks, Philadelphia, 1893; p. 203. See also Henry M.
Minton, “ Early History of Negroes in Business in Philadelphia” , before the
American Historical Society, March, 1913.
18ibid., quoted by Brooks, p. 198.
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They, or the church, were and to an extent still are, the basis of
nearly all major group activities. For these reasons fraternalism
became more deeply rooted among Negroes than among whites,
although its importance to the masses of white “joiners” grows out
of similar socio-psychological needs.
Before the end of the nineteenth century the influence of fra
ternalism among whites had begun to wane. Fraternal insurance
was proving impractical. As one writer put it, “ While the secret
orders are a vast agency for good in giving aid and comfort to their
members, in caring for the sick and ministering to the distressed
in mind, body, and estate; while they give vast sums in beneficence
and afford wide opportunity for developing the social side of their
members, yet they are not an unmixed blessing.” 17
As discussed below (see The Fallacy of Fraternal Insurance),
the lack of reserves, legal laxity and absence of scientific under
writing were among the deficiencies of the fraternal orders which
lead to the view that they “ were not an unmixed blessing” . White
insurance companies by this time were approaching maturity and
were gradually taking over one of the most important functions of
white fraternals. There were no insurance companies to take over
the insurance feature of Negro fraternals. In addition to this, the
fraternal orders fulfilled certain group needs, while at the same
time, providing a measure of insurance. Hence, even after fraternal
insurance had demonstrated its impracticality and had lost its former
position among the whites, the fraternal orders continued to develop
and expand as a basis of insurance among Negroes. In 1892 only
eleven years after the organization of the True Reformers and even
prior to the organization’s peak of success, fraternal insurance had
caused such dissatisfaction among whites that the National Fraterha-1
Congress met in an effort to improve the insurance plan of f£SteriM§.
In 1897 the National Fraternal Congress urged theoM.hri^nclihi^Otff
state laws to authorize fraternals to create rei^yes.%d‘:M il898 -dfte
National Fraternal Congress Mortality Table was wideJyfihddpteA.
Among important white fraternals this markedvihe <ehAAofvthfe oldtype fraternal insurance.
.oloH 9iriT axil aynw Ixiibyob xtl
The Fallacy of Fraternal Ir^h'anW'1^ I
*> BsarrqieJirs sonsmani
Fraternal in su ra n t !( M ^ fiaifMTlF¥i^M ffl^^ld-^pe^ff^te^M^l
insurance in t ^ a ^ ^ ^ f ^ iu M ^ f tlfe Y f l H M f f l i

insurancef®flin^aH^^ ctA&iMte#0h
society!itseffi9^“Fr^M afs Wthefr
------------

Vol. 114, 1897, p. 621.

flfHBSh
.S<? .q

AxmktoRi "Hav&a&m&ifm.'geview,

.7061 ,8891*1 ,'J .A ,21 .oVi .BnoiJfisiidw*! ytra'iev
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plan. They accordingly ignored the necessity of building up re
serves to pay increasing losses when the mortality of the older ages
began to manifest itself. When a society had been in existence for
a number of years and the average age of its members began to
increase, the increasing death rate served notice in no uncertain
terms that if the society was to remain solvent its rates must be
increased. Attempts to increase the rate met with universal disap
proval. Members were not sufficiently versed in the theory of
insurance to understand the reason. The inevitable happened.
Many members withdrew and new members were reluctant to join,
with a result that the breakdown of the society almost certainly
followed.” 18
The state laws under which fraternals have operated have not
required actuarial solvency, the theory being that since fraternals
made their by-laws a part of the contract and possessed authority
to levy assessments any high mortality experience could be suc
cessfully dealt with. Thus, legal solvency for a fraternal had been
merely that its assets equal its liabilities, exclusive of any reserve.
The lenient laws under which fraternals operated also enabled organi
zations to be set up for the purpose o f conducting an insurance busi
ness at a profit to operate without a reserve and with little super
vision by state authorities. While this situation drew unscrupulous
persons into the field and caused many losses to the public, it did
enable the Negro to get a start in the business. All the early Negro
insurance enterprises were mutual aid societies operating on the
assessment plan. The Southern Aid Society of Virginia was one
of the Negro companies that passed through this stage, finally be
coming a legal reserve company. The North Carolina Mutual Life
Insurance Company and the National Benefit Life Insurance Com
pany evolved in a similar manner. The former grew out of the
North Carolina Mutual and Provident Association, while the latter
was originally organized as a fraternal society, the National Benefit
Association.
The True Reformers
In several ways the True Reformers is typical of the Negro
insurance enterprises of its period. Its experience well illustrates
the plight of Negro insurance enterprises up to comparatively
recent times. While there were other important Negro insurance
enterprises during this period, such as the Masonic Benefit Asso
ciation whose claims amounted to over $87,000 a year,19 the Odd
“ John H. Magee, Life Insurance, Business Publications, Inc., Chicago, 1939,
p. 92.
18W. E. B. DuBois, “ Economic Cooperation Among Negroes” , Atlanta Uni
versity Publications, No. 12, A. U. Press, 1907.
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Fellows who possessed approximately $2,500,000 in property, the
Knights o f Pythias, the Independent Benevolent and Protective
Order of Elks, and the Galilean Fishermen;20 the evolution of the
True Reformers best illustrates the trend of Negro insurance enter
prises from the last quarter o f the nineteenth century well into
the first decade of the twentieth.
As stated by Thom, “ The Grand Fountain of the Grand United
Order of True Reformers was organized in 1881 by Reverend Wil
liam Washington Browne. In 1883 it was granted a charter as a
joint stock company. The chief purpose of incorporation was to
provide what is to be known as an endowment or mutual benefit
fund. . . .” 21 The organization was thus started as a full-fledged
joint-stock corporation, whose chief aim was to provide a form of
what is known as mutual benefit insurance for its members. By
1898 the phenomenal success of the True Reformers prompted its
managers to secure an amendment to the charter which enabled
them to issue certificates and hold real estate up to the value of
$500,000. In 1907 there were 2,678 lodges and over 100,000 mem
bers. Up to this time there had been 8,322 deaths, for which claims
were paid amounting to $979,440.55.
The True Reformers had a juvenile department for the insuring
of children known as the Rosebud Department. At the peak of its
growth the organization had 30,000 children in this department.
In order to enable members to increase their insurance upon the
payment of a higher premium, classes were introduced in 1885.
Rates for the “ B” class were as follows:
Table I I 22

AGES

JOINING
FEE

VALUE OF
CERTIFICATE
AFTER
1 YEAR

VALUE OF
CERTIFICATE
BEFORE
1 YEAR

ANNUAL
DUES

QUAR
TERLY
DUES

18-25
25-30
30-35
35-40
40-45
45-50
50-55
55-60

2.50
2.75
3.00
3.25
3.50
3.75
4.00
4.25

200.00
200.00
200.00
200.00
140.00
115.00
90.00
65.00

100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
70.00
58.00
45.00
33.00

4.75
4.75
4.75
5.70
5.70
6.65
6.65
7.70

1.20
1.20
1.20
1.43
1.43
1.66
1.66
1.90

20ibid.., p. 121, et seg.
21U. S. Department of Labor, Bulletin, op. cit., Vol. 41, p. 808.
22DuBois, op. cit. William Trent in “ The Development or Negro Life Insur
ance Enterprises” , included this material and much more on pp. 19-22 of his
essay but neglected to indicate that his was a verbatim quotation of DuBois.
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In the first few years of the life of the True Reformers the effect
o f its faulty underwriting, namely the lack of an actuarial basis for
rate computation, was not felt. This was not unusual. Young life
insurance enterprises usually enjoy a low mortality rate.23 How
ever, it faced another problem common to Negro insurance enter
prises. The problem was that of securing an outlet for its funds—
that of finding investments with a desirable combination of yield
and security. The leaders turned to Negro business. The first mani
festation of this investment policy was the organization of the Sav
ings Bank of the Grand Fountain of the United Order of True
Reformers. The organization of the bank was not a deliberate act
resulting from a formulated investment policy. Race friction and
the reported attempt on the part of certain white people to stifle
the organization led to the belief that the order should have its own
bank as a depository.24 Organized to manage the surplus funds of
the Order, the bank was subordinated to it in fact and theory to the
detriment of both.
The bank was organized in 1887 and chartered by the State of
Virginia in 1889. On April 3, 1889, it opened for business, taking in
$1,200 in deposits the first day. The capital stock was $100,000 di
vided into shares of $5.00 each. The stock was not transferable and
could only be bought by persons who held certificates in the Order.
The Order promised a dividend of 20 per cent on the bank’s stock.
This and the necessity of surrendering the stock certificate at the
death of the holder gave the bank’s stock the nature of an annuity.
Another peculiarity of the charter was that the directors of the Order
were, ipso facto, directors of the bank. The bank enjoyed only fair
success up to the time of its failure in 1910. At this time it had over a
quarter of a million dollars in liabilities and almost the same amount
in frozen or doubtful assets. In organization the bank’s outstanding
weakness lay in the fact that it was controlled by the Order which
was also a borrower. With the collapse of the bank, the Order sank
into oblivion.
The bank was only one, although the most important, of num
erous subsidiaries of the True Reformers. Other subordinate enter
prises were the Reformers’ Mercantile and Industrial Association,
which did an annual business of over $100,000 with its principal store
at Richmond; The Reformer, a weekly newspaper combined with a
printing office; Hotel Reformer, which had accommodations for 150
23This is caused primarily by the low average age of the persons insured.
24Abram L. Harris, The Negro as Capitalist, American Academy of Political
and Social Science, Philadelphia, 1936, p. 62.
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guests; the Reformer Building and Loan Association; Westham
° Farms, a home for old people; and the real estate department which
Managed the Order’s more than $400,000 of real estate holdings.
The lesson that the failure of the True Reformers taught was
that the Negro insurance enterprises would have to find new methods
of dealing with the problems of mortality and investment. Though
the Negro was late realizing the impracticality of fraternal insurance,
the collapse of the True Reformers put an end to the inauguration of
large scale ventures in fraternal insurance. Because the death of
the founder, W. W. Browne, coincided with the decline of the Order,
m any25 have assumed a casual relation between the two events. The
loss, of course, was felt by the organization, but was not primarily
the cause of its collapse. First of all, the Order charged inadequate
premiums. The premium rate was not based upon mortality tables,
and sound actuarial reasoning. As was pointed out, white fraternals
had resorted long before to the use of mortality tables and, in con
sequence, were able more scientifically to compute premiums. The
controlling influence in the fixing of the premiums for the True Re
formers was that they be low enough to attract large numbers. More
over this policy was actuated by the belief that the higher premiums
charged Negroes by white insurance companies were due solely to
racial discrimination and had no justification in facts. While perhaps
the premiums charged Negroes by white insurance companies were
exorbitant, it cannot be denied that the mortality of unselected groups
of Negroes was higher than that of whites. The underwriting policy
of the True Reformers ignored this. Thus, when the average age of
the members of the Order appreciably increased, the premiums proved
woefully inadequate.
But this was not the only problem of the True Reformers. The
second was that of investment. In dealing with this, the True Re
formers turned chiefly to real estate— the bug-bear of Negro insur
ance enterprises— and the financing of subsidiaries. The desirability
of real estate as a form of investment for insurance enterprises needs
no comment at this point. With respect to its subsidiaries the True
Reformers were in a paradoxical situation, for they were the sources
of both its strength and its weakness. The True Reformers’ ideal of
creating opportunities for Negroes caused it to invest large sums of
money in the various enterprises enumerated above. With the cre25
Carter G. Woodson, “ The Insurance Business Among Negroes” , Journal of
Negro History, Vol. 14, p. 209, 1929; Harry Pace, “ Contribution of Negro Insur
ance Companies Towards Economic Status of the Negro” , p. 4, Supreme Liberty
Life Insurance Co., Chicago; and William Trent, “ Development of Negro Insur
ance Enterprises” , Univ. of Pa.
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ation of each new enterprise the popularity of the Order naturally
increased. But these enterprises set up by the True Reformers were
economically weak. They sought to exploit new and untried field ’
and as such were subject to the additional hazards of new business.
Instead, therefore, of- becoming a source of revenue to the Order*
these enterprises were a constant drain upon its finances.
“ The contribution of the True Reformers Order to the establish
ment of Negro insurance companies cannot be underestimated, (sic.
Cannot be overestimated). Many of the men who subsequently went
out and organized either fraternal organizations or mutual benefit
societies or life insurance companies got their first inspiration and
frequently their first training in anything pertaining to insurance
from some connection, either directly or indirectly, with the Grand
Fountain of the United Order of True Reformers of America.” 26
Samuel W. Rutherford, founder of the National Benefit Association
was one of these men- At one time he was an agent for the True
Reformers.
Samuel W. Rutherford.
Rutherford was born in 1866, near Atlanta, Georgia. He at
tended school only about twelve months. He learned to read in a
Baptist Sunday School. The early part of his life was spent on a
farm and in selling cord wood in Rome, Georgia. His rise began
when he got a job in that city as janitor for the Singer Sewing
Machine Agency. Later he was promoted to machinist. Soon after
that he founded the weekly newspaper called the Peoples Journal,
which later was called the Baptist Banner. While working as a
traveling salesman for the Singer Sewing Machine Company, he came
in contact with W. W. Browne, the founder of the True Reformers,
for whom he later worked.27
Rutherford started the National Benefit Association in an old
building where he rented a room for six dollars a month.28 For more
than a quarter of a century he dominated the company. That he was
a man with a dynamic personality can scarcely be doubted. He was
a combination of the old-type Baptist preacher and the shrewd bus
iness man. Although his educational equipment was limited, his
experience was wide. But he seemed never to realize the need of
informing himself on the principles of insurance. Laying great store
“ Pace, op. cit., p. 4.
STWoodson, op. eit.
” George W. Lee, “ Insurance—Its Necessity and Value” , The Messenger,
April 1927.

17

in his own judgment and organizing ability, he cared little for pro
fessional or technical training even among his employees. He was
stubborn in yielding to the opinions of others even when supported
by well founded evidence. For years he insisted upon policies which
were causing the company serious losses. For an example, he insisted
upon keeping in force certain business, which some officials and em
ployees of the company had asked his permission to allow lapse at
the first opportunity, merely because he had written the business.
Alfred B. Dawson, the company’s actuary, wrote, “ . . . Indeed I do
know that for years, S. W. Rutherford carried the company in his
vest pocket, but it was only a vest pocket edition then, and of recent
years the main burden has fallen on R. H. Rutherford and Mortimer
Smith, with the General Secretary [S. W. Rutherford] taking a hand
in the more important problems only now and then, although he has
been and is even now the dominating factor in the company’s manage
ment. We have all seen programs as to company procedure which
have been agreed upon between Insurance Departments, R. H. Ruth
erford, Mortimer Smith and myself, knocked into a cocked hat, and
the only explanation offered by the President [R. H. Rutherford] or
Mr. Smith for the company’s failure to proceed as agreed upon has
been that the General Secretary [S. W. Rutherford] now thinks so
and so.” 29 In his relations with the employees o f the company, he
was dominating and exacting, especially about some small matters
such as checking up on pens and pencils. Nevertheless, he once hired
a young woman to head the premium note department solely on the
basis of her handwriting ability. In the later years it seemed that the
problems of the company were far beyond his comprehension. Upon
being told that the company had a large deficit, which, if not at
tended, would show in the annual statement, he replied that he was
busy with his correspondence and should not be disturbed with such
matters which the bookkeeping department should take care of.
Despite Rutherford’s shortcomings, he was a leader and did
much to build up the National Benefit. Rutherford was among those
leaders, John R. Hawkins, Heman E. Perry, etc., described by Carter
G. Woodson as “ captains of industry thus pressing forward” .30 All
of these leaders started organizations which are now defunct. To
these could be added a host of others whose organizations failed not
because of leadership— for in some cases the leadership was excep
tional— but because of insurmountable obstacles.
29Verbatim quotation from letter of Alfred B. Dawson to Voting Trustees
of the National Benefit Life Insurance Company dated February 20, 1931.
20Carter G. Woodson, The Negro in Our History, 5th ed., p. 295.
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C h a p t e r II

THE ORGANIZATION AND EXPANSION OF THE
NATIONAL BENEFIT ASSOCIATION
In 1898 when the True Reformers were well upon the way to
what at that time appeared to be success, the National Benefit Associ
ation was incorporated. Rutherford modeled it after the True Re
formers, which was natural, for as Mr. Carter G. Woodson said, from
W. W. Browne, Rutherford “ learned the secret o f insurance and its
possibilities among Negroes” .1 The association did a negligible
amount of business in the first few years. It was not listed in the
Insurance Yearbook until 1904, and no statistics on it appear in either
the 1904 or 1905 editions.
The original capital of the association was $2,000. This soon
proved inadequate and on August 1, 1905, authority was received to
amend the charter, increasing the authorized capital to $5,000. On
August 15,1916, the capital was again increased. This latter increase
to $100,000 was not fully paid until June 1, 1918. On August 11,
1922, the authorized capital was increased to $250,000.
The capital was raised largely by an appeal to race pride. The
organization was to be entirely a race institution. Provisions were
made in its constitution to keep control of the organization within
the race through restrictions on the sale of stock. The constitution
as amended in 1918 reads:
Stock of the existing capital of one hundred thousand dol
lars may be transferred only on the books of the company
to some person1
2 who is already a stockholder therein, or
to the company itself, who shall reissue the same to an
existing stockholder.3
In 1924 when the company was faced with the tremendous job
of disposing of $150,000 of new capital stock this provision was
changed by an amendment to the constitution. The following state
ment was added:
A fter the sale and original issue of the stock representing
the increased capital stock of $150,000, par value, said
stock shall thereafter be transferred only on the books of
1 Carter G. Woodson, “ The Insurance Business Among Negroes” , Journal of
Negro History, Vol. 14, January 1929.
3The wording here excludes corporations though this was evidently not the
intent.
3 Quoted by Fackler and Brieby, Report No. 1, Fackler and Brieby, Consulting
Actuaries, New York, 1932.
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the company to some person who, at the time of said trans
fer, is a then existing stockholder in this company, or to
the company itself, who shall reissue the same only to a
then existing stockholder.4
In 1929 when a new constitution was adopted this provision was
eliminated.
At the time of organization, The National Benefit Association
was in the eyes of the law an association similar to a fraternal— an
association legally and actually controlled by its members on the basis
of membership rather than ownership for the purpose among other
things of providing mutual insurance on the assessment plan. Ac
tually, however, the National Benefit Association was a proprietary
business. The liberal legislation authorizing fraternals to collect pre
miums or “ dues” and pay benefits enabled other organizations to
operate without regulation much in the manner of an insurance com
pany. This fact was quite evident to the actuaries who made the last
examination of the company. In regard to this they said:
The company was incorporated under, and by virtue of the
revised statutes of the United States, with a capital of
$2,000 and under the name of The National Benefit Associ
ation. Although chartered as an association for the pur
pose of providing certain benefits to members and their
dependents by means of dues or assessments collected from
such members, it has always been a proprietary institu
tion.5
Not only was The National Benefit Association a proprietary
business, but it approached a sole proprietorship. S. W. Rutherford
ran the business much in the manner of a sole owner. From its
beginning until long after it had become a legal reserve company The
National Benefit was a one-man organization. Even up until near the
collapse, Rutherford held an impregnable position in control of the
company. Rutherford’s position— since he had no great amount of
capital to invest at the beginning— was due to the almost total lack
of governmental supervision exercised over such associations and to
the docility and ignorance of the directors with whom he surrounded
himself.
As has been indicated, associations operating on an assessment
plan did not fall within the purview of state insurance departments.
Moreover, they did not make reports o f any consequence to any gov
ernmental authority. The membership had the final authority. To*
* ibid.
5 Fackler and Brieby, Report No. 2, Appendix B, p. 2.
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control the membership was to control the organization absolutely.
This was exceptionally easy in cases in which the membership was
composed of people unfamiliar with insurance and business generally.
One can see that such a situation lent itself easily to fraud and mis
management. However, in the control of a benevolent dictator such
associations often prospered. Miles M. Dawson, actuary for the
Hughes investigation committee, said in regard to assessment insur
ance: “ The subject of assessment life insurance represents the patho
logical side, if I may express it, of life insurance” .6
In the early days of the National Benefit Association it was prob
ably difficult to get a Negro board of directors conversant with the
subjects of underwriting, investment, and business management. The
early boards of directors were composed of domestics and wageearners who had neither experience nor knowledge of the business
and who had little understanding of what was going on. They had
implicit faith in the word of Rutherford and merely sanctioned his
acts. Indeed, virtually the same thing was said of the late boards of
directors after the association became The National Benefit Life
Insurance Co. According to Fackler and Brieby:
The incompetency, ignorance, carelessness, or culpability
of the several members of the Board is indicated by the
irregularities in the composition of the Board from time
to time, inconsistencies and inadequacies of recorded
actions, failure to require and record reports from the offi
cers on their many involved activities, as well as by their
sanctioning tacitly, if not directly, the improper and irreg
ular transactions which took place.7
When the organization was in its infancy, lack of understanding
of the principles of insurance was not confined to the board of direc
tors alone. Rutherford prided himself upon being a self-made man
and had little respect for formal training. The persons employed
were often not chosen on the basis of qualifications. The employees
were on a whole conscientious and hard workers, but with little un
derstanding of the business or of their function in it. The National
Benefit was never well departmentalized and never had an adequate
accounting system. It is questionable if Rutherford ever understood
the legal significance of insurance accounting.*
* Quoted by John H. Mager, Life Insurance, Business Publications, Inc., Chi
cago, 1939, p. 90. Miles M. Dawson was senior member o f the firm o f Miles M.
Dawson and Son, Consulting Actuaries, whose junior member was Alfred B.
Dawson, Actuary and financial advisor to the National Benefit Life Insurance
Company.
’ FacHer and Brieby, op. cit., Report No. 1, p. 31.
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The policies of management responsible for the growth of the
National Benefit Association were those such as the proprietor of a
small trading business might find advantageous. There were num
erous small economies coupled, doubtless, with certain shrewd prac
tices. Rigid economy was practiced in the payment of salaries and
wages and management expenses such as stationery and supplies,
office rent, actuarial and legal services. Moreover, in addition to the
economies effected the association most likely followed the practice
of such associations at that time of paying as few claims as legally
expedient. These policies of management together with the retention
of all earning within the association resulted in the accumulation of
a large surplus on the basis of which the stock was increased by
$95,000 in 1916-1918. As long as the business was of such a size that
all of its activities could be grasped by the limited capacity of one
man, Samuel W. Rutherford proved to be a competent manager. On
August 16, 1916, authority was obtained to increase the capital stock.
The capital was raised to $100,000. The additional capital, however,
was not fully paid until June 1,1918. Meanwhile, in 1917, by author
ity of a court order the name was changed to The National Benefit
Life Insurance Company.8
The reason for the increase in capital was to achieve the mini
mum legal paid-in capital requirement of $100,000 for insurance com
panies in the District of Columbia. The National Benefit accomp
lished the increase in the following manner. A stock dividend of
$40,000 was declared, $5,000 of stock was sold to old stockholders,
and $50,000 of stock was sold to the public.9 It is reported that at
this point water seeped into the stock of the National Benefit and
that it was not squeezed out before the next capital stock increase of
$150,000 in 1923.
The year of 1923 was the beginning of the period of expansion
of the National Benefit. On November 30, 1923, it absorbed the
Standard Benefit Society of Maryland.10 The charter of the National
Benefit, however, remained in effect. The only changes ever to be
made in the charter were as to name and authorized capital. The
beginning of the expansion period marked a change in the manage
ment policies of the National Benefit. This change in policy was
characterized by: (1) increasing the agency force, (2) entering new
territory, (3) entering the ordinary insurance field, and (4 ), reinsur
ing the business of other companies.
8This change in name was not ratified by the stockholders until January,
1924. The reported reason is that the legal sufficiency of the court order was
doubted and an act of Congress was thought necessary.
9Woodson, op. cit., “ Insurance Business Among Negroes” , p. 215.
“ Best’s Life Reports, 1930, p. 247, Alfred Best and Co., New York.
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Another change to be noted was that of the character of the
agents employed after the beginning of this. This change was to be
seen in the type of business solicited. An investigation of the ordi
nary business in the Shreveport District of Louisiana indicates some
of the problems with which the National Benefit had to contend. It
also gives some idea of the nature of the business in this district. The
failure of the company to act on the findings of the investigation
would indicate that the problems were not peculiar to the Shreveport
District.
The investigation covered the period from November 4, 1930, to
November 28, 1930, inclusive. The investigators worked from ten to
eighteen hours a day including Sundays. They covered an area con
taining 67 towns in which there were 15 county or parish seats. Fiftyseven of these towns were “ touched directly or indirectly” , said the
report. One hundred and fifty-three cases were reviewed. Discrep
ancies in age were found in over one hundred cases. Collusion be
tween agents, doctors, and managers was common. The report was
made directly to S. W. Rutherford. As the report covers 51 single
spaced typewritten pages only a few of the cases selected at random
can be presented here. In a letter to S. W. Rutherford, dated at
Greenwood, Miss., December 6, 1930, the investigators commented as
follows on the business of the ordinary department of the Shreveport
District: “ In keeping with your letter of October 23, 1930, we have
made a partial investigation of the ordinary business written in the
Shreveport half of the state of Louisiana and beg to submit a report
as follows” [cases quoted verbatim].11
Case I
Eugene Kensey, age 35, Policy No. 807946. Discrepancy of about 4
years in age. Was discharged from the World’s War on account of
having had “ bloody piles” of which he has been suffering ever since.
He is a barber by trade, and, on account of “ bloody piles” , he has not
been able to stand up and work all day Saturdays during 1930, and
is now planning to go to the Veterans’ Hospital for treatment. Any
one with common sense can look at him and tell he is sick. He was
written by J. McWashington. His policy was on the verge of lapsing.
If it has lapsed, stop the hole and chink it, so that it cannot be revived.
Case II
Lottie Smith, 815 Lawrence St., age 44. There is about 10 years dis
crepancy in her age. Policy No. 811320. Everybody calls her “ Mother
Smith” . Her sign on her cafe is : “ Mother Smith’s Home Cooking” .1
11Taken from report o f field investigation made in 1930 by a company
investigator.
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Written by J. McWashington. I tried to catch the discrepancy at
Ruston where she is supposed to have married, but the records failed
to reveal that she ever married. Whereas, her supposed to be husband
is one S. W. Smith.
Case III
Peter Ernest Porter, age 50. Application rejected. Peter Ernest
Porter is between 65 and 70 years old. He is teaching Agriculture
at the High School out from DeRidder, La., however, and is very
active. He is gray all over. A portion of his head is so slick and
shiny that it appears that a fly would slip down if he tried to walk on
it. The other portion that has hair on it, is all gray, the kind of gray
that looks like ram’s wool. His eyebrows are even gray. The hair
on his arms is gray. This case was written by Abney and Harris, and
perhaps, would have passed the examination, had it been submitted
to Dr. M. Haddox, or Dr. Leroy A. Jackson, or Dr. Prince 0. Wailes.
Notwithstanding the fact that the case was rejected, we have been
shooting at long range to determine Mr. Porter’s age, so as to estab
lish the intent of the agents who wrote it. We are still watching our
hooks which have been set in Nacodoches, Texas, with good bait, and
may land him yet, or ere this report is closed.
Case IV
Thomas Davis, Policy No. 1028737. Thomas Davis married, accord
ing to Book 1, Page 485, Desoto Parish, La., April 1st, 1870, or 60
years ago, which when added to 21 years, will make him 81 years old,
instead of 55 years old, a discrepancy of 26 years in age, and, also
making him 21 years beyond the insurable age. We did not get a
chance to see Thomas Davis, whereas, we went to his house, he was
supposed to have been out in the woods, but we could not hear the
sound of his ax. According to the record as cited above, Thomas
Davis married five years before he was born, taking into consideration
the allegations made by the agent, A. T. Creswell, who took the appli
cation. Thomas Davis was examined by Dr. Prince O. Wailes, of
Mansfield, La. We would like to know what Dr. Wailes said in his
confidential Medical Report.
Case V
Dr. Prince O. Wailes, Mansfield, La., is a sure-enough old man. He
appears to be between 70 and 90 years old, and is more than 75%
Caucasian. Were he to go to a strange town or city and walk thru
the streets, the children would think of him as the real “ Santa Claus” .
His face is covered with long gray hair, which has been gray so long
that it has turned yellowish-brownish and his beard drags his chest
and when he bows his head, his beard brushes his abdomen. Dr.

24

Wailes is old. He is too old to urinate off of his pants, which are
scorched in front with urine. Some pick for a Medical Examiner!
Case VI
Ellen Bush, May 6th, 1930— “ Rejected” . Local transcript reveals
the fact that Ellen Bush died October 25, 1930, exactly five months
from the date an attempt was made to dump her off on the Company.
Investigation was made simply to establish the agent’s intent in the
case. Dr. W. A. Anderson said that she died of “ Acute Nephritis”
and “ Acute Gastritis” . Ellen Bush’s nieces said that Ellen Bush had
been sick two years and that she had not been able to do any work of
any kind and character for more than a year, and that she stayed
about from one to the other down on their hands, and that they were
glad for “ God to take her out of her misery” . The writer said: “ Well,
she lived to a ripe old age, that shows she was a good woman” . One
of the women said, “ Yes, she was about 65 years old” . I supposed
the agent, J. M. Caradine, was influenced because Ellen Bush’s
brother, Reverend William Grimble, is a great gospel preacher, and
that he would probably reap the benefits at an early date, since he
was proposed as the beneficiary in the application. The two-story
house might have gotten him mesmerized, in which Rev. Grimble
lives, if he wrote the application there. Written by J. M. Caradine.
Case VII
Carrie Muldrow, June 28th, 1930, Policy No. 809980. We went to
DeRidder, La., to see Carrie Muldrow, but did not have an oppor
tunity to see her. However, we found out that her daughter was
teaching in the public school and went out to see said daughter, one
Mrs. Jessie Brown, who is a nice, neat looking chocolate, high brown
widow. Her husband, Mr. J. H. Brown, passed away several months
ago. Having been favorably impressed with the writer, Mrs. Brown
answered freely and favorably all questions which were propounded
to her relative to the history of her family, before she realized what
she was doing or saying, until the writer had gone down to see Prof.
P. E. Porter. She said, “ My mother’s maiden name was Carrie
Sloane. My father was named Ed. Richardson. They married at
New Smyrna, Florida. I am 35 years old. I had been married 12
years when my husband died. I would not mind marrying again if I
could get someone who looks like you. I have a sister older than I
am and she teaches at Minden, La. Her name is Olethra Jones and
she is the wife of Prof. Joseph Luther Jones, Principal of the City
School at Minden. Alethra is older than I am, but I married first,
etc. . . . ” She got scared, however, and while the writer was on
another part of the school ground, she ran out to the automobile and
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asked the driver several dozen questions and told him that the writer
must have had a rabbit’s foot to have made her act like she did and
talk as much as she talked. However, her information was correct,
as we found the following: [A copy of the marriage certificate was
included.]
It will be noted that, according to the Marriage Record “ 6” page 200,
Carrie Muldrow married the first time in Volusia County, Florida,
Sept. 5th, 1893, or 37 years ago, which when added to 21, will make
her 58 years old now, instead of 50, a discrepancy of 8 years in age.
Written by W. L. G. Abney.
Case VIII
Peter Ernest Porter, April 8th, 1930. “ Rejected” . Reference is
hereby made to page 5 of this report, last paragraph thereof [Case
III] relative to the above Peter E. Porter. This investigation was
pursued to Nacodoches, Texas, for completion with a view of arriving
at the intent and purpose of the agent, to determine whether or not
he is dependable, trustworthy and has the Company at heart and the
preservation thereof, or whether or not he is betraying his trust,
stabbing it in the back, cutting its throat, riding it with Texas Saddle,
U. S. Bits, switch and spur or whether or not he is killing the hen
which is laying the golden eggs. Investigation reveals the following:
,[Marriage certificate was included.]
From the above certificate, Peter E. Porter was married 40 years ago
the first time, which, when added to 21 will make him according to
said record 61 years old instead of the purported age of 50, which
■fvould have made a discrepancy of 10 years in his age and made him
1 year beyond the insurable age and a “ tomb-stone” on the Company,
had he fallen into the hands of Dr. Leroy A. Jackson, Dr. M. Haddox
or Dr. Prince O. Wailes. Written by W. L. G. Abney and Hardy D.
Harris.
Case IX
Tom Bailey, Policy No. 809054. It appears that Tom Bailey married
1909, which was 21 years ago and which, when added to 21 years,
will make him 42, instead of 26 years old, a discrepancy of 16 years
in his age. However, we are not satisfied that this is the correct
marriage certificate on Tom Bailey. Our investigation does not reveal
that he is that old, or not older than 31 or 32 years. The clerk of
Webster Parish in the meantime stated that this is the only Tom
Bailey on record and there is not another Tom Bailey around Minden
and that this must have been his first marriage and he must have
married his wife Parthenia in another parish. We had to leave requi
sition with deposit for the certified copies with the County Clerk, and
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when we returned to Minden, received them and checked them up
and attempted to make further investigations, we found that Mr.
Abney had trailed us, and the parties who had talked to us freely
before, refused to talk at all. We would suggest that this certificate
be placed with the original application and with a question mark,
pending further investigation. Written by W. L. G. Abney.
Case X
John Richard Toliver, Deceased, Policy No. 808597, Shreveport Dis
trict (Pineville, La.). Investigation revealed that John Richard Tol
iver was a teacher and was principal of the Public School at Chaney
ville, La. He was a specie of the “ Night Hawk” element and “ Jellj
Bean” type, attended parties, dances, etc., and kept the night candle
burning all night at times; but that he was not ill before his last sick
ness until death. He taught school one day, came home in the eve
ning, went out to a party that same night, stayed out until the roos
ters had ceased to crow for midnight, started home with some more
young men, took a chill on his way home, went to bed and did not
get up any more. He had not been treated by a doctor prior to his
last illness and never missed a day from his school before. However,
he did not conserve his health and energy and the loss of sleep had
underminded the fabric and foundation of his health and he appeared
healthy and strong, but was a walking shadow, without physical
strength and energy to fight off or combat pneumonia, to which he
fell a victim. Investigation further revealed that no one had died in
the family of any contagious disease like tuberculosis, etc., and that
no doctor had visited him nor any one else in the family to have
aroused any suspicion and no one even knew of John R. Toliver’s ever
having had a doctor to treat him this year nor last and no one had
even seen him drooping around, nor laying off from work— they oni'y
knew that he was a lover of and engaged in “ night follies” . It ap
peared that he took deathly sick, apparently without warning before
having started home that night, and that he was at death’s door before
the neighbors knew that he was sick. In a case like the John R. Toli
ver case, even if it is not tubercular, it appears that if a person has
lost a lot of sleep, or is undernourished, or is just a bloater or shell
going along doing light work every day, if a doctor was any count at
all, it should crop out in the examination— the heart would murmur,
the pulse would be accelerated, or intermitting temperature would
exist and the blood pressure would be low. Inasmuch as there was
no history of tuberculosis having existed in the family and John R.
Toliver had never been on the sick list, since the doctor—William A.
Anderson— plastered and then put up a good white-washed job on the
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case, left it and covered up his tracks completely, there is nothing left
for the company to do but pay the claim.
Case XI
Cornelius C. Cook, Deceased, Policy No. 81258-C. This case was
written, or the application taken by Mr. W. L. G. Abney October 27,
1925. Investigation revealed that Cornelius C. Cook was sick before
the application was written. The disease or trouble of which he died
antedated the issuance of said policy. He had an attack of appendi
citis and the attending physician advised him to go to the hospital
and take an operation, but he refused to go, having decided to die
with everything in him with which he was born. Having stubbornly
made up his mind not to go under the knife, ice bags— the freezing
process— and olive oil were recommended as the only panaceas which
would mitigate and prolong his life, but that he was positively warned
that “ some day, those remedies would fail, his appendix would rup
ture and he would surely die” . This information, or news spread over
not only Shreveport, but over several Parishes adjacent to Caddo
Parish, due to Cook’s prominence in the undertaking world. Before
the date of issuance of the above numbered policy and up to the time
of Cook’s death, when attacks were eminent, hundreds of pounds of
ice and gallons of olive oil were used, until, as was predicted by the
attending physician, said remedies failed and Cook’s appendix bursted. I presume that we will have to give Dr. William Wallace a little
credit for trembling in his boots as his conscience must have lashed
him, because I note where Dr. C- C. Carter, Jr., Medical Director, had
to feed him with a long handled spoon and coax him along to com
plete the examination as follows: [See Appendix B for correspondence
in connection with this case.] “ Castilla Cook, Cornelius C. Cook’s
nephew gave me the information of or as to Cornelius Cook’s illness,
the duration thereof, the treatment, ice bags, etc., and, when he found
out that I represented the company, he got angry with me and
would not speak to me any more . . . ” They got him thru notwith
standing the fact that he had appendicitis before he considered taking
the insurance, and the fact was known throughout the county. After
having received the jacket, and noted the date of the policy, we did
not go to any expenses, nor lose any more time on the case.
Case X II
John McCrory, Deceased, Bastrop, La. Investigation revealed that
John McCrory died March 6, 1930, and was buried March 7, 1930,
and that Hardy D. Harris was in Bastrop at the time and attended
the funeral. Hardy D. Harris made a big speech, after having eulo
gized on the funeral occasion, in an effort to boost the business. On
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March 8th, Hardy D. Harris collected a semi-annual premium, somt
twenty or more dollars. After the death papers had been signed and
submitted, a check for $1,000.00 came down and was given to Hardy
D. Harris by W. L. G. Abney to be delivered. Hardy D. Harris car
ried the check out to James McCrory, beneficiary’s home, got the said
McCrory to endorse the said check, after which Hardy D. Harris gave
James McCrory $500.00, explaining that the Claims Adjuster from
the Home Office had been down and investigated the claim and found
out the disease of which John McCrory died antedated the issuance
of the policy and that he, James McCrory, was only entitled to a
refund of premiums, but that the Home Office was paying him $500.00
as a compromise. The matter was taken up with the Home Office.
Then, W. L. G. Abney went out to see James McCrory and told him
that the reason the Company did not pay but the $500.00, was that
the disease of which John McCrory died antedated the issuance of the
policy and that he, James McCrory, was entitled to a refund of pre
miums but the $500.00 was paid as compromise upon the advice and
requisition of the Claims Adjuster. James McCrory wanted to know
why was it, that if he was only entitled to $500.00, the Company or
Home Office would send down a check for $1,000.00 for him to en
dorse. McCrory said that he had Abney to understand “ that a dead
cat was on the line” . Abney then told him that if the Company sent
down a check for $1,000.00, he was entitled to $1,000.00 and that he
would take the matter up with the Company or Home Office, and, if
that was true, he would see to it that McCrory got the other $500.00.
The last $500.00 was paid some time in July, by Hardy D. Harris in
cash. Investigation further revealed that John McCrory was a car
penter by trade, but that his health had not permitted him to pick up
his square, hammer, and saw in more than a year prior to his death.
Aside from having been a carpenter, using that as a side line, his
principal occupation was a professional gambler. He operated mostly
between Monroe, Bastrop and Sterlington, except when the gamblers’
convention was called, when the most skillful and high-handed gam
blers served as delegates, having gone to Shreveport, Alexandria,
Baton Rouge, New Orleans, Pine Bluff, and Little Rock, Arkansas
and to points in Texas, when and where the best skill and talent in
the profession were exhibited in poker, coonkant, etc. . . . James
McCrory stated that he had tried for many years to get John McCrory
to take some insurance, because he had expected him to get killed at
the gambling table at any time, as John was very notorious and a
great winner. He let it slip out that John was sick in the fall of 1929,
had no place to stay, as the woman with whom he had been staying
put him out at Monroe and the other one at Bastrop would not take
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him in sick and he had to come over in the country and stay with
him— James. It was generally known throughout that section of
—Louisiana that John McCrory was a high-handed gambler, even as far
as New Orleans, Arkansas, and Texas.
Case XIII
Josephine Epps, Deceased, Policy No. 1029475-C. As to Josephine
Epps, W. L. G. Abney wrote Mrs. E. E. Christopher as follow s:
Shreveport, La.
November 15th, 1930

-

Mrs. C. E. Christopher
Claims Department,
National Benefit Life Insurance Co.
Washington, D. C.
Dear Madam:
We are enclosing herewith, death proof papers in connection
with claim for Mrs. Josephine Epps. As you will note, this claim
comes up during the first year of the policy and for this reason we
decided to check up very carefully before making recommendation
with reference to paying this claim.
We were pleased to have had Mr. Ralph Harper, Assistant
Agency Director, with us at this time. On a very careful checkup,
we find Mrs. Epps to have been a perfect risk, no previous record of
any previous illness and apparently in perfect health. We found
upon investigation that she died from a very acute attack of indi
gestion or gas, which of course, affected the heart. I have been
there and stayed there for two or three days and I am sure that the
facts given in the case are correct. If there is any other information
you would like, I would ask that you take the matter up with Mr.
Harper, who happened to be in the office and accompanied me on my
trip of inspection.
Very truly yours,
W. L. G. A bney,
Ordinary Department, R.
W LGA:R
Shreveport, La.
November 18, 1930
Mrs. C. E. Christopher
Claims Department
Washington, D. C.
Dear Mrs. Christopher:
I thought it necessary to write you again in connection with the
recent claim for Josephine Epps which probably reached your office
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a few days ago. The letter which accompanied this claim was dic
tated by me, but not signed. Consequently, I did not have the oppor
tunity to read it before it was mailed. It does not carry one import
ant fact which I wanted the Claims Department to know, and I am
herein reporting this situation.
Although Mrs. Epps was reputed to be a married woman, we
found on investigation that she was never legally married, but had
been the common law wife of a prominent white man of that section
who had lived in the home with her and reared a family and had
always her and her children as his own.
Of course, I knew nothing of this condition until the death arose
and it became my duty to investigate every phase of her life. We do
not approve of accepting a risk of this kind and have severely repri
manded our agent, Mr. Crowell, for having accepted the application
and submitting it without bringing this fact out clearly. However,
since it is an established fact that from every other angle, she was an
apparently pretty good risk, I don’t know what effect this might have
on the settlement of the claim. However, I felt that the Claims
Department should have this angle and we are glad to send it along.
I might add that with reference to our agent, Mr. Crowell, it
was among our plans to discontinue his services at the end of the year
anyway and of course, this will naturally mean that his termination
will be asked immediately.
Very truly yours,
W. L. G. A bney, Mgr., P.
Ordinary Dept.
WLGA :P
Investigation revealed that Josephine Epps lived and died back of
the woods in a field between twelve and fifteen miles from Benson, La.
We tried to go out there in a Chevrolet coach and erosion had cut the
roads so deep in the old wagon tracks that the axles dragged on the
ground, as well as the battery, we could not go any further and had
to abandon the trip, as far as going out to where she died. Having
had information that Josephine Epps had never been married and
that her father was na^ned Tobe Epps and that Josephine Epps was
her maiden name and that she had not been dead very long, we went
out to the graveyard in an effort to establish her age from the head
board, if it had been thereon, but we could not find a single grave
with her epitaph, nor her name and age on it . . . Josephine
Epps was a white man’s woman and had been all of her life, or since
she was in her teens. She has a half-white son about twenty years
old and we understand that she has four or five more children, all
half-white. Mr. Abney said that she “ was the common law wife of a
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prominent white man” but our information was that he was a “ red
neck” of the lowest type and did not even class with nor go with the
white folks. However, he guarded Josephine Epps and did not allow
her to associate with the colored people. The people in that neigh
borhood call the man with whom Josephine Epps stayed, or lived, Tom
Morris. However, Mr. T. J. Williams, a colored man who lives at
Benson said that he worked for him two years and his correct name
is Tom Marsh. Tom Marsh, or Tom Morris, died several years ago.
Mr. Abney said in paragraph two, “ I have been there and stayed
there for two or three days, and I am sure that the facts given in the
case are correct” . We are of the opinion that he did not go out there
and stay a minute while Tom Marsh was living, because we under
stand that he did not allow Josephine Epps to hardly look at a col
ored man. While he had to stay one or two nights, we are wondering
why it was he did not see those half-white children and find out some
thing about them. If he went out there in any part o f the year of
1930, we are at a loss to know why he could not tell when it was gen
erally known throughout that country that it was an established fact
that Josephine Epps had tuberculosis. It might have been possible
for her to have muffled her coughs for a short while, but she could not
have muffled them two or three days. Tom Marsh had a case of this
old-fashioned “ consumption” and said information was known
throughout the entire Parish. It lasted nearly three years, and it is
generally known in that community that for at least two years he
lived on soda crackers, raw eggs, and sweetmilk and that he ate noth
ing else. It is known throughout the county that Josephine Epps
was pregnant with a tubercular child when Tom Marsh died and that
the child never did fully develop so as to be born alive, but was mis
carried and it was said at the time that she had tuberculosis of the
womb. Mr. T. J. Williams of Benson, La., said that Josephine Epps
had told him many a time since Tom Marsh died and since her last
miscarriage in 1928, “ Mr. Williams, I am sick— in bad shape— giving
down” , in contrast to her previous and former high-headed manner
and disposition, when well and her man was living . . .
In addition to the difficulties illustrated by the cases above, with
which the National Benefit had to contend, other weaknesses in its
policy of expansion made further drains upon its resources. The ex
pense connected with developing a new territory is a large and heavy
drain upon the resources of a comparatively small company. There
are the expenses of establishing new branch offices, increasing the
salaried field force, together with increased expenses at the home
office. Further, new districts must be supported for a long time be
cause o f the small amount of business written in the early years. In
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regal’d to the policy of expansion of the National Benefit, M. S. Stuart,
a Negro insurance executive of considerable experience, stated:
In 1923 the officers were induced to sponsor an authoriza
tion to increase the capital stock of the company to $250,000 so that nine or ten new states might simultaneously
be entered, and, incidentally, to provide a big office for a
southern supervisor, and numerous lavish sub-offices in
the several states. Pause here to ask yourself what com
pany among us— indeed, except the largest of the white
companies, what company in America— could survive the
expense of developing to a point of profit, this vast ter
ritory at one and the same time. Except in the case of the
great white companies, heavily capitalized and just start
ing business, there is no record of any company ever qual
ifying for business in so many states at the same time . . .
So much of the policyholders’ money was invested in an
effort to buy business in this vast territory that anyone
with common sense would have known that there wasn’t
a chance to make a profit of it back into the company in
time to save it from ruin. It takes years even with cau
tious procedure to get money back from new states . . . In
an effort to sell this large issue of stock, in order to enter
these states, loans were made which were ridiculously
under-secured. Prospective stock buyers were granted
loans far in excess of the value of their real esatte holdings
to induce them to buy stock.12
As the business went into large scale operations, S. W. Ruther
ford gradually relinquished his dictatorial position. The influence
upon management policies of R. H. Rutherford, the son of S. W. Ruth
erford, and Mortimer F. Smith began to be felt after this time.
The West Virginia District
The manner in which the program of expansion was carried out
is best to be seen in the organization and operation of the so-called
West Virginia District. This district covered a section of the south
ern West Virginia coal area with a Negro population of 6,500. It was
composed of Portsmouth, Ohio; Huntington, Wevaco, Cabin Creek,
Logan, St. Albans, Montgomery, Ganley Bridge, Peach Creek and
other small mining towns. The branch office site was a four-room
suite on the second floor in Jacob Street, Charleston, W. Va., in a res12M. S. Stuart, “ Investment Lessons to Be Learned from Mistakes of Com
panies That Have Failed” , 14th Annua! Session N. N. I. A., Richmond, July
1934, p. 6.
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idential section. It was leased at $50 a month for two years. The
investigator strongly recommended the removal of the office to the
business section stating that “ business must be where business is in
spite of the often repeated Home Office dogma that the office site
makes no difference.” The personnel consisted of a manager, a sec
retary-cashier, and six agents.
The expenses of the branch office were as follows: manager’s
salary, $110, increasing monthly for six months, and secretary-cash
ier’s salary, $60; general expenses, averaging $94.75 a month, con
sisted of rent, $50, janitorial services, $10, telephone, $6.75, and
postage and incidentals, $28. Because of the wide territory over
which collections had to be made, Portsmouth 98 miles away and
Charleston, 70 miles away, agents were allowed traveling expenses
amounting to $29.36 a month. Such were the expenses paid by the
company to maintain and, of course, to increase, if possible, $302,064
of insurance in force on its books in 1931.
The $302,064 of insurance in force represented $237,064 of in
dustrial insurance and $65,000 of ordinary insurance. On the health
insurance in force, for the first six months of 1931, $626.50 were paid
in claims. The health collections amounted to $1,555.12 and com
missions $310.02, leaving a balance of $618.60 after deducting claims.
For the same period industrial collections amounted to $6,068.28
and ordinary collections $1,485.67, making a total of $7,553.95. Dur
ing this time the industrial debit decreased from $232.76 to $217.34.
The paid claims were $551.00; claims pending, $1,415.00.
It is evident on the above showing that the West Virginia dis
trict was a loss to the company. In the first place, a district in which
the total number of possible prospects is only 6,500 can hardly sup
port a branch office. And it is a foolish optimism indeed that leads
one to assume that one insurance company can write 50% of the total
possible prospects. In this case even if such had been done only 3,700
persons would have become policyholders. When one considers the
high lapse rate of industrial business one is extremely doubtful that
this number of policyholders could have supported a branch office.
The total collections of this district for six months amounted to
$7,553.95. Deducting from this branch office expense of $1,764.66,
health claims paid of $625.50, death claims of $451.00 and pending
claims of $1,415.00, a balance of $3,196.79 is left. Out of this the
company had to pay state taxes, agents’ commissions, a part of home
office salaries and expenses and establish reserves. This was simply
impossible. The office was a loss though the industrial collections
amounted to over 96% of the debit of $6,310.04 charged to the district
on industrial policies.
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The Standard Life Transaction
Another manifestation of the policy of expansion was the re
insuring of the business of other companies. The absorption of the
Standard Benefit Society of Maryland was the first venture of the
National Benefit along this line. The society was a small one and
because of the scarcity of comment and data upon the transaction, the
absorption was evidently of little consequence. However, the con
trary is true concerning the reinsuring of the Standard Life business.
A knowledge of the history of this company is necessary properly to
evaluate the action of the National Benefit in reinsuring its business.
The Standard Life Insurance Co. of Atlanta, Ga., was incorpor
ated under the laws of Georgia, June 24, 1911, and business began
two years later. Like the National Benefit it was to be a company
controlled by colored interests for the insuring of colored people. Its
difficulties began early and continued throughout its existence. As in
the case of the National Benefit, the Standard Life was built upon an
insecure economic foundation and was involved in a perpetual but
futile struggle to avoid failure. The Standard Life falls in the cate
gory of small companies described by Dr. Donald H. Davenport,
special economic consultant to the insurance section of the Securities
and Exchange Commission. “ The companies that have failed, the
small companies,” he stated, “ were companies that were young com
panies and were not companies that were organized and doing busi
ness where the great bulk of life insurance is done.” 13 Moreover,
failure could not have been forestalled as long as it was or incorpora
tion could not have been accomplished if it had been domiciled in New
York, New Jersey, or any of the New England states. Testimony at
the monopoly hearings implied that in these states, where the largest
proportion of insurance companies are incorporated, the laws are
better calculated to protect the interest of the policyholders.14
The insolvent condition of the Standard Life is reputed to have
been of long standing. A Negro life insurance man of long experience
stated:
I have long entertained the idea that the worm of insolv
ency got in at the placing of the organization stock. At
least, I have had the word of one of the early actuaries of
the Standard that, at one of the first, probably the first,
State Examinations, a deficit of about $60,000 was shown,
13Testimony before the Temporary National Economic Committee from “ Ver
batim Record of the Proceedings of the Temporary National Economic Com
mittee” , Vol. 2, p. 13. Bureau of National Aifairs, Inc., 1939, Washington, D. C.
u ibid., p. 13. These hearings also revealed that companies domiciled in
New York, New Jersey, and the New England states controlled 74.1% of the
total assets of all legal reserve companies in the United States.
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and that this was made up by placing on the field non
participating in the place of participating policies issued
up to that time; and that, had appraisals been made and
titles investigated on the First Mortgage Real Estate
Loans, the deficit would have been even larger.1
16
5
In 1922, just prior to the time when the difficulties of the com
pany came to public notice the statement of the Standard Life showed
assets totalling $2,042,439.18. Of this amount $936,268.85, or ap
proximately 40%, was in Mortgage loans on Real Estate; $305,172.35,
or approximately 17%, was reported as being in cash; interest and
rents due or accrued of $65,371.55; due and deferred premiums of
$236,977.71; policy loans of $274,377.55; and collateral loans of $21,488.29. There were reported bonds of only $299,664.49, or 14%.
The large holdings in mortgages and cash, the value of both of which
was open to question, were a direct result of the company’s affiliation
with its subsidiaries. The subsidiaries of the company were the
Service Company, the Service Realty Company, Citizens Trust Com
pany, Service Engineering and Construction Company, Service Print
ing Company and Service Pharmacies, Incorporated. The company
iad made large deposits in the Citizens Trust Company which it dared
not draw upon. The reason for this is explained below. The com
pany had also invested heavily in financing the operations of the
Service Realty Company. The liabilities of the company including a
reserve of $1,646,310.64 were $1,837,992.17. The capital stock was
$125,000 and surplus $79,447.51. There was $28,881,575 of insurance
in force at the close of 1922.16
According to the statement of December 31,1923, mortgage loans
amounted to $840,845.43; cash, $880,977.83; and bonds, only $215,043.02. Over $700,000 of cash was deposited in the Citizens Trust
Company, the subsidiary. The $700,000 in cash “had been largely
loaned by the bank to the Service Realty Company [another subsid
iary] which had invested the money in real estate being largely
vacant property in the part of Atlanta where colored people are liv
ing. This property was encumbered for part of the purchase price
amounting to $160,000 at that time. This real estate was also encum
bered in favor of the Donald Holding Company and Katz and Levy
to the extent of $105,000. . . It is true that the Citizens Trust Com
pany about this time, that is to say, during 1923, having loaned its
money out to said subsidiary companies was short of cash to meet its
15M. S. Stuart, op. cit., p. 4.
“ Affidavit of J. B. Blayton filed in the suit of Charles H. Brown, et al vs.
Standard Life Insurance Company of Arkansas, No. 68732, Fulton Superior
Court, Fulton County, Georgia.
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clearings. This created a serious condition which called for financial
assistance. . . Having funds ready to pay the bank clearings was a
very serious matter, for, unless the clearings were promptly met, the
bank would have immediately been closed. The existence of the bank
depended upon meeting the clearings.” 17 Thus, it behooved the insur
ance company which was in dire straits itself to keep the bank open
in order to show on its statement a doubtful and completely frozen
asset of $700,000. Just prior to this time the stock had been increased
from $125,000 to $250,000. This new issue was financed in the fol
lowing way. “ The Service Company agreed to underwrite, or take,
the whole issue of 1,250 shares of par value $100 each at the sum of
$335,000 and to undertake to sell out the stock to individual pur
chasers at a price of $300 per share, thus giving the Service Company
a profit or commission of $40,000. The Service Company gave its
check on the Citizens Trust Company to the order of Standard Life
Insurance Company, and deposited with the said bank a stock cer
tificate for 965 shares (285 shares having already been disposed of as
explained hereafter). On receipt of said stock attached as collateral
to the note of the Service Company of $335,000 with personal endorse
ment of its officers, the check of the Service Company was deposited
to the credit of the Standard Life Insurance Company of Georgia. Of
the 285 shares above mentioned, 265 shares had been issued pre
viously to the Service and by that company placed with S. A. Lynch
as part of security given for a loan of $80,000, net, for which the
Service Company gave a note of $107,500.00. The other security for
said loan was equity in the Wesley Memorial property. Twenty
shares of this stock had been sold to various individuals.” 18 The
result of this was that the bank loaned another subsidiary money to
buy Standard Life stock on security of the same stock and credited
the account of the Standard Life for the purchase price of the stock.
The Standard Life could not draw on its account for fear of closing
the bank and the bank could not collect on the note of the Service
Company until the stock had been sold. The whole affair was a paper
transaction, made possible by interlocking directorates, which served
only to inflate the fictitious assets of the Standard Life.
In 1923, the real and practical control of the company “ which so
far had been administered by .colored interest, passed to white interest
by virtue of mortgages and/or other liens against the voting stock
and/or assets of the said Standard . . . ” 19 The change in control was
17ibid.
18ibid.
18ibid., Decree, Exhibit A. “ Contract of Reinsurance Between Standard Life
and National Benefit” , p. 7.
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lescribed in the affidavit of J. B. Blayton, auditor for the Standard
!nfe and its several subsidiaries. Mr. Blayton stated:
At the time I came to the Standard Life Insurance Com
pany, August 1, 1922, Heman E. Perry was president, J.
A. Robinson was Secretary, T. J. Ferguson, Cashier and
Acting Treasurer. These were the active officers and the
company was dominated almost exclusively by Heman E.
Perry.
sj«
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The officers of the Standard Life Insurance Company, part
o f whom were named above, were also officers of the Citi
zens Trust Company, the Service Company and other com
panies mentioned, that is to say, the directors in one, were
directors in the others, the executive heads, however, being
different.
ij:

s|s

ijs

During the latter part of 1928, there was complaint as to
handling of funds of the Standard Life Insurance Com
pany by General Wright, Insurance Commissioner of
Georgia. As a result he had a careful investigation made
by Haight and Haight, actuaries and accountants, who
made their report to the commissioner.20
The control of the Standard Life passed into the hands of two execu
tive managers, Silas W. Davis and Arthur G. Powell, both white. The
manner in which the executive managers gained control is shrouded
in mystery. Mr. Blayton said in his affidavit:
____ Lhave examined the minutes of the Standard Life Insur
ance Company kept during said period, which include the
minutes of the stockholders’ meeting and the minutes of
all directors’ meetings, and no resolution has been passed
or otherwise shown by such minutes whereby the right to
act as executive managers was ever taken. There is an
absence of any record on the subject.21
He further stated that the executive managers
. . . countersigned or initialed all checks and all money
20ibid.
21ibid.
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was spent under their supervision or direction. They never
were at the office of the company, and they took no part
in the management, nor concerned themselves as to the
handling of any of the business. During this time each of
the executive managers were paid the sum of $500.00 per
month by the Standard Life Insurance Company of
Georgia. They also were named as executive managers
of the following named companies: Service Company,
Service Realty Company, Citizens Trust Company, Citi
zens Company, Service Engineering and Construction
Company, Service Printing Company and Service Pharm
acies, Inc. During this time, the business of the Standard
Life Insurance Company was conducted by the same em
ployees, that is, by the same clerks, bookkeepers, auditors,
solicitors, and the force generally which was composed of
colored people. The executive managers did nothing ex
cept sign all checks, as already explained, and they did this
through agents, those acting in the capacity being Joseph
Calus and M. A. Cason. They did not change the policy of
the company or give any constructive suggestion except
they cut down the salaries of some of the employees and
discouraged the solicitors from writing new business.22
The executive managers appear to be responsible for the second
shift in the control of the company. It has already been stated how
important it was to the insurance company to keep the bank open.
The bank was in such a condition that it could not obtain money at
anything approaching the usual rates. Accordingly, if any money
was to be raised, it was to be raised only at unusually high rates and
from persons who specialized in placing “ pawn-broker’s loans.” Dur
ing this period Silas W. Davis negotiated a contract between himself,
the Southern Trust Company, the Service Realty Company and the
Citizens Trust Company, which was for the ostensible purpose of
raising funds for the bank.
Executive manager, Silas W. Davis, offered to remedy this
condition [of the bank] and furnish the financial assist
ance necessary and required. As a result, a contract
whereby the Southern Trust Company was to loan $125,000 to the Service Realty Company, was entered into,
dated July 24, 1924. This contract was entered into dur
ing the period when the executive managers were in con-25ibid.
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trol of all the companies named in the contract outside of
the Southeastern Trust Company. . . In said contract of
July 24, 1924, in paragraph 4, it was provided that the
Citizens Trust Company should release 1,251 shares of
stock in the Standard Life Insurance Company to the
Southeastern Trust Company, which stock was released
by the Citizens Trust Company. . . The 1,251 shares con
stituted a majority of one share of all the stock of the
Standard Life Insurance Company. The Citizens Trust
Company, as a bank, had put up with it, as collateral, to
secure loans made to various colored business men, stock
aggregating about 900 shares. This stock had merely been
Teft with the bank without endorsement in most cases.
The stock had been pledged to the bank, and the bank had
never foreclosed under the pledge and the bank never ob
tained title to the stock by any process. Some 265 shares
had been placed up as collateral with a loan with S. A.
Lynch, and about eighty-six shares with other parties. The
Southeastern Trust Company in some way got hold of this
stock which was added to the amount they got from the
Citizens Trust Company and thereby made 1,251 shares
. . . Pursuant to the verbal agreement that the Southeast
ern Trust Company should furnish funds to the Citizens
Trust Company in order to meet its clearings, from day to
day, and pursuant to the written agreement dated July 24,
1924, referred to, the Southeastern Trust Company . . . nor
anyone else for them, loaned any money whatever to the
Citizens Trust Company except comparatively small
amounts, ranging from two to five thousand dollars at a
time in order to meet the bank clearings, which sums were
repaid from day to day. This money was advanced by the
executive managers out of funds belonging to the Standard
Life Insurance Company. Due to my position as auditor
for all of the companies, as outlined herein, I was in a
position to know and do know that the Southeastern Trust
Company did not lend any money to them. . . In December,
1923, the Service Company and the Service Realty Com
pany borrowed from the Southeastern Trust Company
$20,000 for a period of five days, at the end of which time
they paid back the sum of $25,000.23
The stockholders meeting at which the second change in control
ibid.
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of the Standard Life took place was described as follows:
The meeting was held about 2 o’clock p.m. on January 15,
1925, at the office of the Company, 200 Auburn Avenue,
Atlanta, Ga. I was a stockholder and was present at the
meeting and knew what took place. Heman E. Perry
called the meeting to order. A committee on proxies was
appointed. This committee reported that there was a
majority of the stock represented by proxies or present in
person. William Matthews of the law firm of Little, Pow
ell, Smith, and Goldstein was present and announced that
he had 1,251 shares by proxy, which were the shares which
had been acquired by the Southeastern Trust Company.
Heman E. Perry announced that an offer to ‘merge’ the
Standard Life Insurance Company with the Southern In
surance Company under the name of the Southern-Stand
ard Life Insurance Co. was to be considered and voted
upon. No news of this proposal had been given to the
employees or stockholders generally, except the morning
before the meeting there was some rumor to this effect
which caused considerable excitement. There was some
discussion in the meeting by various stockholders present.
One remarked that Mr. Matthews sat over there with 1,251
shares and that there was no use to have further discus
sion. About this time, Will G. Harris appeared and made
a speech and stated, ‘you boys might as well line up with
this proposition, we want your cooperation, but if you do
not line up, we will go on without you.’ A vote was taken,
but very few, outside of Mr. Matthews, voted. . . It should
be stated that Mr. Harris made the proposition that stock
holders of the Standard Life Insurance Company would
exchange one share of their stock for four shares in the'
Southern Insurance Company, the par value of the South
ern Insurance Company stock being $5.50 per share. . .
He also represented that the stockholders of the Standard
Life Insurance Company would immediately receive a div
idend of $2.00 per share on the stock in the Southern In
surance Company, the result being that the stockholders of
the Standard Life received four shares and $8.00 in cash
for each share in the exchange of their stock. Mr. Harris
also stated in the meeting that this company, the Southern
Insurance Company, then had a surplus of over $200,000
and that the stock was selling for $20.00 per share. . . Two
of the officers of the Standard Life Insurance Company
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resigned at the meeting. One was David J. Jones, secre
tary, and the other John R. Pinkett, director of agencies.24
In spite of the illegal implications in this transaction, the contract
of reinsurance was approved by the insurance departments of Georgia
and Tennessee, home states of the companies concerned.
The Southern Insurance Company had not had the business of
the Standard Life a year when it consummated plans for the reinsur
ing of the business in the Standard Life Insurance Company of
Arkansas. This contract of reinsurance went into effect December
28, 1925. At this time, according to Mr. Blayton’s affidavit, the busi
ness had assets of $1,729,067 to meet a reserve of $3,200,000. This
left a deficit in the reserve of $1,470,933 exclusive of capital stock.
Moreover, the reserve requirements were increasing at the rate of
approximately $400,000 a year. “ These figures represent the con
dition of the company at the end of 1925, and do not include losses
during the year 1926, which would not be less than $150,000. These
losses come about by increases on the reserve which arises as policies
become older, and from lack of receiving normal interest from the
investments, most of the capital being invested in non-income pro
ducing assets.” 25
The control of the Standard Life changed at least four times.
From June 24, 1911 to 1923, the company was controlled by Negroes,
Heman Perry, etc., as the Standard Life of Georgia. From June,
1923, to January 15, 1925, the control vested in white executive man
agers, Silas W. Davis and Arthur G. Powell. From January 15, 1925,
to December 28, 1925, the Standard was controlled by the white
Southern Insurance Company, which transferred the business to the
Standard Life of Arkansas (A Negro company). Control rested here
from December 28, 1925 to 1927. In 1927 the National Benefit Life
Insurance Company took over what was left of the Standard Life’s
business. It is reasonable to assume that the officers of the National
Benefit knew the history of the Standard Life much of which was a
matter of public record. Although the ostensible purpose of the an
nexation of the Standard Life was to increase the volume and invest
ment fund of the National Benefit, there can be little doubt that other
motives were also responsible for the transaction. This idea is
strengthened by the fact that the National Benefit was already writ
ing too much business for its surplus and that traces of financial dif
ficulties and insolvency were becoming more evident and acute. In
the report of an examination by Frank M. Speakman, actuary, repre24ibid.
a ibid.
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senting the District of Columbia, Alabama, Kentucky, Oklahoma, and
Missouri insurance departments the following statement was made:
“ This insolvent condition of the company on December 31, 1926, was
caused principally by their writing too much business for their sur
plus. In the company’s annual statement for the year 1926, to the
insurance departments, the market value of real estate owned was
increased arbitrarily and various liabilities not included.” 26 This
statement was deleted from the filed and approved report with the
knowledge of, at least, some of the insurance commissioners. One is
led to believe that there was some basis to the allegation that the
officers of the National Benefit hoped to use the Standard Life merger
to camouflage the true condition of the National Benefit. It was
stated that “ in 1918, the National Benefit would not have considered
taking over the Standard Life or any other business in such condition
as it was. It only went into taking it over in 1927, because it had
gotten into deep water via the stock and real estate deals and the
new territory entered, all having their inception in 1923. Why did
the National Benefit accept from the Standard Life of Arkansas real
estate at a book value of $1,865,530 without appraisal then, why did
the same property appraise for more than a million dollars under
book value just a few months later. Evidently, somebody was eager
to consummate the deal, perhaps to throw more mud into waters
already muddy.” 27
The business of the Standard Life had been refused by several
white companies, and it was a well-known fact in insurance circles
that the Standard Life had been “ milked” on the three successive oc
casions when control had been shifted. The futile attempt to secure
financial aid through Dr. R. R. Moton, former president of the Nation
al Negro Business League, suggests the degree of the company’s des
peration at this time. This attempt was described in the Negro
weekly, The Afro-American, on May 7, 1932. In an article captioned,
“ Philanthropists’ $550,00 Couldn’t Save Standard Life,” this paper
reported: “ The truth about the offer of a loan of $550,000 from Julius
Rosenwald and John D. Rockefeller, Jr., to the Standard Life Insur
ance Company of Atlanta, Ga., when it was in difficulty five or six
years ago, was told for the first time today by Dr. R. R. Moton, prin
cipal of Tuskegee Institute, at a recent Rosenwald memorial meeting
here. . . According to Dr. Moton, the Standard Life made appeals in
all directions for help, but finally a committee came to him to see if
he could interest Mr. Rockefeller or Mr. Rosenwald in the situation.
. . ‘The company wanted $200,00 to tide them over,’ he said . . . ‘they
88Fackler and Brieby, op. cit., Supplemental Report No. 2.
27M. S. Stuart, op. cit., p. 10.
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were in the hands of lenders who had advanced them $200,000 and
insisted upon foreclosing and taking something like three million dol
lars of good assets to satisfy their claims. I was presiding at the
National Negro Business League in Chicago at the time— the twentyfifth anniversary of the league. I asked the vice president to take the
chair. I called Mr. Rosenwald over the phone and made an appoint
ment. Jumping into a taxicab, I went over to see him— a long dis
tance— and told him the story. But I didn’t ask for $200,000; I want
ed to be on the safe side. I told him we needed $400,000. Colored
people in business don’t always tell all the truth. I thought it better
to put up $400,000 and be safe than try $200,000 and lose it. I told
Mr. Rosenwald just that. He thought it over a minute and then said,
‘I think I could get the money for you. Would you handle it yourself
at Tuskegee?’ ‘No, sir,’ I said. He asked m e ,‘How would you handle
it?’ I said, I would handle it through New York, through the Title
Guaranty and Trust Company; I would get the best actuary to make
an investigation and get some certified accountants, Wall Street men,
to come down and check up, before I would spend a cent. He said,
‘All right, I will see that you get the money.’ I went back to New
York and set things going. The money was deposited with the Title
Guaranty and Trust Company. We got $550,000 to be on the safe
side, Mr. Rockefeller, Mr. Peabody, Mr. Kelsey, and others co-operat
ing. We looked into the situation and on the 23rd of December, after
an all day conference, I wired Mr. Kelsey and Mr. Rosenwald, we
would have to send the money back. We didn’t think it a safe invest
ment from all information at hand; and we didn’t do it.’ ”
The philanthropy of Messrs. Rosenwald, et al, was apparently
directed to the preservation of the faith o f Negroes in Negro-con
trolled business. This motive was likewise responsible in part for the
National Benefit’s acquisition of the Standard Life. Whether con
sidered on the ground o f maintaining the race’s faith in their own
business men or on that of plain business efficiency the taking over of
the Standard Life by the National Benefit was an unsound trans
action. It could not have been otherwise. As has been indicated, the
business o f the Standard Life consisted of a number o f old-time con
tracts, on which the principle of adverse selection had been operating
for a number of years, offset by frozen and doubtful assets, chief of
which was non-income producing real estate.
The merger caused the company to increase its field of operation
without a proportionate or compensating increase in income. As a
result o f the expansion policy begun in 1923, and given new impetus
in 1926 and 1927, the company now operated in 24 states. The result
ant increases in administrative costs moved the National Benefit closer
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to receivership. Despite numerous ruses, these costs shortened the
time in which it was possible to keep the condition of the company
from public notice.
The Standard Life Reinsurance Contract
The contract of reinsurance under which the National Benefit
reinsured the business of the Standard Life grew out of litigation
almost as intricate as that in which the National Benefit later became
involved. In the cases concerned with the business of the Standard
Life a large number of persons and corporations were involved as
plaintiffs, defendants, or intervenors. In the case of Charles H.
Brown, et al, versus the Standard Life Insurance Company,28 the
court sought to put an end to the litigation as well as to provide for
the administering of the affairs of the Standard Life. The decree of
the court is worth liberal quotation because of the light it throws on
the condition of the Standard Life at the time the National Benefit
acquired it. In the words of the court:
The life insurance business formerly belonging to the
Standard Life Insurance Company of Georgia, which by
successive transfers came into the possession of the Stand
ard Life Insurance Company of Arkansas, has sustained
losses of property and funds, to such an extent that it does
not now have the amount of assets which the law requires
as a reserve for the protection of the policyholders and the
amount of said impairment is so great that it is impracti
cal for the business to be continued on the present basis
with justice to the policyholders.
It is further found that the deficiency in the legal reserve
required far exceeds the amount of the capital stock of
the Standard Life Insurance Company of Georgia and that
such a deficiency existed at the time the business was
transferred from the Southern Insurance Company to the
Standard Life of Arkansas, and had not since been materi
ally diminished by the operations of the latter company,
and it being shown by the evidence that there is no possi
bility of recovering enough in value of the assets which
the plaintiffs claim have been dissipated by certain of the
defendants in this case to restore the reserve, it is ad
judged and decreed that the stockholders of the Standard
No. 68732, Fulton Superior Court, Fulton County, Ga.
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Life Insurance Company of Georgia as represented by
petitions in this case, have no claim upon the assets which
formerly were possessed and owned by the Standard Life
Insurance Company of Georgia and that such assets must
be used and administered for the benefit of the policy
holders, together with such assets as the Standard Life of
Arkansas furnished towards reducing the impairment to
the reserve, and to this end, there being no other adequate
remedy, the court must and does hereby take charge of all
said assets, to be disposed of in such manner as is best
calculated to save the assets from further losses and secure
the interest of the policyholders whose rights are found to
be superior to those of the stockholders of the Standard
Life Insurance Company of Georgia. In dealing with such
insolvent condition, the court recognizes that a very valu
able asset of the company is the premium account as paid
by policyholders, which would be greatly impaired and
damaged should the business be continued in charge of the
court by the appointment of receivers or otherwise. . .
With regard to the claims of the policyholders as afore
said, the court has had presented to it in the evidence in
the case a contract of reinsurance, copy of which is hereto
attached . . . whereby the National Benefit Life Insurance
Company of the District of Columbia has agreed, upon the
terms and conditions in said contract specified, to reinsure
the said policies, which contract has been approved by the
Commissioners of Arkansas and the District of Columbia,
the domiciles of the respective companies. . . It is there
upon further decreed by the court that the said proposed
contract of reinsurance adequately protects and preserves
all rights of the policyholders of the said Standard Life
Insurance Company and protects the said policyholders
more adequately and completely than they could possibly
be protected by the court liquidating the business or keep
ing it in charge of the court by receivers or otherwise.
It is ordered and decreed that said contract or reinsur
ance be and the same is hereby approved . . . and the said
contract is to take effect on the date of this decree.
In the preamble to the contract of reinsurance the National Benefit
expressed its intent as follows:
Whereas, it appears from the considerations herein
stated and from the history of the Standard Life Insur
ance Company of Atlanta, Georgia, the reinsurance of
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that business with the Southern Insurance Company of
Nashville, Tennessee, and the later reinsurance of the
same business with the Standard Life Insurance Company
of Eureka Springs, Arkansas, that the subject matters
involved are complex to such a degree, that the National
Benefit Insurance Company of Washington, D. C., acting
on the advice of Miles M. Dawson and Son, consulting
actuaries, of New York City is willing to enter into this
contract of reinsurance as the best possible solution of
these complex affairs, for the sole purpose of furnishing
the utmost protection that can be given with competent
management to the policyholders of the Standard Life,
with safety to the policyholders of the National Bene
fit. . . .
Article one of the contract provided that the Standard Life
policies would be taken over, subject to individually established liens
bearing four per cent. The liens were to be calculated on the basis
of the impairment in the reserve on December 31, 1926. The liens
were to be changed from time to time in accordance with changes
in the reserve deficiency. At the time the policies were taken
over the lien on each policy amounted to 66.043% of its reserve.
By other terms of the contract, which was in effect of the nature of
a trusteeship, the National Benefit was to segregate the assets
of the Standard Life. They were to furnish separate statements
to the insurance departments showing disposition of assets and
profits and losses on that division of their business. Direct expenses
were to be charged directly to the Standard Life Division and indirect
expenses were to be apportioned so as “ not to exceed the reinsured
Standard Life policies’ pro rata share for each one thousand dollars
of insurance of the total home office administration expenses of the
Ordinary Department of the National Benefit.”
The National Benefit received all assets of the Standard Life in
consideration for which it was to assume all the liabilities of the
Standard Life and make certain payments to the Standard Life
Division for a period of years after the effective date of the contract.
These payments were to be made out of the premiums collected on
Standard Life policies. The contract read:
. . The Standard
Life shall be paid a first commission out of the premiums collected
the first year after the effective date of this reinsurance contract
on the policies of the Standard Life by the National Benefit not
to exceed in total amount of fifty thousand ($50,000) dollars
which said commission will be due and payable to the Standard
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Life on the date this contract becomes effective” .29 For six years
such payments were to be made, reduced each time by five thousand
dollars. Each payment was to bear six per cent interest accumulated annualy from the effective date of the contract. The schedule of payments was:
1927.................... .... $50,000 plus interest
((
u
1928.................... .... 45,000
((
u
1929.................... .... 40,000
it
a
1930..................... .... 35,000
a
u
1931.................... .... 30,000
ti
U
1932.................... .... 25,000
a
it
1933.................... .... 20,000
$245,000
In compliance with this and other provisions of the contract the
Standard Life Division was to be charged and credited as follows:
CREDITS
1. Profits on Standard Life investments.
2. Appreciation on Standard Life assets.
3. Seven annual payments totaling $245,000 plus in
terest.
CHARGES
1. Four per cent interest on liens.
2. Direct investment expense.
3. Other direct expenses.
4. Losses on Standard Life investments.
5. Depreciation on Standard Life assets.
6. Pro rata share of home office expenses.
Soon after the contract became effective, the National Benefit
was called upon to pay large sums for loans, surrender values, and
death claims on Standard Life policies. Thus a large indebtedness
was shifted from the Standard Life Division to the National Benefit
Division. Shortly afterwards, the policy of encouraging Standard
Life policyholders to drop their Standard Life policies and take out
new ones in the National Benefit was adopted. This was designed
to increase the indebtedness of the Standard Life Division since
the latter would have to pay surrender values to the National Benefit
Division. The net effect, however, was to draw off the cash and
liquid assets of the National Benefit for which the National Benefit
25ibid., Decree, Exhibit A., Art X.
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Division received in return equity in the non-income producing assets
of the Standard Life. On or about April 7, 1928, the balance due
the Standard Life Division appeared on the books as $135,165.30 But,
“ there was much confusion as to the balance due on the books of the
two divisions. Moreover, in making the record of the transactions
the equity between the two divisions was frequently violated.” 31
Despite the fact that the insolvent condition of the National
Benefit was aggravated by the burden of the Standard Life, the
public got a different idea of the facts. In an article appearing in
April, 1927, it was stated with much pride that the National Benefit
was operating in twenty-four states, employing 2,000 people, had
$50,000,000 of insurance in force and had never failed to declare a
dividend.32
30Fackler and Breiby, “ Report of Condition as o f Sept. 9, 1931” , op. cit.,
Appendix B, p. 3.
“ ibid., p. 6.
3SGeorge W. Lee, “ Insurance—Its Necessity and Value” , The Messenger,
April 1927.
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C h a p t e r I II

THE UNDERWRITING POLICY OF THE COMPANY
Not least among the difficulties which beset the National Benefit
were those connected with underwriting. However, the attention
of the management was concentrated upon keeping the company
operating so that little or no notice was given to some of the basic
problems of an insurance company. The improvement of the com
pany’s mortality and lapse experience never received the attention
it should have. No studies of the company’s experience were made,
and risks, even in the Ordinary Department, were underwritten indis
criminately.
All indications pointed to a bad mortality experince for the
company. In the face of this, the managers sought to conceal the
company’s insolvency by whittling reserves. They changed the basis
of reserve computation without justification. Of course the new
method of calculating the reserve resulted in a smaller amount as
the required reserve. Ordinarily such a change is made only when
the mortality experience of a company unquestionably warrants it.
At the end of 1930 the reserve according to the company’s filed state
ment amounted to $4,752,132.1 Yet only nine months later, on
September 9, 1931, the reserve as computed by actuaries employed
by the receivers was $5,852,772.
This change in the basis of the reserve was not only unwise,
but a deliberate breach of contract on the part of the company.
By the terms of certain contracts issued by the company, the com
pany obligated itself to accumulate the reserve on a specified basis.
The reserve accumulated on the basis specified in these contracts
was greater than on the basis of the new method adopted by the
company. In like manner the rate books showed a surrender
value in excess of surrender values, computed on the new method.
The situation was disclosed in a conference examination at which
the company was warned to remedy these defects as quickly as
possible. The action taken by the company is shown in the minutes
of the Board of Directors meeting of January 7, 1928:
The Secretary stated that Mr. Frank Speakman, actuary
and chief examiner for the six insurance departments
engaged upon the examination of the company had called
attention to the fact that the Ordinary Department sur-1
1 See Table X, p. 67.
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render values given in the rate book at various ages and
various end of years are in a great many instances in
excess of the reserve bases used by the company, and also
that the management had been advised by Mr. Speakman
and Mr. Alfred Dawson that a number of various policy
forms used by the company should be revised. . . . The
president stated that it was the opinion and also the desire
of the management that the rate book and policy forms,
which policy forms and rate books he advised had been
prepared for the company by actuaries other than Miles
M. Dawson and Son, should be made to conform to the
Illinois Standard Method of Valuation, American Experi
ence Table of Mortality and 3y%% interest, adopted by
the company as a basis of valuation for the Ordinary
Department.2
At this meeting of the Board, the following motion was unanimously
carried:
Resolved, that Miles M. Dawson and Son, our consulting
actuaries, hereby are instructed to redraft and amend, as
soon as practicable and as deemed requisite by them and
Actuary Speakman, all our policy forms, and also to com
pute new tables of premiums and surrender values to
bring our rate book values and our policy forms in con
formity with the reserve basis used by the company for
valuation in respect to the intermediate and industrial
departments as well as the ordinary department.2
Later Alfred Dawson, the company’s actuary, in a letter to the
managing officers of the company, had this to say concerning the
company’s method of reserve calculation:
As a matter of fact, if the company policies had been
valued in accordance with the options contained in old
policies, which options should never have been granted,
the company, at the time of the examination of December
31, 1927, was and had been for years previous hopelessly
insolvent, but on my personal assurance that these old
policies would be taken up and policy contracts, in accord
ance with the basis of valuation adopted, issued in lieu
thereof, the Department Examiners let the matter of
ascertaining the additional reserve liability on these old
'Quoted by Fackler and Brieby, Report No. 2, p. 11.
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contracts go over until the next examination, which is now
past due.3
Reserves, of course, are dependent upon the mortality table
used. If a table with a too long expectancy of life is used, the
company will suffer losses. On the other hand, if a table with a too
short expectancy of life is used, the premium will be very high—
out of proportion to the cost of insurance. Another important fac
tor in calculating the reserve is the assumed rate of interest used
in connection with the mortality table. If the assumed interest
rate is too low more of the funds collected as premiums will have
to be held in trust as the reserve than should be the case. For
additions to the reserve due to interest will be less when a low rate
is used, thereby necessitating the segregation in the reserve o f larger
amounts of the premiums. As stated by John H. Magee, one of
the authorities cited in the hearings of the Temporary National
Economic Committee: 4 ‘The vital factor in computing life insur
ance premiums [and reserve] is the mortality table. Since the
obligations of the life insurance company to pay benefits is de
pendent upon the happening of a life contingency, it is important
that life insurance actuaries know the expected life span of a group
of policyholders.” 5 Thus the mortality table has a double signifi
cance. It is the basis upon which premiums are calculated, on the
one hand, and the basis on which the reserve is determined, on the
other. “ The ability of the company to meet all claims as they mature
is dependent upon the adequacy of the reserve account. The reserve
should never be regarded as an extra fund to meet contingencies
or a profit above mortality experience. On the contrary, on the
basis of the calculated experience [mortality table] the mortality
costs will ultimately absorb the entire reserve. Only to the extent
that actual experience is more favorable than the calculations would
indicate will there be any excess over claims in the reserve fund.” 6
If the actual experience is more severe than the calculated experience
the reserve will prove inadequate. And, it should be noted in this
connection that the legal reserve requirement is not necessarily the
actual reserve demanded by sound economic policy in particular
cases.
The legal requirements specify only the minimum reserve that
3Letter of Alfred B. Dawson to the Voting Trustees: S. W. Rutherford,
C. B. Lee, R. H. Rutherford, and M. F. Smith, dated February 20, 1931.
‘ Verbatim Record of the Proceedings of The Temporary National Economic
Committee, Bureau o f National Alfairs, Inc., Washington, D. C., 1939, p. 4.
“ John H. Magee, Life Insurance, Business Publications, Inc., Chicago, 1939,
p. 199.
' ibid., p. 268.
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a company must set up. They are the requirements for all insur
ance companies operating within the state concerned. They set
forth the minimum reserve requirements for both companies that
underwrite preferred risks and for those that cater to a lower type
of business. State statutes also specify the mortality table to be
used as a basis, the assumed rate of interest, and the plan of valua
tion. In calculating its reserve on the basis specified in the state
statutes, a company fulfills its legal obligation. However, this legal
reserve may be inadequate from the standpoint of the type of risks
the said company underwrites and of its mortality experience. As
put by Magee:
The reserve requirements of any particular state are set
up to safeguard the policyholders. They are of necessity
made as conservative as circumstances seem to warrant.
It is to be remembered, however, that reserves are com
puted upon the basis of a mortality table which may rep
resent a death rate not actually in accordance with the
facts. Likewise, the rate of interest used in making the
calculations may not actually represent the real interest
rate earned by the company. To secure a real picture of
the company’s condition, it will be necessary to make the
calculations on the basis of the gross premiums received
less actual expenses, using the actual mortality experi
ence and actual interest earned rather than an assumed
interest rate and a tabular mortality rate. From the
viewpoint of the state, it may be assumed that the stand
ards set up for measuring reserves are sufficiently con
servative to guarantee the solvency of the company for
all practical purposes.7
The adoption of the Illinois Standard method of valuation at
3 % % interest would produce the lowest reserve within the law. In
regard to the legal reserve and adequate reserve requirements the
actuaries who made the last examination reported:
There might, of course, be a difference among actuaries as
to the most applicable mortality table and interest rates
on which to base the premiums, reserve, and non-forfei
ture values for the several classes of risks which this
company would insure. It might also be a matter of
opinion as to whether particular options should have
been granted. However, the fact of the matter is that
the policies provided that their reserves and non-forfeiture
'ibid., p. 277.

values were to be based on specified standards, which
fixed the liability thereunder, regardless of any pro
visions, or lack of provisions, in the laws of the District
of Columbia, so long as the reserves fixed by the policies
were at least as great as the minimum reserves required
by law. . . . The principle underlying level premium in
surance is that of providing reserves which will meet the
increasing cost of mortality as the policyholder grows
older. The mortality reserve standard provided in those
policies were such as to meet the probable mortality trend
of this company’s risks, judging by available experience
among similar risks. The reason ‘the Ordinary Depart
ment surrender values given in the rate book at various
ages and various end of years are in a great many in
stances in excess of the reserve bases used by the Com
pany’ was that the reserve bases used in valuing the
policy reserves and certified to the Superintendent of In
surance of the District of Columbia were not those pro
vided for in the policies, but such as produced lower and
inadequate reserves. . . . The adoption of some other
standard of evaluation for policies to be issued in the
future could not affect the liability under the policies
then in force. The liability under those policies was not
reduced by the ‘assurance’ of an individual that several
thousand policyholders would agree to relinquish their
equities and right in contracts which they held for some
thing of less value. Until those contracts were actually
relinquished the liability remained as set in those con
tracts. Campaigns to make such transfers were begun
in 1930, new policy forms having been brought out in
1929, but without much success. The effort did have the
effect of throwing the insurance records into considerable
confusion and the loss or destruction of the records as to
paid up and extended insurances. . . . The annual state
ments of the Company, on file in the office of the Super
intendent of Insurance of the District o f Columbia,
showed the reserve standards which had been employed.
There was thus official and public notice that adequate
reserve standards had been adopted by the Company,
and the implication was that adequate standards thereon
would be continued.8*
* Fackler and Breiby, op. tit., Report No. 2, pp. 13-14.
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That the change in reserve basis was not the result of a delib
erate policy based upon a favorable mortality experience is evident
from the resolution passed by the Board of Directors at the Janu
ary, 1928, meeting to which reference has twice been made. The
resolution read:
Resolved, that our actuaries are hereby directed to make
an investigation of the lapse experience of the Company
and particularly an adequate investigation of the mor
tality experience of the Company for the purpose of
ascertaining how closely our actual experience is approxi
mating the mortality to be expected on the reserve bases
used by the Company for valuation.9
Of course, such an investigation should have been made long before
this time. Even if the investigation had been made as ordered by
the Board, and there is nothing to indicate it was ever begun, it
was too late to profit by it. That this type of information was lack
ing, although mortality experience is a matter of supreme im
portance to an insurance company, is a sad commentary on the
management policies of the National Benefit. Such studies should
have been constantly going on to guide the administration of the
company.
In formulating an adequate reserve and underwriting policy
an insurance company catering to Negroes should, in addition to the
adoption of, let us say, the American Experience Table of Mortality,
possess a thorough knowledge of the mortality of its policyholders
and that of Negroes generally. In regard to Negro mortality the
most important studies have been made by Dr. Louis I. Dublin,
Statistician for the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. His
studies have been based on the experience for twenty-five years of
the Metropolitan which insures about two million Negroes, or almost
one-fifth of the entire Negro population of the United States. In
this two million are included men, women, and children of all ages,
occupations, and economic status. It is, however, composed pre
dominantly of urban Negroes. A complete comparison of the mor
tality rate of two million Negro and fourteen million white policy
holders in the industrial department of the company is given in
Table III below.
8ibid., p. 12.

55

Table III
DEATH RATES PER 100,000 FROM ALL CAUSES
EXPERIENCE OF METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY, INDUSTRIAL WEEKLY PREMIUM-PAYING
BUSINESS, 1935 10
Males

Age

White

Ages 1-74 838.6
Under 1 2,144.7
1-4
353.1
5-14
152.8
15-24
223.9
25-44
552.6
45-64
2,203.4
65-74
6,620.3

Females

Per cent
Negro of
White
Negro
1,273.9
3,725.7
532.6
234.8
540.4
1,143.8
2,972.7
7,717.7

152
174
151
154
241
207
135
117

White
517.7
1,638.6
323.2
121.2
183.0
400.6
1,487.9
5,280.3

Per cent
Negro of
White
Negro
1,090.9
3,019.6
520.5
197.9
595.5
941.1
2,442.8
6,499.4

177
184
161
163
325
235
164
123

This comparison covers industrial policyholders only. The Metro
politan insures Negroes only on an industrial, intermediate, or en
dowment basis. But one would not be far wrong in estimating that
over 85 per cent of Negroes insured with the Metropolitan are
covered by industrial insurance.
The table indicates that for every age group the death rate for
Negroes is higher than that for whites. In the case of females the
difference between Negro and white is even greater. The greatest
difference is for Negro women between the ages of 15 and 24 for whom
the death rate is three and one-fourth times that for white women in
the same age group. The greatest differences between the death
rates for Negro and white men is also between the ages of 15 and 24.
And for both Negro men and women the most dangerous years are
between 15 and 44, after which the death rates for Negroes more
nearly approximate that for whites. The full consequence of the
excess infant mortality for Negroes is not revealed by the table.
While the tables gives the per cent of Negro infant mortality to
white infant mortality as 174 for males and 184 for females, it does
10Louis I. Dublin, “ The Problem of Negro Health as Revealed by Vital
Statistics” , Journal of Negro Education, July 1937. See also: “ Statistical Bulle
tin” , North Carolina Mutual Life Insurance Co., Durham, N. C., 1923.
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not indicate the effect of mortality in the early ages on the expectancy
of life. At the death of a Negro infant, 48 years of life expectancy
is lost. Although the expectancy of life for Negroes has constantly
increased over the years, it is still less than the white. In 1929-31
on the basis of general population figures, it stood at 47.5 years for
Negro men and 49.5 years for Negro women, as compared with 59.3
years for white men and 62.8 years for white women.
In comparing the experience of the Metropolitan with a smaller,
but more general sample, for instance, the population of the city
of New York, it is found that the excess in the mortality rate for
Negroes is less for the city of New York than for Metropolitan
policyholders. While the excess is less, the rates for both are
higher. The population of New York City for 1936 was estimated
at 7,363,624 persons, 412,053 of whom composed the Negro popula
tion. The total number of deaths for the same year was 77,432.
The number of Negro deaths was 6,092. Thus, while Negroes com
prised only 5.60 per cent of the total population, Negro deaths
accounted for 7.87 per cent of the total deaths. These figures show
a death rate for that year in New York City of 14.8 per thousand for
Negroes and 10.3 for white persons. This indicated an excess in
the Negro death rate over the death rate for whites of nearly 50
per cent.
Table IV
NEGRO AND WHITE MORTALITY IN THE CITY OF
NEW YORK, 1936 *11
PO PU LA TIO N

D EATH S

Per cent
of Total

Number

N eg ro.................
512,053
White ............... 6,951,571

5.6
94.4

6,092
71,340

7.87
92.13

Total ................. 7,363,624

100.0

77,432

100.00

Number

Per cent
of Total

Per
1000
14.8
10-3

In the case of the Metropolitan policyholders the excess of the Negro
death rate over that for white persons was 52 per cent for males and
77 per cent for females. The death rate for Negroes in the regis
tration states of the country at large on the basis of the 1930 census
11Based on New York City Health Department figures as cited by Haw
thorne E. Lee, “ A Comparative Study of the Mortality of Colored People in the
City of New York” , United Mutual Benefit Association, New York City, 1939.

57

was 18.0 per thousand and 9.9 per thousand for whites, an excess of
81 per cent.™
In analyzing the problem of the excessive mortality of Negroes
the first step is a consideration of the causes of deaths among them.
The principal causes of deaths among Negroes have been fairly
definitely established. Various studies have all given practically
the same diseases as the principal causes of death. Statistics of the
Health Department o f New York City reveal that of deaths of
Negroes in New York City, 19.7 per cent are due to heart and cir
culatory diseases; 17.8 per cent to tuberculosis; 12.3 per cent to
respiratory diseases; 7.5 per cent to cancer and other tumors; 7 per
cent to unnatural causes; and 6.9 per cent to rheumatic and nutri
tional diseases.1
*3 These six causes of death accounted for 71.2 per
1
cent of Negro deaths in New York City in 1935 and 1936.
Table V
CAUSES OF DEATHS FOR NEGROES AND WHITE PERSONS
IN THE-CITY OF NEW YORK FOR THE YEARS OF
1935 AND 1936 14
NEGRO

WHITE

Order Percent Order Percent
Heart and Circulatory Diseases.......... .
Tuberculosis .......................................... .
Respiratory Diseases .......................... ..
Cancer and other Tumors .................. .
Unnatural Causes ................................ .
Rheumatic and Nutritional Diseases... .
Miscellaneous ........................................ .
Diseases of the Nervous System ........ .
Genito-Urinary Diseases ......................
Diseases of Digestive System ............ ..
Syphilis ..................................................
Gonorrhoea ............................................

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

19.7
17.8
12.3
7.5
7.0
6.9
6.7
6.4
6.1
4.9
4.5
0.2
100.0

1
9
3
2
8
10
4
5
6
7
11
12

32.0
4.8
8.9
14.8
5.9
4.1
8.4
7.1
6.7
6.6
0.7
0.0*
100.0

* Less than .1%
11Louis I. Dublin, “ The Problem of Negro Health as Revealed by Statistics” ,
and “ Life, Death, and the Negro” , American Mercury, Vol. XII, No. 45, pp. 37-45;
13Based on New York City Health Department figures as cited by Haw
thorne E. Lee, “ A Comparative Study of the Mortality of Colored People in the
City of New York” , United Mutual Benefit Association, New York City, 1939.

14ibid.
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The Metropolitan has had virtually the same experience with
its Negro policyholders.
In 1935 organic heart disease was the leading cause of
death among colored industrial policyholders of the Metro
politan Life Insurance Company. Their death rate was
208.1 per 100,000, or a little more than l 1/^ times that for
whites.
Tuberuclosis is followed very closely with a rate of 152.4,
or more than 3 times that for whites. Third in numeri
cal importance was pneumonia, with a rate o f 104.3,
double that for whites. Chronic nephritis and cerebreal
hemorrhage, important “ degenerative diseases” , take
double the toll of life among Negroes that they do among
whites. These five diseases, together with fatal acci
dents, which also run higher for the colored, account for
60 per cent of the Negro mortality.15
There can be little doubt that the cause of the Negro’s high
mortality is his low economic status. In metropolitan centers the
areas in which the low-income groups live have the highest death
rate. In Washington, D. C., the area bounded by New York Ave
nue, Florida Avenue, and Seventh Street in which the largest per
centage of Negroes live, has a death rate much in excess of any other
section of the city.16 Not only is its death rate higher, but for the
city of Washington it ranks first in number of arrests, second in
illegitimate births, and second in deaths from tuberculosis.
The problem of Negro health and mortality is a socio-economic
one. It arises from the low economic status of the Negro. And
it is the low socio-economic position of the Negro that complicates
the formulation of a sound underwriting policy by Negro insurance
companies. One Negro mutual benefit association has as the first
tenet of its underwriting policy the use of extreme care in the
selection of risks. In pursuing this policy it experienced over a
five-year period on the lives of 30,971 Negroes, 85 per cent of whom
were unskilled workers, 14.5 per cent skilled workers, and .5 per
cent professional persons, a mortality rate of only 59.22 per cent
of its expected mortality as computed on the basis of the American
Experience Table of Mortality. This, however, could not be a
long-run policy for a Negro insurance company because: (1) the
cost of selecting good risks is high and, therefore, could not be borne
by industrial policies, the type of insurance predominantly pur” Dublin, op. tit.
15 Washington Daily News, May 4, 1939, “ X-Ray and Venereal Disease Clinic
Opens at Peoples’ Church” .
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chased by Negroes; and, (2) the market for ordinary insurance
among Negroes is limited to the relatively few Negroes of higher
income.
The policy of the National Benefit was to insure as large a
number as possible regardless of the desirability of the risk. Such
a policy is not in itself unsound. In fact, it is the basis of industrial
insurance. It entails, however, an accurate knowledge of actual and
expected mortality. It has often been said by lecturers on insurance
that if an insurance company could insure all the people who passed
a busy intersection in the course of a few days it could do so profit
ably and with the minimum risk. The reasoning is based on the
law of probability. By random selection a large enough number
of persons would be insured to assure a close approximation to cal
culations. Furthermore, the mortality of the general population
would have been fairly definitely established. The National Benefit
did not enjoy the benefit of random selection even within the Negro
portion of the population. Officials of the company were acquainted
with the agents’ practice of “ writing tombstones” . Moreover, the
National Benefit had no data" or knowledge of the mortality of the
Negro in the various sections in which the company did business.
Indeed, in some of the rural sections into which it had been forced
by competition, this information was positively unavailable. Yet
the company made no studies of its experience to determine how
closely the actual mortality of its policyholders approximated its
expected mortality. If a company made no study of its experience,
an involved actuarial problem, it could not wisely set the terms of
its contracts. A mistake once made in underwriting policy is not
easily rectified but likely to continue for many years and spread its
malignant influence throughout the company.
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C h a p t e r IV

THE INVESTMENT POLICY OF THE COMPANY
From the time that the National Benefit Life Insurance Com
pany became a legal reserve company it operated on a “ shoestring” .
This was true despite its periodic increases in authorized capital and
its showing of a surplus in its annual statements. The pressure for
funds was the dominating factor in its investment policy. The many
dubious transactions to which it was a party were the outgrowth
of this policy which in turn expressed the attempt of the officers to
keep the company operating in the face of impending disaster.
While it can be said that not all the questionable deals entered into
by the officers were directed towards this objective, the larger and,
perhaps, the majority of these transactions aimed to relieve the eco
nomic sickness of the company. The troubles of the National Benefit
date back to 1918 when its capital stock was increased for a second
time, not to 1923 as some observers say. As early as 1918 its stock
was watered and all further expansion was built upon this water
logged foundation. The subsequent expansion increased the water
in the stock. It appears that originally its policy of expansion was
prompted by the idea that a larger premium income would facilitate
the squeezing of the water from the stock and the creation of a
real surplus. The'objective of placing the company on a solid finan
cial basis proved impossible of attainment because of the manner
in which it was pursued. All attempts to achieve the objective were
abandoned during waves of temporary prosperity. Some of the
officers did not appreciate the company’s financial plight. Others
saw no hope of restoring the company whatever policy was inaug
urated. This and the false hopes together with the personal ambi
tion of some of the executives led the National Benefit to its fatal
end.
The National Benefit was declared insolvent as of September 9,
1931. Daniel C. Roper, former Secretary of Commerce, was the
first receiver appointed. The court authorized the receiver to ap
point competent parties to “ ascertain the value of the policyholders’
equity as of September 9, 1931” . Clifford M. Stoy, an accountant
of Washington, D. C., was employed by Mr. Roper for this purpose.
His report fixed the deficit at $2,828,380.35. Shortly after this
report was submitted to the court, Roper, objecting to the appoint
ment of a co-receiver, resigned. The court evidently recognized
that the report was unsatisfactory for it authorized the new receivers
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to have another examination made. For this examination Fackler
and Breiby, Consulting Actuaries, of New York City, were appointed.
The reports of Fackler and Brieby and the court records are
the two most authoritative sources of information on the operation
of the National Benefit in its later years. The records of the District
of Columbia Insurance Department were “ not available” to us. The
Insurance Department disclaims responsibility for the misplacement
of the records. We were informed that during the litigation the
records were turned over to the Department of Justice and then to
the Court House. In these transfers, the records, it seems, dis
appeared.
The reports of Fackler and Breiby are comprehensive and de
tailed. They treat every phase of the company’s activity. One
might take exception, however, to the conservative valuations in the
reports. It is quite evident that in questions of valuation the lowest
figure was used almost consistently. This resulted in an overstate
ment of the deficit— a not uncommon circumstance in such proceed
ings. Examiners are frequently prone to follow the implicit wishes
of the receivers and veer a bit to the conservative side in order to
place all responsibility for loss on the poor management of those who
have preceded the receivers. The status of the company on Septem
ber 9, 1931, as determined by Fackler and Breiby is shown below in
Table VI.
Table VI
Condensed Statement of the Condition of the National Benefit
Life Insurance Company as of September 9, 19311

Assets

National
Benefit
Division

Real E state..................... $ 63,995.11
Leaseholds .....................
None
Mortgage L oans............. 287,264.13
No value
Collateral Loans ...........
Bonds ............................. 197,458.46
Stocks .............................
675.00
87,021.99
Cash ...............................
No value
Accounts Receivable .....
No value
Bills Receivable ...........
Agents Debit Balances..
No value

Standard
Life
Division

Combined

$333,519.50
No value
None
No value
None
27,700.00
8,001.57
No value
No value
No value

$397,514.61
No value
287,264.13
No value
197,458.46
28,375.00
95,023.56
No value
No value
No value

1 Fackler and Breiby, Report of Condition, p. 10.

62
Table VI (Cont.)

Assets

National
Benefit
Division

Furniture and Fixtures..
15,000.00
Automobiles and Eqpt....
250.00
None
Mules (on farms owned)
Checks returned, later
collected .......................
679.28
Meter Deposits...............
719.00
Charged to Hon. Lewis A.
Irons, Ga. receiver.....
6,882.18
200.00
Loans on Crop Liens.......
Due National Benefit from
Standard Life Div...... 686,115.88
Interest and Rents
due and accrued.........
18,034.89
Cash Surrender values
of Policies Owned on
Officer’s Lives .............
3,942.00
Total ....................... $1,368,237.92

Liabilities and Claims

National
Benefit
Division

Net Reserve (deducting
indebtedness under life
policies) ..................... $3,986,071.53
Net Reserve for claims
of disabled policy hold
ers & Permanent Dis
ability Benefits...........
1,705.00
Net Due Beneficiaries of
Deceased Policyholders 207,173.00
Net Due under Endow
ment Policies .............
Salaries,
Commissions,
etc. preferred by pay
ment subsequent to
Sept. 9, 1931.......... .
16,098.00

Standard
Life
Division

Combined

5,000.00
None
1,140.00

20,000.00
250.00
1,140.00

None
20.00

679.28
739.00

2,913.90
None

9,796.08
200.00

-686,115.88
346.05

None

18,380.94

3,942.00

$-307,474.86

$1,060,763.06

Standard
Life
Division

Combined

$667,714.19

$4,653,845.72

10,676.00

12,381.00

34,336.00

241,509.00

4,592.00

4,592.00

None

16,098.00

Table VI (Continued)

Liabilities and Claims
Rents, office expenses,
etc. Not preferred by
subsequent payment .....
Unimproved Miscellane
ous Claims against Co....
State Premium Taxes....
Miscellaneous Deposit &
Suspense Items .............

National
Benefit
Division

Standard
Life
Division

Combined

15,630-00

993.00

16,623.00

37,500.00
60,140.00

2,500.00
4,658.00

40,000.00
64,798.00

25,589.27

1,005.71

26,594.98

T o t a l Liabilities and
Claims Excluding Capi
tal ................................... 4,349,906.80
Deficit after Excluding
Capital Stock Liability.. 2,981,668.88

726,534.90

5,076,441.70

1,034,009-76

4,015,678.64

1,368,237.92

-307,474.86

1,060,736.06

The above statement shows that the percentage of assets to
liabilities, excluding the capital stock liability, was 20.9. But while
certain of the assets listed may have had some cash value, they were
not admitted by insurance departments as means of offsetting liabili
ties of the company. These non-admitted assets amounted to $21,390
including furniture and fixtures, $20,000; automobile and equipment,
$250; and mules on farms owned, $1,140. The inclusion of these
items would not have inflated the statement, on the one hand, because
cash could have been realized from them and, on the other, the value
of certain other assets had been deflated in the statement. The con
servative policy followed by Fackler and Breiby in preparing their
statement was perhaps justified on the grounds that in many cases
they were not using going-concern values but realizable values. This
would make a greater difference than usual in the case of the National
Benefit because of the nature and location of its assets.
The statement of Fackler and Breiby shows a decrease of 82.47
per cent from assets reported at the close of 1930. In this year the
assets of the company when calculated on the basis of its annual
statements had increased 1318.40 per cent since 1918. Yet only nine
months later the increase shown by Fackler and Breiby’s statement
was 248.69 per cent. In 1924, a year after the inauguration of the
expansion policy the company’s statements indicated an increase of
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32.67 per cent over the previous year. The largest single increase in
assets of course resulted from the absorption of the Standard Life.
In 1927 the assets increased 259.71 per cent over 1926 and 1268.98
per cent over 1918. A large part of these were book-value increases,
inflated values resulting from the stock and assets manipulations.
Table VII gives the reported increases in the company’s assets.

Table VII
Changes in the Total Assets of The National Benefit
Life Insurance Company 1918-19312*V
I.
Per cent of Annual
Increase
(non-cumulative)

Per cent of Increase
(cumulative)

Year

Amount

1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929

$ 426,538
513,503
580,655
630,339
700,425
859,885
1,140,789
1,229,703
1,623,316
5,839,199
6,463,971
6,641,278

20.39
13.08
8.56
11.12
22.75
32.67
7.36
32.55
259.71
10.69
2.74

20.39
36.13
47.78
64.21
101.59
174.53
187.13
280.57
1,268.98
1,415.50
1,457.02

1930
1931

6,050,033
1,060,763

8.91
82.47

1,318.40
248.69

1The data used here are from the official statements of the company as
published by Alfred Best and Co., New York, Life Insurance Reports, except for
the years of 1924, 1929, and 1930, for which they were taken from The Com
pendium of Official Life Insurance Reports, published by the Spectator Company,
New York. The figures for 1931 are from the report of Fackler and Breiby and
are as of September 9th, rather than December 31st as in the other cases. The
deficit in this year amounted to $4,015,678.64.

The amounts of insurance written and the amounts of insurance
in force at the close of each year from 1918 are to be found in Table
VIII.
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Table VIII

INSURANCE WRITTEN AND IN FORCE FOR THE NATIONAL
BENEFIT LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 1918-1931
Year
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931

Insurance Written

$ 3,067,125
3,543,556
6,885,381
10,119,643
16,081,235
30,381,832
42,916,215
46,483,854
48,354,085
39,269,022
34,372,494
36,622,010

Insurance in Force
$5,579,406*
7,029,646
7,696,034
10,836,337
13,759,639
21,303,214
28,519,899
43,320,227
72,743,2113
73,897,069
75,552,984
73,443,312
65,754,378
58,287,072

* Assessment Insurance.
When Tables VII and VIII are studied together, they will show the
futile and inflationary character of the company’s expansion program.
Although the company wrote $30,381,832 of insurance in 1924, the
increase of insurance in force was just $7,000,000. (See Table V III),
while the total assets increased less than $300,000 and the capital
and surplus decreased (See Tables VII and IX ). In 1925 the insur
ance in force increased by nearly $15,000,000 but assets increased
less than $100,000 while capital and surplus decreased more than
$20,000. With the taking over of the Standard Life and the intensifi
cation of the policy of expansion in 1927 the assets jumped to $5,839,199 and the insurance in force increased about $30,000,000 but the
capital and surplus stood at only $423,419, just 7.25 per cent of total
liabilities. From this time on the capital and surplus decreased ab
solutely and relatively and, except for the following year, the insur
3The insurance in force of the Standard Life appears to have been reported
as part of the business of the National Benefit slightly prior to the time it was
actually taken over.
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ance in force also decreased. The capital and surplus did scarcely
more than double since 1918, though the assets as reported increased
fourteen times. The changes in capital and surplus are given below
in Table IX.
Table IX
CAPITAL AND SURPLUS OF THE NATIONAL BENEFIT
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 1918-1931

Year

Amount

Per cent of Total
Liabilities

1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931

$185,158
205,878
201,674
175,749
160,202
202,624
196,782
176,589
325,000
423,419
390,438
360,531
386,939
None

45.68
42.30
36.68
27.89
23.53
14.32
20.11
15.94
22.30
7.25
6.40
5.42
6.40
0.00

It was stated that the company’s insolvent condition in 1926 was
caused by writing too great a quantity of insurance relative to its
surplus. In 1926, a reserve of $1,024,049 (See Table X ) was required
by the insurance in force. It represented 70.28 per cent of the com
pany’s liabilities. In this year the company’s reported capital and
surplus amounted to $325,000 or 22.30 per cent of liabilities. All other
liabilities including reserve for taxes, contingency reserve (which,
incidentally, was on $2,359 on $43,320,277 of insurance in force),
prepaid premiums and unearned interest, claims resisted and claims
unpaid, unpaid dividends, and agents’ security deposits amounted to
7.42 per cent of total liabilities. In subsequent years the condition
was even more unfavorable. In 1927, the reserve was 77.51 per cent
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of total liabilities and the capital and surplus only 7.25 per cent. In
1927 the percentages were 79.25 and 6.39 respectively; and in 1929,
79.58 and 5.42 respectively. The absolute and relative changes in
reserve from 1918 to 1931 are given in Table X.
Table X
LEGAL RESERVE OF THE NATIONAL BENEFIT LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY 1918-1931

Year

Amount
of Reserve

Per cent of Total
Liabilities

1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931

$ 200,433
234,060
311,474
377,034
461,592
555,000
676,008
817,546
1,024,049
4,526,132
4,841,604
5,285,844
4,768,222
4,666,227

49.46
51.58
56.64
59.48
67.83
64.55
59.39
73.83
70.28
77.51
79.25
79.58
78.81
79.11

Even when the company’s inflated figures are taken as the basis
of analysis, it is evident that its survival depended upon an exceptionaly favorable mortality experience and a careful investment policy.
The peculiar situation of the National Benefit prevented it from as
sembling a well diversified portfolio. It is interesting to note in this
connection, without at this point going into the reasons for it, the
degree to which the investments of the National Benefit differed from
the normal investments a life insurance company is expected to make.
The Temporary National Economic Committee in its investigations
compiled data on the investments of all the legal reserve life insur
ance companies in the United States. The number of such companies
was 308. The following table based upon the data collected by the
committee shows the relative proportions in which the assets of these
308 companies were invested from 1916 to 1938.
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Table XI

INVESTMENTS OF LEGAL RESERVE LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANIES OF U. S. 1915-1938*
Dec. 31

Cash

Stocks
and
Bonds

1916
1921
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
19385

1 .8 %
1.2
1.1
.9
.8
.8
.8
.8
.7
.8
3.0

4 5 .3 %
46.2
41.3
40.1
38.1
37.8
37.8
37.2
37.1
37.5
56.3

Mortgages

Real
Estate

3 3 .4 %
34.4
39.6
41.1
43.0
43.1
42.5
42.0
40.5
38.4
19.4

2 .7 %
2.0
1.8
1.8
1.8
1.9
2.1
2.2
2.4
2.8
7.8

Policy Loans
Other
Admitted
and
Prem. Notes
Assets
1 4 .0 %
13.0
12.3
12.1
12.0
12.1
12.2
13.3
14.0
16.4
12.1

2 .8 %
3.2
3.9
4.0
4.3
4 .3
4 .6
4.5
4 .3
4.1
1.4

The ratios given here do not necessarily represent the ideal distribu
tion, but they do provide a standard by which the portfolios of life
insurance companies may be judged. Minor differences between them
and the portfolio of a particular company may not be indicative of
faulty distribution of the portfolio of the company in question, but
where the difference is great it would seem definitely to indicate a
weakness ki the investment policy of the company concerned.
Beginning with cash holdings, let us compare the distribution of
the assets of the National Benefit with that of the 308 companies
given in Table XI above. The cash holdings of the company from
1918 to 1931 are given in Table XII below.
Table XII
CASH OF THE NATIONAL BENEFIT LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY 1918-19312
Year

Amount

1918
1919
1920
1921
1922

$ 24,511
34,762
4,721
6,791
49,176

Per cent of Total Assets
5.75
6.77
0.81
1.14
7.02

‘ Verbatim Reports of the Temporary National Economic Committee, op. tit.,
pp. 36-37.
5 Estimated by the Association of Life Insurance Presidents.
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Table XII (Continued)

Year
1923s
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931

Amount
41,656
37,488
163,327
513,864
396,508
462,023
248,340
95,024

Per cent of Total Assets
3.65
3.06
11.21
8.80
6.13
6.96
4.11
8.02

The cash held by the 308 companies in Table XI never rose higher
than 3 per cent in the period from 1916 to 1938. The cash held by
the National Benefit was consistently high varying from a low of .8
per cent to a high of 11.2 per cent. Now, of course, the fact that a
company’s idle cash is consistently high, although uneconomic on
certain general grounds, need not of itself indicate weakness. Usually
the cash holdings of small companies are relatively high because of
the lack of uniformity in the presentation of claims and because of
the difficulty of investing small sums satisfactorily. On the other
hand, the necessity of carrying large amounts of idle funds may in
dicate internal disorders whatever the company’s size. In the case
of the National Benefit the cash account after 1926, was inflated— on
one occasion to more than $250,000. Moreover, during this period
heavy demands for policy loans were made upon the company. On
September 9, 1931, the cash account showed deposits for the National
Benefit Division of the company in fifty operating banks and twentyfive closed banks. For the Standard Life Division there were deposits
in eighteen operating banks and seven closed banks. There was also
an overdraft at the Citizens Trust Company in Atlanta, of about
$20,000 and a deposit at the Guardian Trust Company of Cleveland,
held as collateral for a loan. The security holdings of the National
Benefit were even further from standard than cash While the secur
ity holdings of all insurance companies stayed rather close to 40 per
cent, the holdings of the National Benefit decreased from around 75
per cent prior to 1923, to 17 per cent in 1930.
Around 1923, when the policy of expansion began there was a
change from what evidently had been a “ buy bonds” investment pol
icy. Money was shifted from securities to real estate, policy loans,
"other assets” , and to a small degree, mortgages. Liquid securities
'A t the close of 1923 an examination was in process and no annual state
ment was released. Estimates for some items, however, were given by the
examiners.
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were used to finance the expansion. Furthermore, securities were
sold whenever the company found itself in need of liquid funds.
Table XIII
BONDS AND STOCKS OF THE NATIONAL BENEFIT LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY 1918-1931
Year

Amount

Per cent of Total Assets

1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931

$ 308,782
361,830
437,842
478,749
499,922

72.39
70.45
75.41
75.95
71.38

639,156
664,993
756,107
1,265,919
1,580,077
1,257,234
1,072,919
225,833

56.03
54.31
46.58
21.68
24.44
18.93
17.73
21.29

In 1927, the company owed $592,650 on securities purchased on
margin. There is no justification whatever for an insurance com
pany’s trading on margin. In this case it was exceptionally disas
trous. According to press reports the company lost over $500,000.
Stein Brothers and Boyce, the brokers with whom the company did
its marginal trading, at one period held in the company’s name secur
ities with a book value of $113,648.60, and a market value of $54,875
against a debit balance of $15,221.68. To restore the margin the
receivers later allowed some Joint Stock Land Bank bonds with an
amortized value of $32,063 to be sold for $14,150.
The company’s dealings in securities was one of the sources of
inflation of its balance sheet. For example, certain stock with a par
value of $112,800 and a market value of $28,200 were carried on the
book at $252,000. Moreover, included among this was 20 shares of
stock of the Citizens Trust Company of Atlanta; held by the com
pany but not in its name. Of the bonds, several, with par values
amounting to $530,120, were in default. The total investment in
bonds was carried on the books at $642,747.62 but the market value
was $175,296.50. The company’s investment in stocks amounted to
$265,180, book value; $1.37,500, par value; and $28,875, market value.

Of these stocks only $640, market value, worth of them were paying
dividends.
Table X IV
SECURITY HOLDINGS OF THE NATIONAL BENEFIT LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY, SEPTEMBER 9, 19317
Par
Value

Book
Value

Market
Value

Bonds
U. S. Government................. ....$ 10,100
State, County & Municipal ....... 112,000
Miscellaneous ....................... .... 79,520

$ 10,100.00
115,963.17
81,248.60

$ 10,312.75
72,150.00
38,715.00

201,620

207,311.77

121,177.75

Bonds in Default
Foreign Governments and
Subdivisions ..................... .... 15,000
State, County & Municipal .......
2,000
Railroad ................................. .... 59,500
Miscellaneous ....................... .... 114,500

14,025.00
1,935.10
45,930.00
108,347.75

2,700.00
480.00
9,096.25
12,967.50

191,000

170,255.85

25,243.75

Stocks
Railroad ............................... .... 24,700
Banks & Trust Companies ....... 112,800
Miscellaneous .......................

6,930.00
252,000.00
265,180.00

28,200.00
28,875.00

137,500

265,180.00

28,875.00

.......................................... 530,120

642,747.62

175,296.50

Total

Reference to the appendix will indicate to some extent the char
acter of the security holdings of the company. The South American
mining stocks held by the company were of extremely doubtful value.
The same is true of the stocks of bridge companies- It is reported that
the National Benefit purchased some stock in a bridge company
after the company’s bridge had been closed to traffic and its revenue
from tolls entirely cut off. Likewise, it is reported that the National
Benefit purchased some stock of a toll bridge company after a free
state bridge had been erected beside the toll bridge.
The greatest defects in the portfolio of the National Benefit, how
ever, were the real estate and mortgage investments. As shown by
Table X I the proportion of real estate held by the 308 legal reserve1
1Fackler and Breiby, Report of Condition, Schedule D, p. 1.

72

companies went as high as 7.8 per cent in 1938.® In the period of
1916 to 1937, it never exceeded 2.8 per cent. In 1931, the National
Benefit’s real estate investment was 37.46 per cent of its assets. From
1919 to 1923 the real estate holdings fluctuated between 13.09 and
15.96 per cent of assets.
Table XV
REAL ESTATE HOLDINGS OF THE NATIONAL BENEFIT
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 1918-1931
Year
1918............... .............
1919............... .............
1920............... .............
1921............... .............
1922............... .............
1923...............
1924............... .............
1925............... .............
1926............... .............
1927............... .............
1928............... .............
1929............... .............
1930............... .............
1931............... .............

Amount

Per cent of Total Assets

68,071
81,221
90,150
90,150
90,150

15.96
15.82
15.53
15.08
13.09

162,628
212,776
283,050
1,138,273
1,125,884
1,142,261
1,610,574
397,515

14.60
17.37
17.44
19.49
17.42
17.80
26.62
37.46

The relatively large amount of real estate owned by the National
Benefit was not the result of a deliberate investment policy. It was
rather the by-product of other policies. Like the True Reformers
the National Benefit to some extent was looked upon by fraternal or
ganizations and a large number of race conscious Negroes as a reser
voir of credit for Negro enterprises. The officers, no doubt in re
sponse to pressure and in order to keep the goodwill o f the race, often
came to the rescue of the Negro fraternals and banks. The company’s
actuary, Alfred B. Dawson, once stated: “ I know that the mass of
colored people throughout the United States look at the statement
of the assets of the National Benefit, which figures are all set up
behind a dollar sign and consequently assume the National Benefit
has unlimited cash which has been collected from the colored people
and therefore should be available for worthy colored enterprises,
and you [the voting trustees] are continually confronted with this
obsession. . . . All of you admit that at times you have fallen for
this mesmerism, namely, the obsession that the National Benefit*
* This was the estimated percentage o f real estate holdings seven years after
the beginning o f the National Benefit receivership.
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policyholders’ funds can be used for the benefit of the colored race,
by financing some colored business enterprise, whereas the greatest
usefulness any of you, can be to the colored race, the greatest monu
ment you can build either for yourselves or as a shining example
of colored endeavor, is a successful, prosperous life insurance com
pany, sound to the core, giving the best of returns by way of equit
able treatment to policyholders and their beneficiaries, and last
but not least, a fair return on their investment to stockholders” . 9
Under the guise of assisting fratemals and other Negro enter
prises the National Benefit was often able to acquire sizeable blocks
of real estate which could be carried at a high book value but in
reality had a small market value and were more or less “ white ele
phants” . The largest single items o f real estate held by the com
pany are given in Table XVI.
Table XVI
SOME REAL ESTATE HOLDINGS OF THE NATIONAL
BENEFIT LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, SEPTEMBER 9 , 193110

Description

Appraised
Amount of Book Value Less
Value Less
Encumbrances Encumbrances Encumbrances

Odd Fellows Bldg.
250 Auburn Ave.
Atlanta, Ga................... .

30,000.00

328,000.00

150,000.00

None

23,000.00

1,250.00

50,000.00

50,000.00

20,000.00

The Balfour Apts.
2000 16th St., N. W.
Washington, D. C......... 137,500.00

79,511.61

57,500.00

Masonic Temple
Washington, D. C........, 205,000.00

422,007.69

20,000.00

Unimproved Property
Georgia ........................
1333-41 U St., N. W.
Washington, D. C......... .

Solvent Bank Bldg.
196 S. 32nd St.
Memphis, Tenn............... 21,750.00

1,750.00

* Letter to voting trustees, op. cit.
” Fackler and Breiby, Report of Condition, op. cit., Schedule A, p. 1.
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Table X VI (Continued)

Description

Appraised
Amount of Book Value Less
Value Less
Encumbrances Encumbrances Encumbrances

Fraternal Bank
and Trust Co.
308 Beal Avenue
Memphis, Tenn..............

18,030.39

Willowdale Plantation
Wash. County, Miss......

None

103,900.00

Copeland Plantation
Wash. County, Miss......

None

16,221.74

25,719.61

26,800.00
5,000.00

On September 9, 1931 the company’s total real estate holdings
comprised 91 pieces of property of which the book value was $2,150,906.56 and the encumbrances, $497,280.39. The appraised value
minus encumbrances was only $397,515.00.
In its real estate dealings the company engaged in the develop
ment of Hunter Terrace Subdivision in Atlanta, Georgia. It lost
heavily in this venture. The unsold portion, listed as “ Unimproved
Property” in Table XVI, was appraised in 1923 at about one-twen
tieth of its book value. The company also bought a leasehold for
$65,000 on the property in which its subsidiary, the Citizens Trust
Company, was situated. Despite the fact that National Benefit
funds were used to purchase the leasehold, the trust company was
charged no rent by the National Benefit. The leasehold was ap
praised as being of no value.
Real estate is well-known as a poor investment for insurance
companies. As shown by the investigation of the Temporary Na
tional Economic Committee, real estate of all classes of assets held
by insurance companies in 1937 had by far the lowest net yield.
According to this investigation the yield on the various classes of
assets was as follows: policy loans, 5.9% ; stocks, 5.9% ; farm
mortgages, 5 % ; Canadian government bonds, 4.5% ; United
States, state, county and municipal bonds, 4.1% ; industrial bonds,
3.6% ; U. S. government bonds, 1.95%; and the gross real estate
(10 per cent), minus expenses and taxes (8-7 per cent) gave a net
of 1.3%. The return on real estate was too low even to maintain a
reserve, but the National Benefit had more than one-sixth of its
investments in real estate. The National Benefit had few mortgage
holdings, although mortgages are rated highly as investments for
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insurance companies and savings banks. Table XVII contains the
ratio of mortgages held by the company relative to its assets. The
mortgages as shown were negligible except in 1931 when they were
27 per cent of assets. Yet the ratio of mortgages held by the 308
legal reserve companies [See Table X I] was never below 19 per
cent of assets (1938) varying from a high of 43.1 per cent (1927)
to a low of 33.4 per cent (1916) in the period of 1916 to 1931.
Table XVII
MORTGAGE HOLDINGS OF
THE NATIONAL BENEFIT LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
1918-1931
Year

Amount

1918 ..........................
27
1919 ..........................
None
1920 ..........................
None
1921 ..........................
None
1922 ..........................
None
1923 .........................................
1924 ..........................
None
1925 .......................... 11,010
1926............................. 30,570
1927 .......................... 217,778
1928 .......................... 364,525
1929 .......................... 482,381
1930 .......................... 549,561
1931 .......................... 287,264

Per cent of Total Assets
.......
.......
.......
.......
.......
.......
.......
.90
1.88
3.73
5.64
7.26
9.08
27.08

The National Benefit did not enter the mortgage market until
1925. In 1927 it acquired a number of mortgages when it took over
the Standard Life business. By 1931 it had 120 mortgages on urban
and farm property in fourteen states, including a mortgage with a
book value of $75,134.19 on the Pythian Temple in Wheeling, West
Virginia. This mortgage was later sold for $20,000.
The investment possibilities of mortgages was apparently never
realized by the officers of the National Benefit. Scant attention was
paid to the mortgage lending activities of the company. There was
no systematized method of handling these activities of the business.
Payments made to the company on interest and principal were con
fused. Parcels foreclosed were, in some cases, carried in the Mort
gage Ledger instead of being transferred to the Real Estate Ledger.
Some mortgages were not included in the Detail Ledger at all. Sup
porting documents were misplaced. The practice of proper investi
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gation and the searching of titles was not invariably followed, nor
was legal advice secured in doubtful cases. Lack of attention was
undoubtedly partly responsible for the status of the mortgages in
1931 as shown in Table XVIII.
Table XVIII
Status of Mortgages, Sept. 9, 1931
National Benefit Life Insurance Company11
No. of
Mtgs.

Face
or Book
Value

Receivers
Valuation

Interest
Due and Unearned
Accrued Interest

43
77

270,846.97
131,651.99

184,887.88
151,766.25

2,502.50
11,485.40

1,378.00
7,239.00

Total .................... 120 402,498.96

336,654.13

13,987.90

8,617.00

Mortgage
Loans
In D efault...........
Not in Default ....

The degree to which the investment policy of the company was
influenced by individuals is, of course, impossible of determination.
However, one person who exerted an important influence upon the
investment as well as underwriting activities of the company was
Alfred B. Dawson, financial advisor and actuary for the company.
Alfred B. Dawson
Alfred B. Dawson was a member of the firm of Miles M. Dawson
and Son. The firm rose to popularity and influence as a result of the
senior Dawson’s work on the Hughes Committee in 1906. In addi
tion to being official actuary for the Hughes Committee, Miles M.
Dawson was an important writer on actuarial matters. The influ
ence of the firm was further heightened by the fact that prior to the
time that colleges offered courses in actuarial science the firm trained
many of the actuaries in state insurance departments. Thus, the
firm was known and respected throughout the East. In the early
twenties it appears that the son, Alfred B. Dawson, exerted more
influence in the firm than formerly. It appears, further, that he
personally, rather than the firm, handled many of the affairs of the
National Benefit.
For several years, the firm of Fackler and Breiby were actuaries
for the National Benefit. It appears, however, that with the be
ginning of serious difficulties the company engaged Miles M. Dawson
and Son. In connection with its services to the company Fackler
and Breiby say: “ For several years we had calculated and reported
annually to the National Benefit on its policy reserve liabilities as of
December 31st of each year, based on schedules o f insurance in
11ibid., Schedule B, p. 1.
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force sent us by the company, and for the correctness of which we
had no responsibility. Our reports to which we made affidavit,
stated that the calculations were based upon enumerated schedules
of insurance supplied by the company. . . . The last of such policy
reserve calculations, or valuation, requested by, and made for, the
company was that for December 31, 1926, which we reported to the
company under date of March 28, 1927” .12 During the latter part
of this period in which Fackler and Breiby were making calculations
for the company the firm of Miles M. Dawson and Son were en
gaged to do the same work without the knowledge of Fackler and
Breiby. The calculations of reserve as made by Miles M. Dawson
were on a different basis from those made by Fackler and Breiby and
for this reason were lower. “ In these valuations Miles M. Dawson
and Son employed reserve bases which produced reserves less than
those provided for by the terms of the policies. In fact in the val
uations for the years subsequent to 1926, the reserve standards were
lowered still further. The inclusion in the company’s annual state
ment of policy reserve calculated on such low reserve standards,
produced an apparent surplus in each year which would not have
been the case had the reserve been set up on the bases required by
the policies” .13 For only two years did the company report a
reserve as high as that calculated by Fackler and Breiby. Thus, in
the very beginning Dawson was engaged because he was willing to
strain ethics in order to give the National Benefit the appearance
of a more favorable financial position. Table X IX gives a comparison
of the reserve as calculated by Miles M. Dawson and Son and by
Fackler and Breiby.
Table X IX
Summary of Reports on Policy Reserve Calculations for the
National Benefit Life Insurance Company,
1921-193014

By Miles M.
Dawson & Son

As per
Co.’s Annual
Statement

Capital &
Surplus
Reported
by Co.

............. $377,034
(Not available)
................ 461,592
438,840
................ 662,545
573,028
...............
873,898 (Not available)

$377,034
461,592
558,560
676,008

$175,749
160,202
202,624
196,782

Reserve
Dec. 31st
1921
1922
1923
1924

By Fackler
and Breiby

12Fackler and Breiby, Report No. 2, op. eit., p. 7.
Mibid., p. 8.
14Fackler and Breiby, Report No. 2, op. cit., p. 9.
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Table X IX (Continued)

Reserve
Dec. 31st

By Fackler
and Breiby

1925...............
935,004
1926............... 1,351,664
1927...............(Not valued)
1928............... (After 1926)
1929...............
1930...............

By Miles M.
Dawson & Son
746,484
1,024,409
(Not available)
(Not available)
(Not available)
(Not available)

As per
Co.’s Annual
Statement

Capital &
Surplus
Reported
by Co.

813,546
1,024,409
4,526,132
4,841,605
5,285,844
4,768,222

176,589
325,000
423,419
390,438
360,531
386,939

Three major transactions in which the National Benefit engaged
are generally credited to Dawson. The ingeniousness of the trans
actions would indicate that they were the ideas of one of Dawson’s
training and experience. Moreover, any one of the three transactions
would have successfully achieved its purpose if the National Benefit
had been sound and had had a steady flow of business on which to
depend. They were essentially temporary measures. The three
transactions referred to were the underwriting of 9,000 shares of
stock by the Rutherfords and Smith, the creation of the voting
trust, and the issuing of interim certificates.
The 9,000 share deal grew out of the need of increasing the
capital and surplus of the company. This need was recognized and
discussed as early as 1917, for in the directors’ meeting of Decem
ber 29, 1917, there was discussed the “ need of increasing capital and
surplus; issue of 9,000 shares to Rutherford, Smith, and Rutherford
and financing thereof” . However, no action was taken until after
Dawson had become the company’s financial advisor. In October,
1927, R. H. Rutherford wrote Dawson: “ It is our desire that you
personally step out of your shoes as consulting actuary for the time
being and act as our fiscal agent. . . .” In December of the same
year action was taken towards underwriting the 9,000 shares of
stock. The minutes of the directors’ meeting of December 30,
1927, state: “ The President stated that, due to the absorption of
the Standard Life Insurance Company during the present year, it
appeared not only highly desirable, but imperative, that the financial
statement of this company which is to be issued at the close of
business December 31, 1927, show an increase of capital and surplus
* accounts of this company, and this opinion being heartily concurred
in by the other Directors, was also advised by Mr. Alfred B. Dawson,
the actuary and financial advisor o f this company. . . After a
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thorough discussion of the matter and it appearing that there is
authorized 9,000 shares of the capital stock remaining in the treasury,
and the time within which this stock must be sold, if the proceeds
are to go into the treasury and be shown in the company’s state
ment as of December 31, 1927, is extremely limited; and R .H.
Rutherford, Mortimer F. Smith, and S. W. Rutherford expressing
their willingness to purchase the said 9,000 shares of treasury
stock at the price of $50 per share, less selling expenses, but at this
time not sufficient funds [being] in hand to pay the company the pur
chase price in cash, the following solution is duly made, seconded
and adopted. . . . ” 15 The minutes continued with details of
the plan. The officers were to borrow money to purchase the stock
and in turn sell the stock for $50 a share cash or $55 a share on
time. As the deal actually went through, the stock was issued to
the Rutherfords and Smith at $50 a share, or $450,000, less a selling
expense allowance of 15 per cent, or $67,500, $22,500 of which was
paid to the officers concerned in cash shortly after the issue of the
stock prior to the “ re-sale” of any of the stock. Meanwhile, the
officers had paid nothing for the 9,000 shares which stood in their
names. What they had done was to make a loan in their names at
the National Park Bank of New York City for $382,500 ($450,000
less $67,500) and pledged the 9,000 shares as collateral. In addi
tion, 4,078 shares in the names of Rutherford, Smith, and Ruther
ford, a guarantee of payment in the name o f the National Benefit,
as well as the certificate of deposit in the name of the National
Benefit for the $382,500 were held as collateral. Thus, though the
officers paid nothing and no cash was made available to the com
pany, the company carried among its assets the pledged certificate,
listing it as cash, and increased its capital accordingly. The books
were made to appear as if an outright sale of stock had been made
and $382,500 in cash realized by the company.
Dawson’s part in the above transaction is indicated in a letter
which he wrote on March 2, 1929, to Daniel C. Boney, Insurance
Commissioner of North Carolina. The letter indicates that if Daw
son did not engineer the entire transaction, it was done with his full
knowledge and consent. The letter stated the following: “ On the
occasion of my calling Superintendent of Insurance Baldwin on
the long distance telephone today in regard to another matter, he
tells me that you have been worried about the financial condition
o f The National Benefit Life Insurance Company of Washington,
D. C. . . . I well recall receiving a letter from you some time
last summer in which you indicated that you thought the loan obtained
15Quoted from Fackler and Breiby, op. cit., Report No. 1, p. 12.
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by Rutherford, Smith and Rutherford from the National Park Bank
as of December 31st, to underwrite the heavy subscription of stock
prior to distribution of same in small lots, was a liability to the
National Benefit and should so be set up in the statement. I did not at
the time burden you with a lengthy explanation and point out the
error of your reasoning from an accounting standpoint, because I ex
pected to see you shortly and preferred to wait until then and give
you complete details of the whole transaction and I will not now
so burden you with a long letter other than to tell you that any
liability on the National Benefit’s part as of December 31st was
only after all other manner of payment had failed. The liability
to the company was so contingent and remote as a liability on the
part of the company that the examiners could not even set it up as a
liability. In fact it was too contingent to even call for a footnote
on the statement; and as evidence and proof in regard thereto,
permit me to state that $103,500 was paid off on the note by the
borrowers, Rutherford, Smith and Rutherford, on December 27,
1928. . . . The net sale value of the collateral deposited by the
borrowers and their friends with the National Park Bank on their
loan of $382,500 was $588,123, and in addition thereto life insur
ance policies on the lives of borrowers amounting approximately
to $120,000. For your advance information (I mention as advance
for the reason that the Annual Statement at December 31st being
verified by the Insurance Department examiners is not yet out nor
will it be for a while) upon payment of $103,500 to the National
Park Bank, the borrowers obtained a loan on December 27, 1928
from the Central National Bank of Cleveland, Ohio, of $279,000
depositing as collateral securities having a net value of $588,123,
the proceeds of which loan with the Central National is invested
in a certificate of deposit of $279,000 payable to the order of the
National Benefit Life Insurance Company on 30 days’ notice and
bearing 31/£% interest. . . . The renewal of the balance due the
National Park Bank was switched to the Central for the reason that
the Central National would allow 31 / 2 % interest on the certificate of
deposit and I anticipate that with the subscriptions to voting trust
certificates already in hand at December 27, 1928, and the installment
payments which they will collect in 1929 on such 1928 subscriptions,
together with the subscriptions to voting trust certificates received in
the first six months of this year, there will be a very small balance, if
any, outstanding as of December 27, 1 9 2 9 .... As a matter of fact the
underwriting syndicate, Rutherford, Smith and Rutherford, could
have still further reduced the amount of their loan at December 27,
1928, but inasmuch as the original certificates of deposit at the
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National Park were for $103,000 and $279,000, it appeared to me, in
order to make a cleanout record of the same, advisable to substitute or
exchange as of a given date the higher interest bearing certificate of
deposit of the Central National for the certificate of deposit of the
National Park for a like amount. . . . If you so wish, I will obtain
either photostatic records or have copies made of all of the various
resolutions, letters, etc. in connection with this transaction, as well as
the closing out of the National Park transaction, but wish to assure
you, Commissioner Boney, that while the National Benefit Life Insur
ance Company has its problems concerned with the Standard Life
Division Policyholders’ account, its own assets will liquidate at a profit
and it had no liabilities other than as set forth in its statement. I
have been accused of unduly marking down assets and also of setting
up unnecessary reserves, but in twenty years’ experience in dealing
with large and small companies, as well as fraternals, I have never
been accused of— nor have I— underestimated liabilities” .16
Dawson was also active in effecting the voting trust agreement
by which the National Benefit was controlled. The voting trust
agreement that he drew up was read at the directors’ meeting of
January 7, 1928. In it he named the Rutherfords and Smith as
trustees. The final voting trust agreement was dated March 21, 1928
and named the Rutherfords and Smith, as well as Charles B. Lee,
treasurer, as trustees. The voting trust controlled 13,484 shares
of the company’s stock. Of this 13,078 shares, including the 9,000
shares discussed above, stood in the name o f the Rutherfords and
Smith; 328 shares in the name of Charles B. Lee; and 74 shares in
the names of employees. The stock was deposited with the Guaranty
Trust Company of New York City which by the terms o f agreement
was appointed registrar and transfer agent. In place of the stock
deposited with it the Guaranty Trust Company issued voting trust
certificates. The 13,078 shares of stock held as collateral for the
loan by which the 9,000 shares were “ sold” was exchanged for
voting trust certificates.
The plan apparently was to sell the voting trust certificates of
the Rutherfords and Smith and apply the proceeds to paying off
the loan at the bank. The voting trust agreement was entered into
because the sale of 9,000 shares of stock, when the Rutherfords and
Smith together held only 4,078, might cause the Rutherfords and
Smith to lose control of the company. However, as arrangements
for sale of voting trust certificates were made, the underwriting
syndicate (Rutherfords and Smith) was unable to withdraw certifi
cates for delivery. To circumvent this, the syndicate issued and
16Report No. 2, op. cit., Appendix D.
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sold, in lieu of voting trust certificates, interim certificates. These
were merely promises of the syndicate to make future delivery of
voting trust certificates.
In these and other financial arrangements Dawson made for
the company, all of which were, on the whole, quite ingenious and
might have achieved their purposes under different circumstances,
the fact that the National Benefit was a small company and that it
did not have a steady, dependable flow of revenue, sources of credit,
and a market for stock, was lost sight of. However, it was prin
cipally, due to Dawson’s skill in financial techniques, that receivership
or dissolution was not forced upon the company sooner. But in
accomplishing this, which later proved not to have been the wisest
procedure, it appears that he had violated the ethics of his pro
fession. On June 21, 1981, Dawson committed suicide. The tragedy
occurred four days after the downfall of the Rutherfords and the
election of John Risher as president of the company.
A Maze of Manipulation
Investigations of the books of the National Benefit revealed a
maze of manipulation. The omissions and doubtful classifications
found in the books “ were not usually the fault or error of the ac
counting department, but arose from the practice of the executive
officers (especially the two Rutherfords and Smith) of carrying out
transactions which were never entered on the books at all, delayed in
entry for a long period, or wholly misstated when entered” .17 The
equities were confused between the Standard Life Division and the
National Benefit Division. There were irregularities in transactions
with the subsidiary, the Citizens’ Trust Company of Atlanta. For
the period between January 1st and July 30th, 1931, according to
the bank’s statements, $31,980.70 of checks were paid that did not
appear on the company’s books. The books were so out of line with
actual facts that frequent “ correcting” or “ adjusting” entries were
necessary. One such entry dated December 31, 1930 and made by
P. J. McDermott, then assistant to Dawson, filled several pages and
affected nearly every account of the general ledger.
These attempts of the officers to maintain solvency “ on the
books” and thereby forestall legal bankruptcy only delayed the inevi
table failure. For several years prior to its failure the National
Benefit had been nothing more than a living corpse. In the later
years investment principles were disregarded and many of the com
pany’s transactions, its speculation in stocks and bonds, for example,
were simply the frantic efforts of the doomed to grasp anything that
offered a semblance of hope.
17Fackler and Breiby, op. cit., Report of Condition, Appendix B, p. 3.
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C hapter V

THE COMPANY AND STATE EXAMINATIONS
As in the ease of other Negro financial institutions, state author
ities appeared to be extremely lax in forcing a strict observance of
the law by the National Benefit. As stated by Fackler and Breiby:
“ The eventual loss to the policyholders was increased by the reinsur
ance of the Standard Life business, and still further increased by the
subsequent manipulation and transactions, which took place during
the several postponements, or continuances, of official examinations.” 1
These conditions which aggravated the loss to policyholders came
about with the knowledge, and in one instance, the consent of insur
ance departments. Why the state insurance departments concerned
approved the reinsurance of the Standard Life business or why some
action was not taken by the insurance examiners when it was al
legedly known by six of them that the National Benefit had a deficit
of $228,724.26 in 1926, has never been explained. Still more puzzling
is why several state insurance departments consented to the suppres
sion of a report of an examination which disclosed irregular trans
actions and a deficit. Other questions have arisen concerning the
integrity and efficiency of the state insurance departments, under
whose jurisdiction the National Benefit operated, and particularly
the District of Columbia Insurance Department which had direct
regulatory powers over the home office. A typical instance of the
regulation of the National Benefit by state insurance departments
may be seen in the minutes of a hearing on the National Benefit Life
Insurance Company by Arkansas, Alabama, Oklahoma, Missouri, Ken
tucky, and the District of Columbia at the Gibson Hotel in Cincin
nati, Ohio, on September 26, 1927. According to the minutes of the
meeting:
A full and complete discussion was had of the National
Benefit Insurance Company and a complete review of the
situation having to do with the reinsurance of the Stand
ard Life of Arkansas by Hon. Frank N. Julian [Supt. Ins.,
Ala.] . . . Actuary Speakman discussed the various mat
ters relative to the affairs of the National Benefit Life In
surance Company, and in view of the conditions as re
ported, it was agreed by all present that the examination
now being conducted should be continued [postponed] and
a report prepared as of December 31, 1927; this continu1 Fackler and Breiby, Report No. 2, op. cit., p. 23.
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ance being granted in order to enable the company to ad
just a number of its affairs, with advice to the examiners
that if matters complained of were not adjusted by Nov
ember 1, 1927, another conference was to be called at the
discretion of the examiners.2
The minutes continue:
After considerable discussion concerning the examination
generally, the following motion was duly made, seconded
and carried unanimously:
Whereas, in the fall of 1926, the insurance de
partments of Alabama, Arkansas, and Okla
homa demanded an examination of the Stand
ard Life Insurance Company of Arkansas and
the transactions leading up to the formation
of the Standard Life Insurance Company of
Arkansas; and
Whereas, on or about December, 1926, an ex
amination of the Standard Life Insurance Com
pany of Arkansas was arranged with the
states of Alabama, Arkansas and Oklahoma;
and
Whereas, upon starting the examination, it was
learned that the Standard Life Insurance Com
pany of Arkansas had entered into negotiations
with the National Benefit Life Insurance Com
pany of Washington, D. C., and had in January,
1927, consummated a reinsurance contract, the
Department of Insurance of the District of
Columbia was invited to join with Alabama,
Arkansas and Oklahoma in making said exam
ination. The examination progressed and the
reinsurance agreement with the National Bene
fit Life Insurance Company was consummated.
Following the examination, a hearing was held
in the city of Washington, during the month
of June 1927. At said meeting, Arkansas, Ala
bama and Oklahoma instructed the examiners
to proceed with an examination of the National
Benefit Life Insurance Company at the earliest
possible date, and request the District of Col
umbia and Kentucky to join therein.
’ ibid., pp. 18-19.
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The examinations referred to seem to have been conducted by F.
M. Speakman, representing Arkansas, Alabama and Oklahoma, and
P. J. McDermott representing the District of Columbia. A report
of this examination is not available. However, there are two reports,
both dated May 1, 1928, of another examination conducted by F. M.
Speakman. The examination was made for the states of Alabama,
Arkansas, Kentucky, Oklahoma, Missouri, and the District of Colum
bia. One copy of each report was allegedly sent to the following six
state insurance officials:
1. T. M. Baldwin, Superintendent of Insurance, D. C.
2. Geo. H. Thigpen, Superintendent of Insurance, Alabama.
3. J. S. Maloney, Insurance Commissioner, Arkansas.
4. S. M. Soufley, Insurance Commissioner, Kentucky.
5. J. G. Read, Insurance Commissioner, Oklahoma.
6. Ben C. Hyde, Superintendent of Insurance, Missouri.
One report revealed the deficit and the other damaging facts about
the National Benefit. Another report concealed them. The latter
was accepted and approved by the following:
1. J. M. Baldwin, Superintendent of Insurance, D. C.
2. Geo. H. Thigpen, Superintendent of Insurance, Alabama.
3. S. M. Soufley, Insurance Commissioner, Kentucky.
4. Robert E. Daly, Actuary, Insurance Department, Missouri.
5. J. G. Read, Insurance Commissioner, Oklahoma.
This latter report was filed and became the official report for the
company as of December 31, 1927. In this “ official” report certain
facts revealing the condition of the company were omitted. The fol
lowing statement appeared in the suppressed report:
The annual statements for the years under examination
were verified and found to agree insofar as the company’s
books were concerned, the differences, consisting prin
cipally of various liabilities not reported in their annual
statements.8
In the “ official” report the same statement read as follows:
The annual statements submitted to the insurance depart
ments for the years under consideration were verified,
and the figures therein found to be in accordance with
the company’s books.4
Similarly, the suppressed report carried the following two para
graphs which were entirely deleted from the “ official” report:
We are attaching to this report “ Exhibits #2 and #3”
Comparative Financial Statements of the National Bene' i b i d Appendix.
‘

ibid.
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fit Life Insurance Company as of December 31, 1926,
showing the differences between the assets and liabilities
as reported by the company and as determined by your
examiners.
You will note that the company reported a surplus of
$150,000 and a Special Contingent Reserve of $2,359.44,
whereas we show a deficit, including capital stocks, of
$228,724.26. We have commented on the differences under
their respective headings.5
The following paragraphs concerning stock transactions were also
omitted from the filed report:
On December 31, 1926, the Company increased its capital
stock account the sum of $14,550.00 and its surplus ac
count the sum of $135,450.00 through money borrowed
from the Delta Penny Savings Bank of Indianola, Miss.,
and the Solvent Savings Bank of Memphis, Tenn., in the
names of M. F. Smith, C. B. King, and T. W. Johnson, the
banks crediting the account of the company the amount so
borrowed. According to the books of the company, the
stock was sold to R. H. Rutherford, President; S. W. Ruth
erford, Secretary and M. F. Smith, Assistant Secretary,
King and Johnson, totalling $150,000.00 was repaid by the
company during the year 1927 and charged to the follow
ing accounts:
1. H. I. Brown, Collateral Loan....$ 75,000.00
2. M. F. Smith, Loan.......................
4,000.00
3. Commissions to Officers............. 13,675.00
4. Cash rec’d on sale of stock......... 31,575.58
5. Cash deficit in Liberty
National B a n k ............................. 32,185.75
Total........... $156,436.33
In May, 1927, the Company sent $90,000.00 to the Solvent
Savings Bank to pay off some of the notes of Smith, King,
and Johnson, and put the expenditure on their books in
the form of a collateral loan to C. B. Rollins, and made it
appear that C. B. Rollins paid off his loan on June 30,
1927, when in reality the $90,000.00 was repaid in the form
of a collateral loan to H. I. Brown, an employee of the
company, amounting to $75,000.00 and the balance of
$15,000.00 from funds received through the sale of their
stock and not entered on the Company’s books. The H. I.
*ibid.
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Brown loan was put on the books of the Company as of
July 5,1927, and when questioned, Brown admitted that he
merely acted as a straw man in the transaction and did not
receive the money or put up any collateral.
The M. F. Smith loan, amounting to $4,000.00, was used
to help pay off the notes and was charged on the company’s
books to an account called Miscellaneous.
Commissions were paid to the officers of the company
amounting to $13,675.00 on account of the stock which
was sold them, according to the books, and this amount
was used to apply on the notes.
The Company received cash in the amount o f $31,575.58
through sales of their Capital Stock, and this amount
was not entered on their books, but was used to pay off
the notes of Smith, King and Johnson.
The Company transferred cash from time to time to the
Liberty National Bank, and according to the Company’s
books, had a balance in that bank of $32,185.75, when in
reality the account had been closed and the funds used
to pay off the notes.
The Company in addition to paying off the notes of Smith,
King and Johnson in full, paid interest on them, amount
ing to $6,436.33.
The officers of the Company state that they consummated
the above transaction to show a large surplus in their
Financial Statement as of December 31, 1926, so that
there would be no question as to their financial condi
tion in acquiring the Standard Life Insurance Company,
which Company was acquired in January 1927. It ap
pears to have been the intention of the officers to sell
the stock to the public and pay off the notes with the pro
ceeds, but the bank called for payment before they had a
chance to dispose of the stock.
Your examiners, in eliminating the above transaction in
its entirety, and recalculating the Company’s non-ledger
assets and liabilities as of December 31, 1926, showed the
Company to be insolvent by the amount of $68,274.26,
and at a meeting of the Insurance Commissioners held
at Cincinnati on September 26, 1927, [hearing mentioned
above] at which a representative of the company was
present, it was agreed to allow the company a limited
time in which to make good the amount required, and
it was finally decided to bring the report down to De-
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cember 31, 1927, in order to give the company sufficient
time to make good this amount.
This insolvent condition of the company on December
31, 1926, was caused principally by their writing entirely
too much business for their surplus. In the company’s
annual statement for the year 1926 to the insurance
departments, the market value of real estate owned was
increased arbitrarily and various liabilities not included.
Your examiners, in arriving at the above insolvency,
secured appraisals during the course of the examination
on the company’s real estate, allowing them the values
secured, and set up all liabilities of the company.
With respect to the reserve it was stated in the suppressed report
that:
On December 31, 1926, the Company arbitrarily reduced
its industrial insurance in force by the sum of $300,000
to take care of probable lapses. Your examiners do not
approve of this method, and would recommend that the
company report all business in force in the future and
value the policies accordingly.
In the suppressed report it was noted that although insolvent, “ In
May, 1927, the company declared a dividend of six per cent on the
shares outstanding” .8
It appears that another examination was made as of December
31, 1928. Such an examination was referred to in a letter by
T. M. Baldwin, then Superintendent of Insurance of the District of
Columbia, to the executive officers of the Company advising them
of the action taken at a hearing on the National Benefit Life Insur
ance Company at Chicago, on June 4, 1929. Mr. Baldwin stated:
At the hearing held at the Edgewater Beach Hotel, Chi
cago, on June 4, 1929, for the purpose of considering the
financial condition of your company at December 31, 1928,
as found by the examiners representing the Insurance
Departments of Alabama, Arkansas, District of Colum
bia, Kentucky, Missouri, and Oklahoma, set forth in the
annual statement as submitted, I was instructed to ac
quaint you with the various matters under consideration
and advise you directly concerning certain resolutions
unanimously adopted.
For your information, the Insurance Department of
North Carolina was invited to participate in the hearing
. . .
After a general discussion of the Company’s
• ibid.
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affairs the financial statement at December 31, 1928 was
approved as set up by the examiners, but no formal
written report was requested covering transactions for
the year of 1928.
It was unanimously agreed by all those present that,
pending the outcome of the transactions of the Company
for the year 1929, consideration be deferred in the matter
of a further examination and final report.
On motion made, duly seconded and unanimously carried,
it was Resolved, that Superintendent of Insurance Bald
win be and hereby is requested to inform the Company’s
chief executive officers of the exceptions taken by the
insurance departments in regard to certain real estate
holdings and bond investments of the company, and fur
ther instruct the Company that all investments shall here
after be subject to the approval of Mr. Alfred B. Dawson.
Mr. Dawson promised on behalf of the Company to advise
the insurance departments represented at this hearing in
regard to the status of the investments in bonds and real
estate as of June 30, 1929, and what transactions have
taken place in the interim to carry out the Department’s
recommendations, and to also advise as to what program
had been agreed upon to bring about an early improve
ment in the present investment situation.7
These hearings and examinations were a source of considerable
expense to the Company. For example, the expenses of the insur
ance commissioners of Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, Oklahoma,
Missouri, and South Carolina for attendance at a hearing on De
cember 5, 1927 amounted to $1,468.80. Similar expenses for a
hearing on May 14, 1928, amounted to $1,950.67 and on May 28,
1929, $500,00. This, of course, was in addition to the direct work
on examinations. F. M. Speakman and his associate, E. P. Higgins,
actuaries for several state insurance departments on examinations of
the National Benefit, made charges as follows for actuarial services in
connection with official examinations: $42,973.25 for 1927; $24,783.51
for 1928; $9,726.30 for 1929; and $630 for 1930— a total of $78,113.06.
P. J. McDermott, Special Examiner for the District of Columbia,
drew the following sums for actuarial services in connection with
official examinations and reports: $11,390.00 in 1927; $10,352.84 in
1928; $10,551.65 in 1929; $15,376.29 in 1930; and $8,684.17 in 1931—
a total of $56,354.95.
Payments to Miles M. Dawson and Son, the Company’s actuaries,
'ibid.
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were far in excess of those already cited. For the same years they
received the following: $30,647.81 in 1927; $52,054.47 in 1928; $46,874.24 in 1929; $66,833.46 in 1930; and $44,661.64 in the first six
months of 1931— a total of $241,071.62. For the same period there
was paid to the legal firm of Dawson and Dawson, of which A. B.
Dawson was a member, the sum of $7,354.20. In addition to the fore
going, payments amounting to $2,975.10 in 1927 and $772.00 in 1928
were made to Fackler and Breiby, another firm of actuaries. Thus, in
a period of approximately four and one-half years the National Bene
fit paid $392,534.40 for examinations and actuarial services.
Though large sums were paid for actuarial services the efforts
of the actuaries were not directed primarily towards the formulation
of a sound underwriting policy. While the actuaries did realize the
uniqueness and difficulties of the underwriting problem of the Na
tional Benefit, investment problems because of their critical char
acter monopolized most of their time and attention.
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Chapter VI
COLLAPSE STUDIED FROM COURT RECORDS
The receivership of the National Benefit was the result of the
petition of an officer of the company rather than the action of the
District of Columbia Insurance Department. John R. Pinkett, for
mer vice-president and agency director, instituted the action which
resulted in receivership for the company. Pinkett had formerly
been agency director for the Standard Life Insurance and resigned
when the Standard Life was taken over by the Southern Insurance
Company. His resignation was in protest against the manner in
which the deal between the Standard Life and the Southern was
carried out. As agency director for the National Benefit it had
been his duty to present the company to the public. Because of this
many policyholders and agents looked to him for an explanation
of the rumors concerning the financial status of the company. This
and the desire to clear himself of responsibility for the condition of
the company probably prompted his action in instituting the suit
against the company. In his “ Bill for Receivership and Dissolution”
filed September 10, 1931, or the case of John Randolph Pinkett
versus The National Benefit Life Insurance Company,1 a clear ac
count of the financial condition is given. He alleged:
That plaintiff [John R. Pinkett] has been employed by
or connected with the defendant corporation since Feb
ruary 10, 1925; his employment being Agency Director,
Ordinary Department, and thereafter, on February 26,
1931; he became Third Vice-President and Manager of
Agencies in charge of the entire field forces, being then
elected a member of the Board of Directors and a member
of the Executive Committee.
That up to said time, the employment of plaintiff
was such that he had no knowledge of what was being
done by the officers and executives of the company and he
had no means of ascertaining and was therefore without
any suspicion as to any improprieties or misconduct on
the part of any officer or employee of the company,
having full faith in the integrity of all, and believing
that said company was in all respects financially sound
and that its investments were made with care and caution.
1Petition for Receivership and Dissolution, Equity No. 53,391, D. C. Supreme
Court, John R. Pinkett v. National Benefit Life Insurance Company.
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That some few months after the elevation or ad
vancement of plaintiff, that is, in June, 1931, plaintiff
obtained information and knowledge of facts and cir
cumstances in connection with the conduct of the com
pany, its chai'acter of investments, and its methods of
doing business, which aroused him and disturbed him to
the extent that he sought the advice of his personal counsel
as to his duty, his obligations to the policyholders, and his
rights as an officer and director of said Company. That
upon the advice of said counsel, he continued observing
the affairs of the company and sought to avoid doing any
thing that would disturb or affect the financial standing
of the company, but at all times being concerned and
becoming more and more concerned as to what was being
done, and to what was the real financial status of the
Company.
That the plaintiff learned others were becoming dis
turbed and that others were seeking to ascertain what
was the real situation, what was the financial status of
the Company, what was the condition of the assets of
the Company, the investments, etc., with the final result
that plaintiff became so disturbed that he would have
insisted upon some legal action, except for the fact that
the officers of said company signified a willingness to
thrash out the differences and to give the full facts, all
resulting finally in the plaintiff’s tendering his resignation
and seeking to sever his connection with said Company,
which said resignation was tendered on June 17, 1931.
That at said time, the President of said Company, the
First Vice-President and Chairman of the Board, the
Second Vice-President and Comptroller, the Fourth VicePresident and Medical Director, and the Treasurer, all
resigned; and the present officers of said Company were
elevated in their place and stead. Upon invitation from
said newly elected officers your plaintiff permitted them
to re-elect him as an officer of said company in the ca
pacity of Second Vice-President and Manager of Agencies,
which position he now holds and has held since that date.
This position was accepted by plaintiff after he had ad
vised with the Commissioner of Insurance of the District
of Columbia, and had requested of said Commissioner of
Insurance that an examination be made at once into the
affairs of said Company, and further after he was advised
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by the present President of said Company that they, like
your plaintiff, were desirous of having, and would request
an authorization of the authorities of the several states
where the company was doing business, to make a full
examination and investigation into the financial status
and affairs of the company, its investments, the conduct
of the former officers, and to furnish the present officers
(including your plaintiff) with a full analysis and state
ment as to the financial condition of the company and all
of its obligations and the condition of all of its assets
and investments.
That since the election of the new Board, your
plaintiff has been diligently examining and looking into
the affairs of the company, its investments, its capital, its
outstanding obligations, its general financial status, and
has advised from day to day with representatives of the
several Insurance Departments which are now making
an examination of, and who have for some time been
examining into the affairs of said company, with the
result that the folowing facts have been developed and
admitted to be facts by the present officers of said com
pany, or most of the present officers, all of which facts,
however, existed and were in fact in existence at the time
of the election of the present Board of Directors and
Officers of said Company, that is to say:
1. That there is at the present time outstanding, due and
unpaid to policyholders for death, sick and accident
claims, a sum in excess of $100,000.
2. That there is now due, outstanding and unpaid to
policyholders by way of surrender values and policy loans
a sum totaling about $150,000. All represented by de
mands and claims of said policyholders upon the Com
pany.
3. That in 1927, one R. H. Rutherford, S. W. Rutherford,
and Mortimer F. Smith, who were at that time in charge
of said Company as President, Secretary and General
Manager, and Assistant Secretary, of the defendant
corporation, entered into a certain agreement whereby
and under the terms o f which, they undertook to pur
chase 9,000 shares of capital stock of the defendant
corporation, which said 9,000 shares of capital stock
[were], as represented by them, then in the treasury of
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corporation and unsold. The consideration to be paid the
Company by the said parties for said stock being $50
per share, less $7.50 per share, to cover selling expenses
which was supplemented by a further agreement by an
adidtional charge of $2.50 per share, or a total of $10.00
per share, which entitled the company under the terms
of said purchase and sale to $360,000 in cash.
4. That there was then issued on the books of the com
pany certificates representing 9,000 shares of stock,
which certificates were signed by the said R. H. Ruther
ford, and S. W. Rutherford, as President and Secretary
of said defendant corporation, or by others designated
by them for said purpose, and said stock was delivered
to, or taken by the said R. H. Rutherford, S. W. Ruther
ford, and Mortimer F. Smith, and placed in a bank or
trust company as security for an alleged loan of $382,500,
which said loan, however, was guaranteed by the de
fendant corporation, and for which said loan not a single
cent was ever paid into the treasury of the defendant
corporation by the said R. H. Rutherford, S. W. Ruther
ford, and Mortimer F. Smith, or by any other person
for or on their behalf, although the said R. H. Rutherford,
5. W. Rutherford, and Mortimer F. Smith claim to have
paid into the treasury of the company $103,500 in the
Potomac Joint Stock Land Bank bonds, $29,000 worth of
miscellaneous mortgages which have been shown since to
have no appreciable value.
5. That plaintiff is advised that there was a certain note
executed by the said R. H. Rutherford, S. W. Rutherford,
and Mortimer F. Smith at the Guardian Trust Company
of Cleveland, Ohio, under the date of December 27, 1929
in the sum of $250,000 payable in 365 days, and renewed
in December 1930, for another period of 365 days, with
interest thereon at the rate of 6% per annum, payable
monthly; and that plaintiff is advised and upon such
advice states that in fact the said makers thereof under
took to obligate the Company by a guaranty or endorse
ment of some nature, the payment of the full sum of said
$250,000 with interest; and plaintiff is advised that this
$250,000 represents the same obligation, above referred
to, originally in the sum of $382,500. That interest on
said note is overdue and unpaid.
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6. That plaintiff is advised and informed, and upon such
advice and information states that there has been sold
to various agents and representatives of the Company
and to other persons, a number of shares of stock, which
sales were made or undertaken to be made by the said
R. H. Rutherford, S. W. Rutherford, and Mortimer F.
Smith and that there has been paid to the said R. H.
Rutherford, S. W. Rutherford, and Mortimer F. Smith
by the prospective shareholders a very considerable sum
of money, which sum of money was from time to time
deposited in a local bank of the District of Columbia to
the credit of R. H. Rutherford, S. W. Rutherford, and
Mortimer F. Smith. That plaintiff is advised that there
is in said bank to the credit of said account at this time a
small sum of money and about $93,000 in promissory
notes. That the makers of said notes, and the various
and sundry persons who executed and signed agree
ments to purchase various and sundry shares of stock, or
many of them are now demanding that the defendant
corporation pay to them the money paid to the said R. H.
Rutherford, S. W. Rutherford, and Mortimer F. Smith,
upon the ground that these certain parties were officers
of the defendant corporation and the defendant corpora
tion is therefore liable for their acts and should return to
them the money paid, which sum so paid aggregate in
excess of $100,000; that at least one suit has been insti
tuted, and, it is believed that many more suits will be
instituted within the next ten days unless some action is
taken by the court on this petition.
7. That the said former officers of said company, or some
of them entered into a speculative stock and bond account
with Stein Bros, and Boyce which account was opened on
October 31, 1927 and which account shows a loss to the
Company of $462,355.20.2
After the forced resignation of the Rutherfords and the election
of John T. Risher and his regime, Pinkett was re-elected an officer
and director because his stand and views were shared by some of
the new officers. This fact, namely, that the principal officers of
the Company were in accord with the plaintiff in an action against3
3ibid.
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the Company indicated that no defense of the suit would be made.
Thus, other interested parties entered the suit as intervenors.
At the time Pinkett’s petition was filed the license of the com
pany was being revoked in several states, receivership action was
being rumored in others, and in Georgia an action for receivership
was actually pending and the assets of the Company in that state
were being held by the authorities. In view of this and the allega
tions set forth in Pinkett’s bill, which later proved to be substantially
correct, Pinkett asked the court for the appointment of a receiver
and the dissolution of the Company. This bill precipitated litiga
tion which has not as yet terminated. Meanwhile the remaining
assets of the company have all but completely disappeared and no
distribution to stockholders, policyholders, or ordinary creditors
has been as yet made.
The first intervening petition to be filed was that of Charles
B. Lee, a director and former treasurer of the Company. Lee
charged that the appointment of a receiver would be inimical to the
interests of policyholders, stockholders, and creditors and that the
bill of complaint was not filed in good faith. He averred that
Pinkett filed the bill in collusion with the new president of the com
pany, John T. Risher, who, it was alleged, prepared the answer to
the bill before it was filed.3 This intervening petition was the first
of many that were filed. The intervening petitions give some indi
cation of the factionalism in a controversy which was so involved
that it was impossible to organize any single group with the same
general interest. The directors, stockholders, policyholders were
divided into several cliques, each fighting the other. It appears that
the directors were first split into two camps. When Pinkett brought
his action the Rutherfords, of course, were opposed to it. Louis C.
Washington and Charles B. Lee, Treasurer and Comptroller, re
spectively, both rather large stockholders, and although officers and
directors of the company, had no intimate acquaintance with its
affairs. At first they were inclined to join the Rutherfords. How
ever, after many criminal and civil suits were brought against the
Rutherfords, the Rutherfords did not take an active part in opposing
Pinkett’s suit. This left their camp without leadership. Washing
ton and Lee afterwards appear to have acted at times independently
and at times in unison. Risher and Pinkett continued vigorously to
press for the appointment of a receiver. But in his attempt to con
trol the affairs of the Company, Risher sought to stave off the
appointment of receivers in several states until a decision was
rendered in this case.3
3Affidavit of Charles B. Lee.
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The affidavit of Louis C. Washington, filed shortly after the
Pinkett petition, revealed a matter which caused concern. It was
considered important by the clique to obtain the appointment of a
receiver friendly to it. Each wanted to be permitted to exercise
some control over the Company, or at least be connected with it.
The Washington affidavit stated:
. . . That pursuant to the call of the President, a
meeting of the Executive Committee of the Board of
Directors of the National Benefit Life Insurance Com
pany was held at 4 p. m., Thursday, September 10, 1931.
The President, John T. Risher, in calling the committee to
order, stated that the purpose of the meeting was to
inform the comittee that Mr. John R. Pinkett, one of the
members of said committee and Second Vice-President of
The National Benefit Life Insurance Company, had filed
suit in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia,
praying for a receivership and dissolution of the Com
pany. Mr. Risher stated that he, Mr. Pinkett, W. Gwynne
Gardiner, the five colored lawyers for the Company and
Insurance Commissioner Davis, had been in conference
for several days over the subject of a receivership, and
over the best thing to do, and the best way to go about
securing the appointment of a receiver; that Mr. Davis
had secured permission from the District Commissioners
to act as receiver, provided he would serve without com
pensation. That all the lawyers for the stockholders of
the Company had trained their guns upon him (Risher)
and wanted to put him out, ‘but they are going to find me
hard as h------ to get rid o f’ ; that he realized he might be
subject to criticism for conducting such negotiations with
out knowledge and consent of other members of the
Board and Executive Committee, but nevertheless, he
and Mr. Pinkett had decided the course which they had
followed was for the best interest of all concerned; that
due to much unfavorable publicity during the last pre
ceding weeks, he feared that some person unfriendly to
the present administration might seek a receivership and
in that event a receiver unfriendly to the existing admin
istration might be appointed and ‘somebody on the out
side might beat them to it’ . He recommended that the
Executive Committee adopt a resolution recommending
the appointment of Commissioner Davis as receiver and
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recommending to the meeting of the Board of Directors
which would be called for the following day, Friday,
September 11, that the company’s attorneys be instructed
to concur in the allegations set forth in Mr. Pinkett’s bill
and consent to the receivership. This the Executive Com
mittee refused to do.4
From this point on, factionalism increased. Personal attacks
were frequent in the succeeding petitions. Charles B. Lee in his
intervening petition upon the question of appointment of a receiver
gives some indication of the personal bitterness which had developed
in the controversy. He made a severe attack on Risher in an
attempt to dislodge him as president of the company and vigorously
opposed the appointment of any person suggested by Risher or
Pinkett as receiver. He charged that Risher had been derelict in
his duty to the company both as agent in the transaction involving
the purchase of the Masonic Temple and as president. He men
tioned the $25,000 commission received by Risher from the Masonic
organization and an additional $10,000 received from the National
Benefit with the implication that the money received by Risher was
not in accord with the services rendered and that the $10,000 was
not received in due course of business. The petition continued:
Your petitioner further avers that it is the duty of
the directors of defendant corporation, and if a receiver
be appointed, it will be the duty of said receiver, to investi
gate all the matters hereinbefore related concerning said
John T. Risher, and if it should appear proper, to demand
and compel an accounting by and from him, the said
John T. Risher.
But the matter which apparently was of even greater concern to
Lee, was the selection of a person for receiver, if receivership was
not to be avoided.
Your petitioner [he stated] further respectfully rep
resents to this Honorable Court and respectfully urges
that no receiver should be appointed from or among, or
upon the recommendation of any officer, director, stock
holder, or any person interested in said corporation, nor
from any present or former attorney or attorneys of said
defendant corporation or of any of its officers, directors,
‘ Affidavit of Louis B. Washington.
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or stockholders, but that a receiver, if one be appointed,
should be selected by this Court without any recommenda
tion or suggestion whatsoever by or from any officer,
director, or other person interested in the affairs of said
defendant corporation or any former or present attorneys
for said defendant corporation or any of its officers,
directors, stockholders, or other interested persons.
Your petitioner further respectfully urges that this
Court should not appoint any person recommended by said
Risher and said Pinkett and/or their attorneys, and espe
cially should not appoint the person heretofore recom
mended by them, namely, Herbert L. Davis, esq. . . .
Lee’s complaint appears to have carried considerable weight
with the court and helped to shape the opinion on which later its
ruling was based. The opinion of Deputy Superintendent Bryan
of the Insurance Department as reported in the petition is identical
to that which the court expressed later. The petition stated:
That petitioner’s attorney asked said Deputy Super
intendent Bryan whether, in his opinion, the capital stock
of said company was impaired, and if so, whether or not
said company could be saved from utter failure and could be
rehabilitated under proper management, and said Deputy
Superintendent Bryan replied to your petitioner’s attorney
that it was his opinion at the present time, especially on ac
count of the filing of suit for receivership in the state of
Georgia and the cancellation of the license of said defend
ant corporation in a number of states, it seemed advisable
that a temporary receiver be appointed; that it was his
firm belief that if a properly qualified receiver be ap
pointed, the company could be saved and rehabilitated and
resume a successful and profitable business.
While taking a stand similar to that of Charles B. Lee, with
reference to the selection of a receiver, Louis C. Washington indi
cates in his petition that many negotiations were carried on among
interested parties over the question. Each party was interested in
perpetuating his relationship with the company. But unable to
secure the appointment of a receiver which would make this possible,
they preferred to have an entirely impartial one appointed. Above
all, no party desired an appointment backed by another faction. Ac
cording to Washington’s petition:
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On Wednesday, September 16, 1931, one R. R. Church
(against whom petitioner makes no reflections whatever),
acting as representative of said John T. Risher and as
‘go-between’ between petitioner and said Risher, proposed
to petitioner that he agree to the appointment of said
Risher as receiver under an agreement that Risher as
receiver would retain the present personnel of the com
pany (of whom petitioner is one) ; petitioner declined the
proposal, Mr. Church went away for further discussion
with Risher, and shortly thereafter returned and proposed
that said Risher and Dr. W. G. Lofton should be appointed
receivers with the agreement that the present personnel
of the company would be retained. This proposal the
petitioner also declined. Whereupon, Mr. Church said
substantially, “ Wouldn’t you like to see yourself in there
as co-receiver? You and Risher could not be co-receivers
on account of the equity suit. How would you react to the
suggestion that all of the lawyers for the defendant and
Risher recommend your appointment to the court as re
ceiver, provided that if the court did not appoint you,
your attorneys would recommend the appointment of
Risher?” Petitioner replied that he would not even con
sider such a proposition nor have anything to do with any
proposal which continued John T. Risher’s connection
with the management of the affairs of the company in
any manner whatever.
Wherefore, petitioner prays that if the court appoints
a receiver the court will select no one who has been recom
mended by any of the parties to the cause and that the
court will appoint some disinterested person in no way
connected or associated with any of the parties, stock
holders, or officers of the said corporation.5
The intervening petition of Dr. William A. Warfield, former
director and medical director of the company, expresses the same
attitude upon the appointment of a receiver and the activities of
Risher. Risher’s affidavit in reply to these petitions points out that
the intervening petitions are not in reply to the bill of complaint
and do not attempt to answer the question should a receiver be
appointed, but were personal attacks on him, although he was not a
party of record in the suit. Immediately following Risher’s affi
davit Pinkett filed an “ Amended and Supplemental Bill of Complaint
‘ ibid.
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for Receivership and Dissolution” . All the while personal enmity
had been growing. And in this “ Amended and Supplemental Bill” ,
Pinkett attacked those who had made aspersions concerning his and
Risher’s character and activities. He stated:
The plaintiff, upon information and belief, avers that
various and sundry of the former officers and directors
of this corporation who are responsible for the present
insolvency of the corporation, as set forth in the original
bill of complaint, have interested themselves in this suit
and by various affidavits, so-called intervening petitions
and correspondence of their counsel with the court, made
certain representations concerning the appointment of a
receiver. For the purpose of identifying these parties to
the court, the plaintiff says that: William A. Warfield,
S. W. Rutherford and R. H. Rutherford are charged in the
bill of complaint filed in Equity No. 53097, The National
Benefit Life Insurance Company vs. Robert H. Rutherford,
et al, a suit to cancel stock, for injunction, accounting and
other relief, with an illegal and fraudulent scheme and
conspiracy to defraud the defendant corporation in the
various matters recited in said bill of complaint. Similar
charges of participation in a fraudulent scheme to mis
apply the funds of the defendant corporation are in said
bill of complaint made against Charles B. Lee. In said
bill of complaint it is also charged that while Louis C.
Washington was acting as a director of the defendant cor
poration funds of said corporation were by vote of the
Board of Directors misapplied and dividends were de
clared by them as directors and improperly paid to them
selves and other stockholders in impairment of capital.
. . . The plaintiff respectfully informs the court that
neither he nor the policyholders whom he represents de
sires to have any receiver appointed by this court who
has been nominated by the parties who are standing
under undenied charges of wrecking the company or nomi
nated by any person associated with them and not a party
to this suit.6
On September 24, 1931, the court with Chief Justice Alfred A.
Wheat presiding, handed down the following decision:
‘ Amended and Supplemental Bill of Complaint for Receivership and Disso
lution.
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It is adjudged, ordered, and decreed that Daniel C.
Roper be, and hereby is, appointed Receiver pendente lite
of and for the defendant, The National Benefit Life Insur
ance Company . . . to carry on the business of said cor
poration as a going concern . . . to employ or dispense
with any of the present officers . . . to report to the court
with respect to the condition of said corporation and the
practicability of rehabilitating and restoring it to a safe
and sound condition.7
This marked the end of the first stage of litigation. While no
faction could declare a decisive victory, succeeding events indicated
defeat for Washington and Lee. Not only did the presiding judge
order their petition struck from the records, but subsequently Roper
caused them to sever connections with the company. About this same
time the American Security and Trust Co. foreclosed on its mortgage
of $125,000 on the Balfour Apartments, Sixteenth and U Streets,
N. W., Washington, D. C., one of the company’s dubious real estate
transactions.8
On November 10, 1931, the receiver, Daniel C. Roper, filed his
report on plan of reorganization. In the preliminary statement of
7Decree, Equity No. 53,391, D. C. Supreme Court, John R. Pinkett v. National
Benefit Life Insurance Company.
8 The National Benefit acquired this property about July 13, 1928 and held
it without the consent of the Insurance Department. It had been ordered to
dispose of it even if such necessitated a loss. In the previously quoted letter of
Dawson to the trustees, Dawson said: “ For instance, the Balfour Apartments
was and has been a big bone of contention with the Insurance Departments.
The building has been mismanaged from start to finish; it was never suitable
for what we claim was the company’s main purpose of purchase, and its actual
value is now most uncertain. The right of the management so to invest the
policyholders’ funds has been continually questioned by the Insurance Depart
ment, and at one time they threatened to take charge of the company’s affairs.
Well, I stalled the situation off promising the Insurance Department positively
that the company would sell the property and take a loss, if need be, to which the
President and Mr. Smith agreed, and so by reversing the procedure I got after
so substantial a citizen as William Montgomery, President of Acacia Mutual and
put up the plea that ‘For the benefit of the white race, Father and myself’ who
had served his company for over a quarter of a century he personally should
come to the front and purchase the Balfour Apartments. . . . During the boom
we got an appraisal of $262,000 and by pleading with Mr. Montgomery I induced
him to offer $265,000 which was acceptable to the President ana Mr. Smith, but
they said they would have to talk it over with the General Secretary [S. W.
Rutherford]. Later I was blandly informed that the General Secretary thought
the property fully worth $350,000, but the company might be willing to accept
$275,000 which would be a compromise between his offhand offer without inspec
tion of $265,000 and the $350,000 and you all know that since then the company
even though it has been agreeable to carry a first mortgage of $190,000 the
equities offered above the mortgage have not exceeded $25,000 to $50,000, at most,
that is, a sale of from $215,000 to $240,000 and mind you this only in trades—
acquisition of other real estate. What we can now realize in cash above a first
mortgage of, say, $190,000 I would just like to have any of you tell me.”
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the report Roper reviewed the company’s affairs during the receiv
ership and just prior to it. He stated that the company had in
force approximately $60,000,000 of insurance divided into ordinary
and industrial with average policies of less than $1,000 and about
$150, respectively. The insurance was represented by a great va
riety of different policy forms in each case. The legal reserve as
determined by his actuary was $6,063,503.98, impaired to the extent
of $2,828,380.35. This was the situation despite the fact that in the
statement of condition of the company attested to and filed with the
Insurance Department of the District of Columbia as of December
31, 1930, the assets were stated as $5,599,678.61, the legal reserve,
$5,212,739.73, the capital, $250,000, and the surplus, $136,938.88.
Roper further stated that the Department of Justice was investigat
ing certain questionable transactions with a view of instituting
criminal action if necessary.
As to the plan of reorganization Roper reported that he had
been advised by actuary and counsel that the following were the
methods by which an insolvent life insurance company might be
reorganized, namely:
(1) By reducing the amount of insurance and premiums pro
portionately ;
(2) By reducing the amount of insurance, premiums remain
ing the same;
(3) By increasing the premiums, insurance remaining the same;
(4) By combining one or more of the above methods;
(5) By reinsuring all policies in another existing company;
(6) By the imposition of a lien against only the amount of in
surance under the policy or a lien against the reserve by taking a
loan, with interest, on the security of the policy; or
(7) By organizing a new mutual life insurance company to take
over the National Benefit policies on some equitable basis.
Each of the first six methods had objections which made them
impracticable in the case of The National Benefit. This, the receiver
said, left them with but one method of dealing with the problem:
To organize a mutual life insurance company and invite
National Benefit policyholders into it on a basis found to
be equitable. . . . In the event that the stockholders do
not make good the impairment now existing [which, of
course, could scarcely be expected] and the court should
be of the opinion that the formation of a mutual company
would be to the best interest of the old policyholders,
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then in that event, the procedure by which the interest
of the policyholders would be fully protected in the new
company might be as follows: Let the policyholders of the
old company coming into the new company assign to the
new company whatever of interest they may be found to
be entitled to in the assets of the old company; due credit
would be given to each policy transferred into the new
company at an amount arrived at through an equitable
dividend formula. This method would guarantee to
the old policyholders who transferred to the new company
the highest possible value under their contracts obtain
able for their interest in the assets of the old company
and would prevent needless sacrifice of their interest.
At the same time this procedure would not embarrass the
interest of persons coming into the new company as new
policyholders.9
While the court was considering the report of Roper, Wash
ington and Lee made another attempt to oust Risher and Pinkett.
Details of the Masonic Temple transaction were recited in an affidavit
in an attempt to show that Risher had betrayed the trust of The
National Benefit. Washington and Lee were opposed to Pinkett and
Risher because the latter having very small stockholdings, represented
interest of the policyholders. Risher and Pinkett held out for
mutualization. The Rutherfords and Washington and Lee had filed
answers to Pinkett’s bill of complaint denying that the company was
insolvent. Moreover, control of the company whether mutualized or
not was an important factor. The story of the Masonic Temple as
told by Washington and Lee is a maze of plots and counterplots
involving officers of the company, attorneys, brokers, and finance
and construction companies. So involved was it that it is doubtful
if all of its intricacies will ever be known. However, many of the
allegations made by Washington and Lee in their affidavits were
not disputed, while some of them were supported by substantial evi
dence. The attitude and purpose of Washington was revealed in a
sentence taken from their “ Petition for Directions to the Receiver”
filed in conjunction with their affidavit. The sentence reads: “ Ever
since his [Risher’s] incumbency in the office of president and long
prior thereto, he and the plaintiff, John Randolph Pinkett, combined,
conspired and agreed to obtain control of the management and af
fairs of the said corporation and to so dominate, manage, and operate
the same so as to bring about this appointment of a receiver for said
9John R. Pinkett v. National Benefit, op. cit., Report of Receiver.

105

corporation, deprive the stockholders of the control thereof through
officers elected by them, deprive the stockholders of their interest in
the said corporation, dispose of the assets of the corporation to their
own advantage, either by a sale thereof, or by mutualizing the com
pany and perpetuating themselves in control thereof, or in some
other manner” .10*
As large stockholders in the company, Washington and Lee were
interested in dislodging Pinkett and Risher from their positions of
authority and sought to show that the capital of the company was
not impaired. They were, of course, opposed to mutualization be
cause it would wipe out the stockholders’ interest. Furthermore,
Risher and Pinkett were drawing substantial compensation from the
company and would doubtless continue as officers if the company
were mutualized. The bitter opposition of Washington and Lee to
Risher was perhaps motivated by his connection with the construc
tion of the Masonic Temple building as the headquarters of the
Masonic Order.
The details of the Masonic Temple transaction before the Na
tional Benefit became involved in it were summarized as follows:
“ For several years prior to 1926, the attempt had been made to
complete the New Masonic Temple at Tenth and U Streets, N. W., by
a building corporation of the same name which had sold stock to
member lodges and individual Masons to the extent of approximately
$300,000. In the year 1925 upon request of the Trustees of the Grand
Lodge (Acacia) F. A. A. M., all stockholders assigned their stock to
the said Trustees for dissolution of the corporation. The court
appointed Herbert L. Davis (now insurance commissioner) Special
Master in Chancery for the dissolution and William L. Houston (o f
the firm of Houston and Houston, Attorneys at Law) and one Wolf,
now deceased, were made receivers for the corporation in dissolution.
The building was sold at public auction for $99,000, of which the
trustees of the Grand Lodge received approximately $46,000 in cash.
After futile attempts on the part of the Grand Lodge officers to
complete the building, they were approached by John T. Risher who
proposed to secure the necessary money to complete the building at
a maximum cost of $450,000, for a commission of $25,000 payable in
advance” .10 An agreement containing these stipulations was entered
into on April 12, 1929. On April 23, 1929, acting on the advice of
Risher, the lodge conveyed the building to Mortimer F. Smith11 and
entered into an agreement with Smith for the completion of the
building. According to the agreement the building was to be com” ibid.
"Affidavit Louis C. Washington.
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pleted at a cost of $450,000 to be amortized at the rate of $25,000
per year; in addition the lodge was to pay rent to Smith of $2,000
per month. Risher was appointed agent for both parties. Shortly
afterwards the National Benefit conveyed to Smith its home office
building, 609 F Street, N. W., and 1924 13th Street, N. W., and 1209
U Street, N. W. Immediately Smith deeded these properties to the
G. G. Loehler Construction Co., the builders of the Masonic Temple,
and the National Benefit lent the construction company $70,000 on
them. “ These properties,” state the affidavit, “ were given to the con
struction company to pay off an indebtedness of $53,000 to secure the
payment of which the Loehler Construction Company held $103,000 of
second trust notes which they had peddled at 50% discount. The full
face value of the notes was charged against the cost of the building.
The $70,000 loan was to furnish the cash necessary to complete the
building” .12
At this point a contract was sought between the Masons and the
National Benefit instead of Mortimer F. Smith. The law firm of
Houston and Houston was first employed to draw up the contract and
were paid a retainer of $3,000. Their contract was unsatisfactory
and the firm of Collins and Collins was then employed and paid a
retainer of $5,000. The last contract proved satisfactory to the
National Benefit, but the officers of the Masons refused to sign it.
Risher was then given $10,000 to “ work with” in getting the con
tract signed. In July, 1931, Risher had succeeded in getting the con
tract signed.
By a deed dated June 30, 1930, but not recorded until December
29, 1930, the Masonic Temple was conveyed from Smith to the Na
tional Benefit. In January, 1931, the National Benefit threatened to
evict the Masons. The Masons sought the advice o f Risher, who re
ferred them to the law firm of Howard and Hayes. As a result, upon
the payment of a $500 fee a bill to be filed in the Supreme Court of
the District of Columbia was prepared. The National Benefit em
ployed Houston and Houston to defend the suit. The suit never en
tered court.
In the meantime, the property at 1209 U Street had been con
veyed successively from the Loehler Construction Company to Gary
and Risher, Incorporated, Risher’s brokerage firm; to Alonzo Collins,
reputedly an employee of the firm; to Anna Louise Risher, wife of
Risher.13
A mere recital of the recorded facts in connection with the Ma” ibid.
13ibid. The deed citations are: 8-4-30, Liber 6472, Folio 345, Docket 92;
10-8-30, Liber 6491, Folio 67, Docket 158; 6-12-31, Liber 6566, Folio 213, Docket
214, respectively.
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sonic Temple gives little indication of the motivation for many of the
acts and the ramifications o f the deal. It is necessary further to
examine the transaction^ In the fir'st place, although the temple was
to be completed at a total cost of not more than $450,000— according
to the contract between the Masons and Risher— Risher’s first report
reveals the impossibility of accomplishing this. His report made
sometime after October 1, 1929, in part states:
To the Board of Trustees of the Most Worshipful
Acacia Grand Lodge, F. A. A. M.
Gentlemen:
On April 12, 1929, your board employed Messrs. Gary
and Risher for the purpose of relieving its condition and
financial embarrassment, liquidate its indebtedness and to
arrange for the completion of its uncompleted structure at
Tenth and U Streets, N. W.
The agreement entered into at that time gave us, as
your fiscal agents, full and unrestricted power to do any
and all things necessary to bring about the desired results.
The only restrictions to be placed upon us by said agree
ment with you were, first, that the total for the
completion of the temple and liquidation of its indebted
ness, would be four hundred and fifty thousand ($450,000)
dollars, and, second, that ample safeguard be thrown
around the structure to the end that the Masonic Fra
ternity would have sole and exclusive use of the Fraternity
Floors of the building, so long as it carried its share of the
obligation. But notwithstanding broad and sweeping
powers granted us as your fiscal agents to solve your
financial difficulties, there had never been an instance
where any act was committed by us, without first coming
to you and receiving your specific authority in such
instance.
One of the first steps necessary to give us an accurate
knowledge of the indebtedness against your property, was
to procure from the Columbia Title Company an abstract
of the record appearing upon your property. To our utter
surprise and amazement we found that the property was
encumbered by trusts and liens to the extent of $834,200,
consisting of the following items:
1. Mechanic’s lien, filed October 18th, 1927, by
Sumner and Todd, in the sum of $14,200;
2. A deed of trust recorded February 27, 1928, to
secure Joseph Sanders and Henry A. Berliner in the
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sum of two hundred and twenty thousand ($220,000)
dollars;
3. A deed of trust recorded February 27, 1928, to se
cure William H. Jackson, in the sum of 8150,000; and
4. A deed of trust recorded July 16, 1928; to se
cure Joseph Chiavone and Frank T. Fuller, in the sum
of $450,000.
In addition to the above obligations, we found that
the taxes, special assessments, plus the penalties, aggre
gating approximately three thousand ($3,000) dollars
was due. We further found that the interest and curtail
ment provided in the deed of trust to secure Messrs.
Sanders and Berliner was over a year in arrears, which
sum represented approximately $14,500 at the time you
entered into the contract with Mr. Gary and myself. In
addition to this, we found that the G. G. Leohler Construc
tion Company claimed that you owed them the following
sums:
1. For monies advanced in the payment of first
trust interest, $7,829.64;
2. To principal paid on first trust, $5,000;
3. To payment to Chiavone and Fuller for trustee
fees, $2,200;
4. For printing cei'tain bonds, $814.11;
5. For payment on taxes $237.30, and $464.82;
6. Fire insurance, $413.35;
7. For damages suffered by contractor through the
Grand Lodge, necessitating delays and extra expense,
bonds, commissions pledged on second trust notes, etc.,
amounting to $13,432; and
8. To extras agreed upon and ordered by Grand
Master Ford, $3,000. Balance due for completion of
building $15,000, making a total claim of Mr. Leohler,
$257,653.23.
It will be recalled that our authority was limited
to the extent of $450,000 in settling the indebtedness of
the Grand Lodge and complete the Temple, but upon the
discovery of the condition just enumerated, and the exact
financial status of the proposition, it was necessary to
begin a series of negotiations for the purpose of keeping
all these items within the authorized amount of $450,000,
and still have sufficient funds available to complete the
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structure in accordance with the then existant plans and
specifications.
After numerous conferences with all the parties con
cerned, covering a period of weeks, we were successful in
bringing about a satisfactory adjustment in every case
except one involving the $450,000 bond issue, and it looked
for some considerable time that success or failure in our
endeavor hung solely upon the adjustment of this item.
Upon a very thorough and careful investigation, we dis
covered that a Mr. Dewey had obtained possession of a
block of these bonds, representing a large amount of
money, ostensibly for the purpose of arranging a loan and
to use said bonds for collateral and to enable the Grand
Lodge to meet certain pressing obligations. It developed,
however, that he was unsuccessful in obtaining the desired
loan, after a considerable lapse of time he returned all of
the bonds to the Depository, which was the International
Exchange Bank, with the exception of bonds totalling
$22,750 which he had sold. We then discovered that with
the exception of this amount of $22,750, and an item of
$2,200 owed the trustee for identifying these bonds, there
were no other liens or obligations against the issue. We
came back to the Trustees and explained the situation to
them, and received the authority to increase the author
ized indebtedness $22,750, the sum necessary to make
up the difference in the bond transaction, and making a
total authorized indebtedness of the sum of $472,750. The
$2,200 item owed Messrs. Chiavone and Fuller we made
the G. G. Loehler construction company pay that, and the
Grand Master, Assistant Grand Secretary, Mr. Gary and
myself, after procuring the release of this transaction,
stood in the office of Mr. Chiavone and destroyed all these
bonds and interest coupons.
Our investigation disclosed the fact that Mr. Dewey
has in his possession what appears to be full authority,
backed by written instructions and agreements with the
Grand Lodge for all of his transactions and it is our
opinion, and the opinion of counsel consulted in this
matter, that the Grand Lodge could never recover one
dime from this transaction, nor could they hold Mr. Dewey
for any irregularities.
Shortly after your contract was made with Mr.
Gary and myself, we interested Mr. Mortimer F. Smith
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in our proposition, the result of which was that the prop
erty of the Grand Lodge was conveyed to Mr. Smith, in
fee simple, subject to an equity of redemption, encouched
in a certain agreement executed on the 23rd of April,
1929. It was with the funds furnished by Mr. Smith that
the indebtedness was liquidated and a contract made to
complete the building in accordance with the then existant
plans and specifications. For the purpose of safeguarding
his security in this project, it became necessary for Mr.
Smith to consult experts along business lines, who had
not heretofore been connected with this project, and as
a result of which, the services of Mr. Albert I. Cassell,
one of the best equipped architects in the country, regard
less of race, was engaged by Mr. Smith. After making a
very careful survey, it was the opinion of Mr. Cassell
that the completion of the building in accordance with the
plans and specifications that we had been following would
be a serious mistake, and that the building would be so
thoroughly lacking in certain requirements that were
absolutely necessary, that the income would never justify
the investment to the extent which Mr. Smith had already
entailed. He was then directed to draw plans and specifi
cations which would bring the building up to the accepted
standards of the owner, which could be safely counted
upon to produce sufficient revenue to carry its obliga
tions. Mr. Cassell has finally completed his drawing, and
is receiving bids to cover the same, which approximates
the sum of $53,000 . . .14
It appears that the numerous burdens on the Temple caused
Smith and the National Benefit to advance much more money than
was originally thought necessary. The cost of the Temple advanced
very quickly from $450,000 to $560,000. Records fail to reveal
whether Smith was at first acting on his own behalf and later—
when the transaction became larger than was contemplated— on be
half of the National Benefit. It is, however, reasonable to assume
that early in the transaction funds of the National Benefit were used.
Moreover, it is known from the time the National Benefit interested
itself in the venture its object was to obtain the building for use as a
home office building. In Risher’s report he said that Mr. Smith was
willing to finance these changes. Risher stated: “ With reference to
the estimate of approximately $53,000 [ultimately this figure was
14ibid.
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much larger] for necessary additional work, we have invited Mr.
Cassell to appear here tonight and make his own explanation, but
whatever the Trustees do in this connection, it must be borne in mind
that it was never contemplated by Mr. Smith to go beyond the figures
involved in his contract, but since he is anxious to go as far as pos
sible in the interest of the Grand Lodge to have a building that will
meet the requirements of modern times and at the same time produce
adequate revenue, he has been magnanimous enough to undertake the
task of raising the necessary cash to do this work. He has asked us,
however, to request the Trustees to advance the sum of ten thousand
dollars which will be stretched out to cover what they would be ex
pected to pay monthly. We urgently recommend that this be im
mediately done . .
15
Up to this time nothing concerning the Masonic Temple trans
action appeared on the books of the National Benefit. Dawson’s cor
respondence indicates that the company entered the transaction with
out his knowledge. In February, 1930, when Dawson learned that
the company had become deeply involved in the deal, having deeded
away three properties and having lent $70,000 on them, he wrote
to Smith as follows:
As I advised you over the phone today, in view of the
questions Examiner McDermott has asked me, it would
appear that I have not been fully informed in regard to
all matters leading up to the present status of affairs from
the National Benefit’s standpoint.
Frankly, Mr. Smith, as I told you today, I am startled
at the proportions to which the above transaction has
assumed and it is indeed very embarassing to me, to say
the least. However, before making any specific comment
or recommendation to the company, and certainly prior to
my conference with Examiner McDermott on Saturday
of this week, I wish you would answer fully, at length and
in writing, the following questions:
1. Give exact date of first negotiations relating to any
phase of the Masonic Temple Deal;
2. Give names of all parties present at first interview
or discussion and the interest represented by each respect
ively;
3. Give the exact dates of one or more subsequent
interviews prior to the signing of any papers, options or
18ibid.
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agreements and names of the parties present at such inter
views ;
4. Give date of first written instrument signed in
connection with any phase of the deal and the names of the
parties who signed same, indicating the interest each rep
resented ;
5. Give dates of any and all written instruments sub
sequently signed in connection with any phase of the deal
and the names of the parties who signed the same, indicat
ing the interest each represented;
6. Describe fully both by figures and explanatory
notes, as nearly as possible, the exact financial status of
the Masonic Temple proposition, immediately preceding
the signing of the first instrument and/or the making of
the first payment in connection with any phase of the
transaction which was later consummated;
7. Describe and outline both by figures and explana
tory notes, what was to be undertaken by the respective
parties (name them) to the deal:
a. By M. F. Smith,
b. By National Benefit,
c. By holder of first and underlying mortgage,
d. By contractor or contractors,
e. By Masonic Lodge as a corporate body or any
other such organization,
f. By any other parties affected by or involved in
the deal,
g. By brokers or agents through whom negotiations,
both preliminary or otherwise, were carried on;
8. Who held the fee title to the property at the begining of the negotiations,
9. Give dates of any subsequent changes in title, the
parties affected, and the reason for such change or
changes;
10. Who held fee title December 31, 1929 ?
11. Has there been any change in title since Decem
ber 31, 1929?
12. Give full details including dates, names, amounts
and nature or purpose of each disbursement made in con
nection with each and every phase of the transaction:
a. By National Benefit,
b. By M. F. Smith,
c. Indicate amounts first advanced by M. F. Smith
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which were later paid by National Benefit in re
imbursement to Mr. Smith or to other parties,
banks, or corporations who had advanced funds
to meet obligations assumed in the transaction;
13. Give exact financial status of the proposition as
of December 31, 1929;
a. As regards M. F. Smith,
b. As regards National Benefit,
c. As regards the holder or holders of any first or
prior liens,
d. As regards amount due or to become due on any
completed or uncompleted contracts or to any
other parties,
14. Same as question 13, but as of February 17,1930;
15. Supply typewritten or photostatic copy of each
and every document executed by any of the parties to the
deal;
16. Give full details relating to tenants and leases in
force as of December 31, 1929, with a brief prospectus of
rentals collectible in 1930; and
17. Give statement of rentals collected and expenses
paid in connection with the Masonic Temple operations
since M. F. Smith became owner in fee simple.
You understand, of course, that irrespective of any
negotiations you may now have in hand, or their ultimate
outcome, I will need, in writing, the information called for
in these questions, in complete detail, prior to my confer
ence with Examiner McDermott on Saturday next. . . The
preparation of this data . . . in view of the exigencies exist
ing . . . would appear absolutely essential.18
The answers to Dawson’s questions would have been interesting.
However, we have searched in vain for Smith’s reply. It is very
doubtful if anyone connected with the transactions could have answer
ed these questions. Dawson’s letter, however, seemed to have caused
the abrogation of the contract between Smith and the Lodge followed
by one between the Lodge and the National Benefit. Considerable
difficulty was encountered in getting the lodge to agree to the terms
of the new contract. During the negotiations, Dawson wrote a letter
to the Rutherfords, Smith, and Lee admonishing them of the serious
ness of the Masonic Temple transaction and, likewise, of the Whitelaw
and Balfour Apartment House deals. He stated:
15ibid.

Regardless of the possible consequences which the
threatened Masonic Temple litigation might have precipi
tated and may even yet do, unless a satisfactory settlement
is effected, permit me to call your attention as voting
trustees that the one great embarassing feature is that the
National Benefit Life Insurance Company does own the
Masonic Temple, which property was acquired not only
contrary to the advice of this office, but counter to the
directions of the various insurance departments engaged
upon the last examination, also in direct violation to the
instructions annually given the management by the Board
of Directors.
You are all familiar with the seriousness of the
charges alleged by the Grand Lodge and, to speak very
frankly, the whole transaction from beginning to end has
many most unsatisfactory and inexplicable angles, to say
the very least. For instance, much more serious reflec
tions against the management of the National Benefit than
charged might be brought out by the attorneys for the
Grand Lodge if just a cold-blooded statement of the check
transactions concerned with the Masonic Temple are listed.
It has never been explained to me, nor do I anticipate
it will be satisfactory to the Insurance Department exam
iners, why so many Masonic Temple transactions were
handled through Mortimer F. Smith’s personal account,
when one of the very first transactions was a company
matter, the alleged sale of those three National Benefit
properties totalling $95,000; nor have I been able to fath
om why the total cost of the building was pyramided from
a $450,000 proposition, as at that time the National Bene
fit entered the picture, to an approximate $560,000 cost to
finish same, irrespective of the inability of the Grand
Lodge then to finance the completion of even the $450,000
building.
Off hand I will frankly state, from my cursory ex
amination recently, the Masonic Temple building looks
to me to be fully worth the purchase price, but why should
Washington Masons be furnished with a Rolls-Royce by
way of a meeting place at the expense of the National Ben
efit policyholders, and furthermore, why were not the In
surance Departments or ourselves consulted in regard, first
to the original purchase price ($450,000) proposition, and,
second, the dumping of approximately $110,000 additional

of policyholders’ cash when same was so badly needed on
other company matters.
As a matter of fact, when the proposal was made in
the Spring of 1928 by the management of the company
that it take over and complete the Masonic Temple as a
home office building for the National Benefit, the Execu
tive Committee was very definitely informed that it was
too large a transaction and out of all proportion as an
individual investment for the company. The National
Benefit was even then under Insurance Department criti
cism and on account of its real estate holdings, the Balfour
Apartments in particular, and the management was duly
notified that there would be a hearing held at the June
meeting of the National Convention of Insurance Com
missioners.
Along the last of April or the early part of May, 1929,
Assistant Secretary Smith called up and said the company
had an opportunity to sell three of its properties for $95,000 provided the company could make a first trust loan for
the purchasers on the properties sold of approximately
70 %. I advised Mr. Smith that although the company was
restricted in making loans of more than 50% of the ap
praised value, that inasmuch as this loan would be con
cerned with the sale of real estate I felt confident the trans
action would be approved by the Insurance Department.
Along the last of May, 1929, Mr. Smith wrote me a
letter to be read at the Insurance Department’s hearing,
to be held at the Edgewater Beach Hotel early in June,
1929, stating that he had actually sold these properties
for $95,000 and thereby realized the profit, which letter
was read to the Commissioners and indicating that the
management was getting the company out of real estate
whenever possible, but nevertheless the complaining De
partments were not satisfied, and only agreed to defer
their own examination of the company provided the other
Departments agree to adopt a resolution directing the
management of the Company not to make any investment
without my approval, and the management was so duly
notified in writing and by hearing with Superintendent
Baldwin, all at the direction of other State Insurance
Departments.
Needless to say, it is no satisfaction to me personally
that both myself and the Insurance Departments were kept

in the dark regarding the Masonic Temple transactions
nor that, even prior, without my knowledge, Rutherford,
Smith, and Rutherford went to the Guardian Trust Com
pany and obtained a personal loan to finance their pur
chase of the Whitelaw Apartment Hotel, thereby jeopar
dizing a very important company transaction with the
Guardian, as we quickly found out last fall when our offices
had to come to the rescue one day and the company was
put to heavy expenses to straighten out the matter with
the Guardian. As a matter of fact, the company had been
put no end of expenses on account of ill-advised
real estate and colored bank transactions. I recall fully
the amount of time that I personally had to put in with
the Examiners concerned with the report of the examina
tion as of December 31, 1927, not to speak of the time
consumed in company conferences all of which concerned
using policyholders’ funds for the benefit of other in
terests.
Mr. Smith has made the statement that not one cent
of the company’s money was used in connection with the
Whitelaw Hotel deal, in spite of the fact that the General
Secretary a year ago publicly stated that a large sum was
invested by the company in repairs to the Hotel. I have
been told by prominent colored citizens of Washington that
the company did make a heavy investment and recently I
have been advised that on or about December, 1928, there
was a check drawn to the order of Rutherford, Smith, and
Rutherford, for over-subscription of capital stock in the
amount of $6,500, which was written off to Profit and Loss,
although the company records- do not indicate any over
subscription of stock. Perhaps it is just a coincidence
that $6,500 was equal in exact amount to the down pay
ment on the Whitelaw Hotel, which I merely mention, not
that I personally question the items, but to call your at
tention to the inferences that are likely to be drawn by
the Insurance Department Examiners who surely will
check back to the last report to point out that dabbling
in real estate by the management has its terrors.
Now I am not going to dwell on the way the manage
ment has involved itself in connection with certain checks
company officers drew upon the Citizens Trust Company
cencerned with the Masonic Temple transaction, nor other
irregular transactions subject to official and critical re

view and adverse comment by Insurance Department Ex
aminers. . .
In addition to all else, let me call to your attention that
Assistant Secretary Smith has not turned over to Ex
aminer McDermott all of his personal account checks re
lating to Masonic Temple transactions, and that each and
everyone of you is involved in his proving what was done
with policyholders’ funds.
Again I do not for a moment question same, but it
would not surprise me at all if the Insurance Department
Examiners engaged upon the coming examination demand
that he show cancelled checks for his entire personal ac
count from the time the company entered the Masonic
Temple deal, and “ What a lovely time will be had by all,”
if he can not produce each and every check.
One of the big bones of contention with the Grand
Lodge is that the cost of the Masonic Temple has been
pyramided by the National Benefit from a $450,000 prop
osition to a $560,000 proposition all at the instigation of
the General Secretary, as the attorneys claimed, for the
personal benefit of a friend of his who profited thereby.
Now, of course, I personally know that these are not
the facts at all. The purpose of the General Secretary
was to put the necessary finishing touches on the building
in order to make it appear worth the money, whether it
was a $450,000 or a $560,000, and all of you know the
arguments I put forth on behalf of the National Benefit
at the joint meeting of company officials, Grand Lodge
officers, counsel for both sides and McDermott and Risher.
But here is the unfortunate situation, neither Mor
timer F. Smith, President R. H. Rutherford, nor the Gen
eral Secretary consulted me or sought my advice, let alone
approval, in regard to the Masonic Temple transaction
until they had approximately $250,000 of the policy
holders’ funds stuck into the proposition, in addition to a
company liability of over $200,000 to Sanders, and further
more while I was laboring under the belief that it was
a $450,000 proposition, as were members of the Board
other than the management, the company went right ahead
and contracted for approximately $110,000 additional in
vestment of the policyholders’ funds without my approval
or in any way seeking my advice on the matter, utterly
ignoring the directions of the Board of Directors and in
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absolute violation of the Insurance Department’s instruc
tions that all proposed investment should be submitted for
my approval.
The policyholders have already paid many thousands
of dollars additional expense on account of lawyer’s fees
and the time I have had to devote to the matter in an en
deavor to ward off developments which might precipitate
a receivership for the company, not to speak of the bonus
of $30,000 to be paid the Federal Mortgage people and
lawyers’ fees yet to come, which all told may cost the
policyholders a full $50,000 loss.
As I stated before, it is no personal satisfaction to me
to have the management not only on the Masonic Temple
transaction but on the other transactions violate and ut
terly disregard Insurance Department instructions and
their own pledges and promises. . . .17
In order to complete the negotiations in connection with the new
contract between the National Benefit and the Masons, which in
addition to making the National Benefit a party to the contract con
tained substantial changes in stipulations, Risher was assigned the
task of getting the contract signed. The Masons at first refused to
sign. But after the National Benefit gave Risher $10,000 to “ work
.with” he was successful in procuring the signatures of the Masonic
officers. Dawson said that the company was fortunate in getting
Risher to use his influence to get the contract signed. The contract
was dated June 30,1930. By a deed of the same date but filed Decem
ber 29, 1930, title of the Temple was transferred from Smith to the
National Benefit.
Though relations between the Masons and the National Benefit
had become strained, open conflict did not occur until the National
Benefit attempted to enforce the new contract. On January 17,1931,
R. H. Rutherford wrote to the Grand Lodge claiming that they were
$14,000 in arrears in their rent and demanding payment not later
than January 3, 1931, and threatening to institute suit to dispossess
the lodge if the money was not paid. Risher, it appears, had assured
the Masons upon securing their signatures to the new contract that
the new contract would not be enforced and that the contract
was for the purpose of exhibiting to the Insurance Department.
Rutherford’s letter was probably a surprise to both Risher and
17Letter of A. B. Dawson to Voting Trustees.
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the Masons. However, it indicated the National Benefit’s real
intent in interesting itself in the deal. The Masons immediately
sought counsel of Risher. Risher’s reaction is described in the
affidavit of the Grandmaster and Chairman of the Board of Trustees
of Free and Accepted Masons. The lodge “ disputed the correctness
of the claim and by correspondence sought an interview with said
Rutherford which at first was refused and later affiants obtained
an interview with him but without definite or satisfactory results.
John T. Risher was at the time the fiscal agent of the National Bene
fit Life Insurance Company, and affiants called upon him and con
ferred with said Risher before the expiration of the month of January,
1931. Said Risher: ‘If you will employ the attorneys whom I name,
I will give them information which will bring the Rutherfords to
their knees; I will not give it to any other attorneys because of my
confidential relationship to the National Benefit Life Insurance Com
pany.’ Said Risher named Howard and Hayes and as a result of
said conversation affiants employed Howard and Hayes paying them
a retainer fee of $500.” 18 Thereafter a bill entitled “ Bill to Rescind
Contract, for an Accounting and Other Purposes” was prepared in
the name of the Masonic Lodge naming the National Benefit as de
fendant.
This suit between the Masons and the National Benefit, which
was never filed, gives some indication of the off-stage play that went
on in the drama of the National Benefit. After the bill for this suit
was prepared there were a series of conferences at the Willard Hotel
in Washington, D. C., February 5th, 6th, and 7th, 1931, attended by
John T. Risher, Alfred B. Dawson, P. J. McDermott, the Rutherfords
and Smith, Howard and Hayes, Charles H. Houston of the law firm
of Houston and Houston, and Frank D. McKinney and Ernest Dickerson, officers of the Masons. At the conclusion of the last conference,
Attorney Howard is reported to have said to the Masonic officers,
“ This bill will never be filed and somebody will be calling you up
before the night is over.” 19
The bill under discussion contained allegations which would have
doubtless brought about an investigation of the National Benefit and
a receivership. It recited details of questionable transactions and
intimated that the capital of the company was impaired. Though the
suit was successfully compromised and large sums of money paid by
the National Benefit, the Masons received nothing but the tacit as
surance that the new contract would not be enforced.
18Affidavit of Washington and Lee, Exhibit 11.
"ibid.
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Fiddling While Rome Burned
The case of the National Benefit proceeded exceedingly slow. The
presiding Judge, Mr. O’Donognue, in commenting on the progress of
the case said: “ It seems that Rome is burning while Nero is fiddling.”
While the lawyers argued, the assets and business of the company
wasted away. In the latter part of February, 1932, prior to the
appointment of permanent receivers, Judge O’Donoghue gave the
following opinion:
The court is of the opinion that the company is insolvent.
There is evidence here that the company cannot pay its
debts, cannot pay the death benefits, and cannot pay the
loans to the insured that they are entitled to receive, and
cannot pay the surrender values on their policies. Now,
the extent of the insolvency is a matter of accountancy.
That being the case, while it may be ultimately found that
the company may be in better shape when we come to a
final accounting than it is now, the court is not at this time
going to say that the stockholders having rights may not
possibly receive some dividends on their stock. Therefore,
the court overrules the motion that the intervening peti
tions be dismissed. The receivership must be continued.
A receivership is not an ultimate remedy for equity. It is
merely an ancillary remedy. There must be some ground
for coming into equity other than just the mere receiver_ship; otherwise the proceedings would fail. The only
ground set forth specifically in this bill is dissolution, and
they pray for such other relief as the court may grant. It
is not the duty of a receiver to rehabilitate a company or
to reorganize a company, nor in the case of an insurance
company, to mutualize it. The receiver is to continue the
operation of the company in status quo as far as possible,
pending the outcome of the litigation. Therefore it is up
to the parties interested, either the stockholders or officers
of the company, or the policyholders to take such steps as
any or all of them may be able to take to rehabilitate the
company. This court cannot do that. If some such plan
is not undertaken by the stockholders or by the company
or by the officers of the company or by the policyholders,
then there is no other course for this court to pursue than
that of dissolution of this corporation. The court is not
unmindful of the fact that there are persons interested in
this litigation many of whom have put all of their little
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savings into this company in order to insure them some
thing in a day of stress or in a time of need. Therefore,
the court is going to endeavor, as far as possible, to give
these people and those that are interested in them every
reasonable practicable chance to save that which they
may have in this company. The court could at this time
let the company be dissolved and the assets be distributed
to the various parties in interest as their various holdings
may appear but the court is not going to do that, because
sitting as a Court of Equity and Justice, it thinks in fair
ness to those nearly 200,000 people interested in the case,
the court should take the chance, even though this chance
fails, of continuing this receivership for a reasonable
period of time until an accurate accounting of the condi
tion of the company of its assets and liabilities may be
ascertained, before any such step is taken.. . If the parties
are able during the period of time that the actuarial ac
countant is working on the affairs of the company to form
ulate some practical plan whereby this company may be
saved, they will then be able to submit any such prop
osition to the court immediately after the detailed and
complete report of the actuarial accountant is filed. If
the parties interested in this concern cannot get together
and formulate some plan within that period of several
months, or a settlement as indicated, then there will be
no other course for the court to pursue but that o f dis
solution.20
On February 29, 1932, the court appointed Frank B. Bryan, Jr.,
and Gilbert A. Clark as permanent receivers. Roper, objecting to
the appointment o f a co-receiver, had resigned. Shortly afterward
the major interest in the National Benefit litigation shifted from the
case of Pinkett versus the National Benefit to the case of the ShawWalker Company versus the National Benefit. It was in this suit
that the legality of the appointment and acts of Clark and Bryan were
seriously questioned. One of the allegations made against them was
that they allowed the equity of the National Benefit in the Masonic
Temple building to be extinguished through foreclosure which, it was
alleged, could have been avoided.
Shaw-Walker vs. National Benefit
In the case of the Shaw-Walker Company versus the National
Benefit Life Insurance Company, the Shaw-Walker Company, a judg20Quoted by The Afro-American, February 27, 1932.
litigation as reported by tne press, see Appendix D.
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ment creditor of the National Benefit, sought relief in equity. They
sought removal of the receivers, Clark and Bryan, and a winding-up
o f the business, contending that the National Benefit fund was being
dissipated without any distribution to preferred creditors. Some intervenors entered the suit. Foremost among these was Leah B. Wil
son, a policyholder in the Standard Life and later in the National Ben
efit. She charged that the receivers had been conducting a modified
insurance business without a reserve as required by law and that the
money received from this business was being dissipated. The court
ruled that the Shaw-Walker case superseded the Pinkett case and that
the appointment of Bryan and Clark was done without proper author
ity. The judge accordingly signed an order removing Bryan and
Clark and naming Risher receiver. Bryan and Clark appeal the deci
sion. Pending the decision of the Court of Appeals Bryan and Clark
were receiver in name but were restrained from negotiating any busi
ness other than routine matters for the National Benefit.
During the long period of litigation to which the National Benefit
was subjected, the assets of the company were reduced from three to
considerably less than a million dollars. All hope of rehabilitation
soon disappeared. To date no dividends have been paid policyholders
nor stockholders nor have general creditors been paid. The real
losers in the whole affair have been the policyholders whose response
to the appeal to support Negro business enterprises made the National
Benefit possible.
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Chapter VII
CONCLUSION
The failure of the National Benefit is to be explained in part by
the internal weaknesses of the Company and in part by the general
economic and social environment in which it functioned. The aim
of the present chapter is to give a brief review of the causes of failure
found in the operations of the company itself and then to describe
the part played by broad economic and social forces in the downfall
of the enterprise.
Among the factors connected specifically with the Company itself,
the following stand out: (1) Unwise expansion; (2) Excessive oper
ating costs; (3) Reinsurance of the Standard Life Insurance Com
pany; (4) Manipulation of capital stock; (5) Lack of a sound under
writing policy; (6) Lack of a sound investment policy; and (7) Lack
of prudent management.
The National Benefit’s policy of expansion led to a situation in
which a company with considerably less than $400,000 in capital and
surplus was underwriting more than $70,000,000 of insurance (See
Tables VIII and IX ) and operating in 28 states (See Appendix F ).
The wide area over which the Company operated increased its opera
tion costs tremendously. Its agency costs as illustrated by the West
Virginia District were in many cases entirely out of proportion to
the amount of insurance written. Operating costs were further in
creased by excessive payments for actuarial and investment services
and the expense of numerous official examinations. Moreover, poor
organization generally added its toll to the operating expenses which
the company had to bear. Another manifestation of its mistaken
policy of expansion was the reinsurance of the Standard Life Insur
ance Company. Though this move was prompted by something more
than the desire to expand, it was a direct outgrowth of the “ big busi
ness” notions of the management.
,
The manipulation of the capital stock and the resulting involve
ment of the management and the company in irregular transactions
were not only costly in terms of interest charges and fees for legal
and investment advice, but also diverted the attention of the manage
ment from other pressing affairs of the company. While the com
pany’s lack of a sound underwriting policy is revealed in the ineffi
cient supervision over claims and the failure to investigate mortality
experience; its lack of a sound investment policy is evidenced by mar
ginal trading in securities, its relations with the Citizens Trust Com
pany, its subsidiary, and its dealing in real estate.
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The foregoing specific causes of failure may be reduced to the
following categories: first, incompetence, negligence, and lack of in
tegrity on the part of the management; second, the failure to develop
and follow a sound underwriting policy; third, the failure to develop
and follow a sound investment policy; and, finally, the malicious com
petition for control of the company and the advantages which control
afforded.
The career of the founder, Samuel W. Rutherford, is typical of
the successful small-scale business man who is unable to adjust him
self to growth of the institution he helped to create. Rutherford, who
dominated the company up to the end, represented that type of man
agement which fails to keep pace with the growth of the business.
This situation has been described by Foulke: “ As a business grows,
it invariably becomes a little more sluggish, slightly more bureau
cratic, a trifle more difficult to handle, a little harder to keep in a
healthy financial shape. So, if policies which are successful for a
small business are not at times modified as an enterprise grows in
size—that is, unless the management grows in its breadth of practical
knowledge— a reaction is bound to come.” 1 The reaction came in the
case of the National Benefit in the form of unsound underwriting and
investment policies, and in the unfortunate competition and rivalry
among officers, employees, and other interested parties, many of whom
came to regard the company, in the words of Dawson, “ as a Christ
mas tree” . Yet, to attribute the failure of the National Benefit largely
to incompetence and dishonesty is to give a decidedly one-sided and
misleading explanation of what happened. Even if the management
had been far more competent and far more honest than was actually
the case, the final result might not have been much different in view
of conditions over which the company had no control. The specific
history of the National Benefit, to be understood and evaluated prop
erly, must be viewed in terms of the broad setting in which this and
other forms of Negro business enterprise are placed. It is often
alleged that the primary cause of failure for Negro business ventures
is found in the personal factors of ignorance and dishonesty. With
out denying the existence of both among Negro business men, two
points may in all fairness be made: first, the inability of the Negro
business man to cope successfully with his problem should be judged
in the light of the unusually difficult character of those problems;
second, unethical practices are by no means monopolized by the Negro
business man. It is interesting to note that the Armstrong insurance
investigation of 1905 revealed a far more serious lack of business
1Roy A. Foulke, Behind the Scenes of Business, Dunn and Bradstreet, New
York, 1937, p. 23.
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integrity than any disclosure in connection with the National Benefit
or the Standard Life. “ The 1905 [Armstrong] investigation dis
closed, among other things, the following outstanding abuses in the
private insurance business: (1) nepotism, (2) excessive wages for
high officers as against starvation wages for the hordes of clerks and
agents, (3) extravagant costs of writing insurance, (4) an excessive
rate of lapses, and (5) control of legislation and public opinion by
the expenditure of large sums for lobbying. Outside of the last, light
upon which could be shed only by another government investigation,
all the other evils are not only being perpetuated today, but their
extravagance and wastefulness are more appalling than ever before.” *2
“ They [the companies being investigated by the Armstrong Com
mittee] used their affiliations with the banks to manipulate their
funds to meet the annual statements of operation required by the
insurance departments of the states and countries in which they oper
ated. While not permitted to own stocks they still kept them as con
cealed assets by disguising entries made in the books of account.” 3
Negro business enterprise shares the difficulties which all small
concerns encounter in the current American scene. That the trend
of American business, at least in many important lines, is towards
concentration and integration is a fact too well established for ex
tended comment here.4 The entry of a new firm into the business
system without sponsorship by some influential interest has become
increasingly difficult. The field of life insurance is one in which the
competitive power of large companies is of particular importance.
As an indication of the degree of concentration in the insurance bus
iness itself, one may cite certain evidence presented to the Monopoly
Committee. For the 308 legal reserve life insurance companies in
the United States, 54.4 per cent of the aggregate assets were con
trolled at the close of 1937 by the five largest companies; 80.6 per
cent of these assets were controlled by the sixteen largest companies;
and 87.2 per cent by the twenty-five largest companies. Of the 308
companies, 283 controlled only 12.8 per cent of the aggregate assets.5
It is important to note in this connection [hat the real degree of com
petitive power of the large companies is by no means full indicated
by their legal size. For the large legal units of business are often
linked together by means of such extra-legal ties as interlocking
directorates. One concrete example of the increased power thus ac
2Abraham Epstein, “ The Insurance Racket”, The American Mercury, Vol.
XXI, September, 1930, p. 2.
2Terrence O’Donnell, History of Life Insurance, American Conservation Co.,
Chicago, 1936, p. 580.
4 See Berle and Means, The Modem Corporation and Private Property, New
York, 1933, for a full discussion of the modern corporate system.
4Temporary National Economic Committee, op. cit., p. 14.
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cruing to large companies is cited below in connection with the prob
lem of insurance investments.
Aside from the limitations imposed upon small business gen
erally, Negro business suffers in particular from the inadequacy of
its capital resources and from the handicap of its strictly racial mar
ket. As to the first, economic segregation prevents the Negro from
tapping even those sources of capital available to the small white
business man, and forces him to rely largely upon the accumulations
of his own race. Yet, the Negro population has little to offer in this
respect. A people held in slavery during the period in which the
natural resources of the country were being appropriated and subject
since Emancipation to heavy economic proscriptions can scarcely be
expected to control large funds of capital upon which potential en
trepreneurs of the race may draw.
The Negro business man is not only dependent upon the relatively
low savings of the Negro masses for capital; he is also limited to the
Negro community for a market. Moreover, the Negro community is
not his exclusively to exploit. While Negro business cannot extend
beyond the limits of the black ghetto, large-scale monopolistic enter
prises find few obstacles to entry in the Negro market. There are,
to be sure, types of Negro business which are protected and thrive
because of segregation. In past years when white insurance com
panies refused to write policies for Negroes, insurance belonged to
this category. Such a situation, in fact, was directly responsible for
the early growth of Negro insurance companies. Today, however,
that is not the case. In the field of industrial insurance, by far the
most important type among Negroes, the larger white insurance
companies enter freely into the Negro market.
The dependence of the National Benefit upon this segregated
market is clearly reflected in the history of the company. The sound
development of the company as contrasted with its later geographic
expansion and capital inflation took place during the wave of pros
perity of the World War period and immediately after. This pros
perity had been felt in the Negro community by«an increased demand
for Negro wage-earners and the resulting higher wages. During the
World War and in late 1922 and early 1923 there was a strong de
mand for Negro industrial labor.*6 It was on the basis of this pros
perity of the Negro wage-earner that development of the company
was perforce based. The falling off of demand for Negro labor in
industrial centers beginning in late 1923, in a period of only mild
agricultural prosperity, had an immediate effect upon the business of
'E d w a r d E . L e w is , “ T h e S ou th ern N e g r o a n d th e A m e r ic a n L a b o r S u p p ly ” ,
P olitica l S cien ce Q u a r ter ly , V o l. X L V I I I , N o. 2, J u n e, 1933.
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the company, and resulted in a high lapse rate. It was at this time
that the company, to keep a reasonable amount of insurance on its
books, embarked upon its program of geographic expansion, the un
fortunate effects of which in increasing the costs of operation have
already been traced.
Economic exclusion also has a direct effect upon the investment
opportunities of a Negro insurance company. This is a consequence
of the growth of the “ private-placement” method of security issue.
A corporation wishing to raise capital engages the services of an in
vestment banker, “ who manages the details of preparing the issue,
determining the set-up, arranging for the necessary preliminary
financing and finally the production of certificates and for the distri
bution of them to investors.” 7 Instead of offering these securities
directly to the public, the investment houses often place them with a
“ preferred list” of investors at favorable prices, the latter in turn
either holding the securities for investment purposes or selling to the
public at substantial profits. The importance of the practice is in
dicated by the fact that “ the volume of securities so purchased had
increased from $100,000,000 in 1934, to over $700,000,000 in 1938.
The growth o f the practice is demonstrated by the fact that in 1938,
thirty-seven per cent of the dollar amount of total new issues were
purchased privately.” 8 Large insurance companies and to a less ex
tent smaller white companies are able through interlocking relation
ships of one sort or another9 to participate in this system of security
distribution, and as a result to obtain preferred investments at large
discounts. As a matter of fact, the large insurance companies
sometimes deal directly with the issuing corporation. For example,
the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company recently bought an entire
bond issue ($5,000,000 par value) of the Potomac Electric Power
Company of Washington, D. C., at a price which, while undisclosed,
was presumably very favorable. The acquisition of investments by
’ J o h n T . F ly n n , S e c u r ity S p ecu la tion , H a r c o u r t, B r a c e & C o., N e w Y o r k ,
1934, p . 25.
«
8 T e m p o r a r y N a tio n a l E co n o m ic C om m ittee, op. cit., p. 29.
9 A n e x a m p le o f in te r lo c k in g r e la tio n s h ip s, w h ich is n o t a t a ll u n u su a l, is
in th e ca se o f th e M u tu a l L ife In su ra n ce C o m p a n y o f N e w Y o r k . T h ro u g h
com m on officers th e co m p a n y w a s affiliated w ith an in d u s tr ia l c o m p a n y ; th r o u g h
o n e o r m o re com m on d ir e c to rs it w a s affiliated w ith 22 b a n k s an d in su ra n ce
co m p a n ie s , 55 in d u s tr ia l co m p a n ie s , 1 lif e in su ra n ce c o m p a n y , 6 c a s u a lty an d
s u r e ty co m p a n ie s , 25 m a rin e in su ra n ce com p a n ies , 3 m e r c a n tile co m p a n ie s , 1
p u b lis h in g co m p a n y , 9 r e a l e sta te com p a n ies , 29 r a ilr o a d com p a n ies , 1 stea m sh ip
co m p a n y , 1 a ir tr a n s p o rta tio n c o m p a n y , 8 u tility co m p a n ie s , an d 15 m iscella n eou s
c o m p a n ie s ; an d th r o u g h com m on officers an d d ir e c to rs it w a s affiliated w ith 8
b a n k s an d t r u s t co m p a n ie s , 2 in d u s tr ia l com p a n ies , 2 m e r c a n tile co m p a n ie s , 1
u tility c o m p a n y , 8 re a l e s ta te com p a n ies , 15 r a ilr o a d co m p a n ie s , 1 steam sh ip
c o m p a n y , an d 2 m iscella n eou s com p a n ies, ibid., p. 176.
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insurance companies as a whole with or without the intermediation of
investment houses amounted in the years from 1934 to 1987 to from
70 per cent to 94 per cent of all private placements.10
Negro insurance companies enjoy no such preferential invest
ment position since they are excluded from the system of interlock
ing relationships just described. They occupy the position of the
small investor, with a consequent smaller investment yield than that
of their more favored competitors. The heavy real estate investment
of the National Benefit represented in no small part an attempt
to meet this investment disadvantage, although it has been shown
in earlier parts of the study that the cure was quite as bad as the
disease.
The failure of the National Benefit epitomizes the position of
Negro business and finance in general. The competitive power of
large concerns on the one hand and the limited market available to
Negro business on the other confine the entrepreneurs of the race
to those fields which do not lend themselves readily to concentration
and which tend to offer a protected market in the Negro commu
nity. This should not be construed to mean that there will not be
some Negro enterprises which will be able to defy the general ten
dency for a time and attain a rather large size. But, in general,
any people without masses of accumulated wealth cannot force an
entrance into the capitalist class. Nor is it to be expected that the
segregated pattern of American life will not be reflected in business,
for such is seen in the confining of the Negro merchant to a segre
gated portion of the market. Negro business enterprise, just as the
business enterprise of any property-less group, will be limited to
enterprises which can be promoted and financed by the small savings
of Negro wage-earners and which are not subject to the severe
competition of large centralized or monopolistic enterprises.
A ppendix A
The following is a list of the larger Neg^o insurance societies
operating in 1907:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Afro-American Industrial Insurance Company....-Jacksonville,Fla.
American Beneficial Insurance Company................. Richmond, Va.
American Life and Benefit Insurance Company....... Durham, N. C.
Atlanta Mutual Insurance Company...... ......................Atlanta, Ga.
Benevolent Aid and Relief Association.......................... Baltimore,Md.
Benevolent Aid and Relief Association.......................... Annapolis,Md.
Benevolent and Relief Association.............................Guthrie, Okla.
10ibid.
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8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Carolina Mutual Life Insurance Company............... Durham, N. C.
Children’s Aid Society............................................. Cincinnati, Ohio
Consumers Cooperative Fraternity............................... Norfolk, Va.
Cooperative Insurance Company............................... Hannibal, Mo.
Cordele Mutual and Fire Insurance Co.......................... Cordele, Ga.
Cosmopolitan Beneficial Association.......................St. Paul, Minn.
Fidelity Mercantile Fraternity..................................... Norfolk, Va.
Georgia Southern Home Aid Insurance Company..... Augusta, Ga.
Grand United Order of True Reformers.................Richmond, Va.
Guarantee Aid and Relief Society............................. Savannah, Ga.
Guarantee Relief Association....................................... Augusta, Ga.
Hand in Hand Fraternity................................... Washington, D. C.
Home Protective Association.....................................
?
Independent Benevolent Order............................................ Georgia
Independent Order of St. Luke................................. Richmond, Va.
Industrial Savings Society..................................... Wilmington, Del.
Keystone Aid Society............................................. Philadelphia, Pa.
Lincoln Benefit Association......................................... Raleigh, N. C.
A ppendix A (Continued)

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
38.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Long Island Industrial Association......................... Brooklyn, N Y.
Metropolitan Mutual Benefit Association............. Charleston, S. C.
Mutual Benefit Society............................................... Baltimore, Md.
Mutual Improvement Society............................. Washington, D. C.
Mutual Insurance Company
..................................... Athens, Ga.
Mutual Reliable Aid Society...................................Philadelphia, Pa.
National Benefit- Association............................... Washington, D. C.
National Benefit Insurance Company................. Jacksonville, Fla.
Northern Aid Society............................................. Philadelphia, Pa.
North Carolina Mutual & Provident Association..... Durham, N. C.
People’s Mutual Aid Association.........................Little Rock, Ark.
People’s Mutual Aid Association......................... Muskogee, Okla.
People’s Mutual Aid Asociation................................... Iienela, Ark.
People’s Beneficial and Fraternal Co....* ................. Baltimore, Md.
Piedmont Life Insurance Company..................... Greensboro, N. C.
Pimbas Mutual Aid Society....................................... Baltimore, Md.
Progressive Benefit Association.............................Charleston, S. C.
Reliable Aid and Improvement Society.................Philadelphia, Pa.
Richmond Beneficial Insurance Company................. Richmond, Va.
Savannah Mutual and Fire Insurance Company.....Savannah, Ga.
St. James Beneficial Society..................................... Baltimore, Md.
Southern Mutual Insurance Company......................... Augusta, Ga.
Star of Zion Relief and Accident Corporation.........'....Boydton, Va.
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49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Standard Beneficial and Relief Company............... Baltimore, Md.
The Alpha Insurance Company............................ Washington, D. C.
The Home Insurance Company.............................. Charleston, S. C.
The Pilgrim Health Insurance Company................... Augusta, Ga.
The Royal Mutual Aid Beneficial Association..... Wilmington, Del.
Toilers Mutual Insurance Company...................... Greensboro, N. C.
Toilers Mutual Life Insurance Co.............................. Tarboro, N. C.
Union Central Relief................................................... Florence, Ala.
Union Mutual Aid Association............................. Jacksonville, Fla.
Union Mutual Insurance Company............................... Atlanta, Ga.
United Aid Benevolent Association.......................New York, N. Y.
United States Life Insurance Company................ Charleston, S. C.
United Aid and Benevolent Association............. Jersey City, N. J.
United Brotherhood Fraternity..................................... Norfolk, Va.
United Aid Insurance Company.................................Richmond, Va.
Virginia Beneficial Insurance Company.......................Norfolk, Va.
“ Economic Cooperation Among Negroes,”
Atlanta University Publications, No. 1 2 ,1907, p. 99.
A p p e n d ix B

Correspondence relative to Case XI, page — (Cornelius Cook).
November 19th, 1925
Dr. W illiam W allace
Shreveport, La.
Dear Doctor:
We are returning to you the medical certificate of Cornelius
Cook and wish to call your attention to the fact that you failed to fill
in answers to questions four and five of your Special Report, and
you also failed to state how you rate the applicant or whether or not
you would recommend him for insurance.
We also wish to advise that we have not received a specimen of
urine. Kindly advise if you are certain that you sent a specimen
to this office.
Appreciating an early reply and wishing you continued success,
we are
Very truly yours,
C. C. Carter, Jr.,
Medical Director.
CCC/LPD
Copy Wm. L. G. Abney
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November 19th, 1925
Dr. W illiam W allace
Shreveport, La.
Dear Doctor:
Enclosed you will find the medical certificate o f Cornelius Cook,
and we wish to call your attention to the fact that you failed to
answer all questions. Kindly complete and return to us at once.
We are very anxious to issue this policy and trust that you will
favor us with an immediate reply.
Very truly yours,
C. C. Carter, Jr.,
Medical Director.

CCC:EGG
December 4, 1925.
Dr. W illiam W allace
1059y2 Texas Avenue,
Shreveport, La.
Dear Doctor:
Some days ago we returned to you the medical certificate for
Cornelius Cook, because you had failed to answer all questions. Up
to this date we do not find that same has been returned to us. We
are very anxious to clear this matter but cannot do so until we have
received the blank properly filled out. Kindly give this matter your
immediate attention.
Very truly yours,
C. C. Carter, Jr.,
Medical Director.
*

*

*

*

*

CCC:EGG
Then, Mr. W. L. G. Abney comes along, being, or having been very
anxious to get the insurance through, writes:
December 11th, 1925.
Dr. C. C. Carter, Jr.,
Medical Director,
*■
Standard Life Insurance Co.
Dear S ir:
I am taking the liberty to write you about C .C. Cook who
applied for $5,000.00. I had a letter from you telling me that the
dn
aifl. qoo^— Apradoad uoi^noqddn oq^ yy 0 } paynj puq mq
with the Dr. and he reported that he had met the requirements.
Please let me know if he has not.
Best wishes,
W m . L. G. A bney.
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A ppendix C
Consolidated Statements of 28 Negro Life Insurance Companies
In the Proceedings * of the National Negro Insurance Associa
tion for 1938 Esther O. Tibbs, Actuary for the Afro-American Life
Insurance Company consolidated the statements of several com
panies which were members of the Association. It is interesting to
note how her comments indicate that the pattern of Negro business
in the field of insurance differs from that of white insurance com
panies. She wrote: “ It is conceded by the majority of authorities
that the investments of insurance companies should be in the fol
lowing order: Bonds, Mortgages, and Real Estate with the following
proportions less policy loans, 57%, 23%, and 11% respectively. Now
turning to our own companies we find Bonds 35%, Mortgages 17%,
and Real Estate 30% of the assets. . . . The aggregate net rate
earned on assets for our companies was 3.3%. The contractual rate
[in order to maintain reserves] for the same companies was 3.6%” .*
This, of course, is due to the position of Negro Insurance companies
on the periphery of economic life— the effect of exclusion and the
resulting lack of interlocking or consolidating relationships.
She compared the consolidated statements of 28 Negro insurance
companies— 10 mutual and 18 stock—with that of one white com
pany comparable in size to the aggregate of the 28 Negro companies
and found that the one white company was in far better competitive
position than was possible for any of the Negro companies. For
an example, the Negro companies paid on account of home office
salaries and medical and inspection fees more than three times as
much as the one white company which was doing a comparable
amount of business. Yet it is a well-known fact that the officers,
employees, and agents of white companies receive more in salaries
and commissions than do those of Negro companies. In the case
of the National Benefit the wages of the masses of employees, ac
cording to a former officer ranged from $35 to*'$90 a month, with
an average of about $65. The reason that the expense for Negro
companies in this respect was greater than that of the white com
pany was because of the small unit size of the former and the lack
of concentration and integration. In the case of the Negro com
panies the money spent was far less productive.
The consolidated statements are as follows:
* P r o c e e d i n g s , National Negro L ife Insurance Association, 1938, Esther O.
Tibbs, p. 54.
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STATEMENT OF INCOME AND DISBURSEMENTS
(28 Companies) *
INCOME
Premium Income
Ordinary ................. $2,040,220.55
Industrial................. 6,360,781.16
Health and Accident 4,087,679.95
Income from Other
Sources ................. 1,178,345.38
Total Income ....$13,667,027.04
DISBURSEMENTS
Claims
Ordinary ................. $ 611,211.76
Industrial................. 1,391,953.44
Health and Accident
359,743.86
Sick and Disability.. 1,756,753.09
Commissions to Agents 3,249,784.24
Home Office Expense....
509,294.48
Dividends to Share
holders .................
66,424.65
Officers and Home O.
Employees Salaries
978,774.49
Agency Supervision.....
574,436.87
Medical Exam. Fees.....
87,809.07
Advertising .................
87,373.18
Taxes on Real Estate....
100,570.69
Taxes, Licenses & Fees
368,741.50
Inspection of Risks.....
35,284.15
All Other Disbursem ents..................... 1,713,718.32
Total
Disbursements $11,891,873.79
* P r o c e e d i n g s , National Negro L ife Insurance Association, 1938, Esther O.
Tibbs, p. 54.
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Gain and Loss Exhibit *
Gains
65,415
Mortality .........
55,345
Interest ...........
Lapses and
Surrenders.... 425,160
Net Gains......... 132,221

Losses
Loading ........................... 1,021,367
Dividends to Stockholders
64,882
Dividends to Policy
holders .........................
1,339
Investments .....................
62,720
Increase in Surplus .... .... 118,833

1,269,141

1,269,141

BALANCE SHEET ITEMS *
Book Value of Real
E state....................... 5,487,565.56
Mortgage Loans on Real
Estate ....................... 3,120,305.31
Policy Loans................. 1,722,902.08
Book Value of Bonds.... 6,425,540.01
Book Value of Stocks....
934,900.20
Non-Admitted A ssets.. 1,307,773.60
Total Admitted Assets 20,125,870.37
Net Reserve................. 14,719,178.64
Capital Paid In............. 1,477,584.00
Surplus ....................... 2,855,315.15
* Proceedings, National Negro Life Insurance Association, 1938, Esther O.
Tibbs, p. 54.

EXHIBIT OF POLICIES *

I n F o r c e 1 2 - 3 1 - 3 7 ...............................
Is su e d D u r in g 1937 ..........................
L a p se D u r in g 1937 .............................
T e rm in a te d b y D e a t h ........................

O R D IN A R Y
N um ber
A m ount
121,529
$67,906,561
28,411
16,129,516
21,285
11,242,549
1,066
632,563

IN D . and H . A .
N um ber
A m ount
1,537,026
$704,620,777
1,173,203
163,716,840
1,113,942
145,955,614
16,783
1,947,928

TOTAL
N um ber
A m ount
1,658,555
$272,527,788
1,201,614
179,846,356
1,135,227
157,198,163
17,849
2,580,491

* P ro c e ed in g s , N a tio n a l N e g r o L if e In su ra n ce A s s o c ia t io n , 1938, E s th e r O. T ib b s , p. 54.
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A ppendix D
The story of the collapse of the National Benefit Life Insurance
Company as carried by the Washington press is indicated below.
The headlines suggest some of the important incidents as well as give
a chronology of the litigation. The articles and their references
are as follows:
The Washington Tribune, Washington, D. C.
June 19, 1931 “ National Benefit Changes Officers, Rutherfords
Out”
“ Examination of National Benefit Now Under Way”
“ 9,000 Shares of Stock Will Be Cleared Up”
June 26, 1931 “ S. W. Rutherford Refuses to Talk of Future Plans”
“ Mortimer Smith and Rutherfords Sued on Note”
July 10, 1931 “ Rutherfords and Smith Sued for Fraudulent Mis
management”
Sept. 18, 1931 “ National Benefit Receivership to Be Appointed”
April 1, 1932 “ Court Refuses to Stop Meeting of Stockholders”
March 11, 1939 Editorial: “ The National Benefit Receivership”
“ Justice Gordon Names Risher National Benefit
Receiver”
“ National Benefit Repudiates Two Attorneys, Las
key and Brooke”
April 1, 1939 “ $375 Per Month for Attending to Mail”
The Afro-American, Washington, D. C.
June 27, 1931 “ National Benefit Directors Control”
“ Bank Accounts of Rutherfords and Smith At
tached”
July 4, 1931 “ Probe Rutherford’s Activity With 9,000 Share
Trust”
“ To Protect All Policyholders, Says Risher”
“ $100,000 Assets of Rutherfords Are Attached”
July 18, 1931 “ Court Is Asked to Compel Itutherfords and Smith
to Account for Alleged Frauds”
“ National Benefit Suit Exposes? Alleged Frauds”
July 25, 1931 “ Did Standard Life Gobble Up National Benefit?”
“ National Benefit Suit Drags as Lawyers Confer”
Sept. 19, 1931 “ $500,000 Lost in Stock Market”
Oct. 10, 1931 “ National Benefit Feud Ousts Paul Crane”
“ Maryland Lifts Ban on National Benefit”
“ Receiver Named for National Benefit in Maryland”
Nov. 14, 1931 “ National Benefit’s Deficit Is Enormous Sum of
$2,828,380”
Nov. 28, 1931 “ National Benefit Ax Hits 70 Employees”
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“ Receiver Recommended That Company Be Mu
tualized at Once”
Jan. 30, 1932 “ Smith on Stand Tells of Half Million Deal”
Feb. 13, 1932 “ Risher, New National Benefit Director, Had Only 2
Shares of Stock”
Feb. 27, 1932 “ Court Orders Officers Ousted as Rutherfords Win 4
Weeks Fight”
“ Pinkett on Stand Says He Didn’t Know of National
Benefit Investments”
“ Attorney Urges Court to Cut Trial Short”
“ Perry Howard and O’Brien Defend Risher and
Pinkett”
“ Rutherford Group Lawyers Contend Risherites
Sought to Wreck National Benefit”
March 5, 1932 “ Final Decree in National Benefit Case Debated”
March 26,1932 “ Rutherford Is Hopeful of National Benefit Re
vival”
April 2, 1932 “ National Benefit Receivers Are Granted More Au
thority by Court”
“ Court Hopes for Practical Plan to Save National
Benefit”
June 4, 1932 “ Ex-President of National Benefit Indicted for
$450,000 Plot”
“ Rutherfords and Smith Sued by Boswell”
June 25, 1932 “ National Benefit Will Pay 253 Death Claims”
July 16, 1932 “ National Benefit Receivers Want $25,000 Fidelity
Bonds”
Jan. 14, 1933 “ Multitude of Errors in National Benefit Accounts”
“ Shrinkage in Realty Caused National Benefit
Losses”
May 14, 1933 “ Risher, Smith and Gary $450,000 Trial Halted”
June 3, 1933 “ Newest Suit Would Dissolve National Benefit”
Nov. 19, 1938 “ National Benefit Receivership Illegal”
March 11,1939 “ Suit Charges 90 Per Cept of National Benefit As
sets Gone”
March 18,1939 Editorial: “ How Was It Possible?”
March 25,1939 “ National Benefit Receiver Says Public Is Confused”
April 1, 1939 “ Court Suspends Ouster Order in National Benefit”
The Washington World, Washington, D. C.
July 10, 1931 “ Rutherford-Smith-Rutherford Snydicate Charged
With Serious Juggling o f Stock and Funds”
The Washington Star, Washington, D. C.
July 9, 1931 ‘$6,000,000 Insurance Accounting Is Asked”
Nov. 21, 1938 “ Insurance Company May Get New Receiver”
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Security Holdings of the National Benefit Life Insurance Company as of September 9, 1931*
Par
Book
Market
Bonds
Value
Value
Value

Item
No.
1 . Palls Church School District, Fairfax County, Va.—5%, 1945................................... $10,000
2,000
2. Beaumont, Texas— 5% Public Park Bonds, 1965..........................................................
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8
9.
10

.

.

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20

.

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Beaumont, Texas— 5% School Bonds, 1950....................................................................
Beaumont, Texas—5% Street and Highway Bonds, 1950...........................................
Beaumont, Texas— 5% Sewer Bonds, 1965......................................................................
Beaumont, Texas— 5% Street Improvement and Repairs, 1955.................................
Beaumont, Texas— 5% Street and Highway Bonds, 1965.............................................
Danville, Va.—School and City Hall Bonds, 4% % , 1939-40-41...................................
Federal Security and Mortgage Co.—5% Collateral Trust Bonds, 1939-1949...........
Charleston County, S. C.— 5% % Road Bonds, 1941......................................................
Charleston County, S. C.— 5% % Road Bonds, 1943......................................................
Spartenburg, S. C.— 4% % Street Improvement Bonds, 1946.......................................
Norfolk, Va.—4% % Public Improvement Bonds, 1947.................................................
U. S. 4th L. L.—4% % , 1933............................................................................................
Bayway Terminal Co.—6% % , 1946.................................................................................
Havana Electric Railway—5% % Gold Debenture, 1951...............................................
Interboro Rapid Transit Co.—5% Refunding Bonds, 1966...........................................
St. Louis and Santa Fe Railway— 4%% Consolidating Mortgage Bonds, 1978.......
United Porto Rican Sugar Notes— 6% % , 1937, Series A .............................................
Department o f Cundinamarca Extension— 6% % Sinking Fund Gold Bonds, 1959....
Roosevelt Water Conservation District, Arizona—2nd Lien 6% Gold Bonds, 1940....
Shubert Theatre Corporation— 6% Gold Debenture, 1942...........................................
79 Madison Ave. Building, N. Y. C.— 6% 1st, 1932-1940.............................................
Terminal Hydro Electric Co.— %Vz% 1st Mortgage, 1953.............................................
Department of Antioquia, Col.—7%, 1957......................................................................
Georgia, Florida and Alabama Railroad Co.— 1st Refunding 6% Gold Bonds, 1952
Washington, Baltimore & Annapolis Railroad Co.— 1st Mortgage 5% Bonds, 1941
“Based, on Schedules in Fackler and Breiby.
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1,000
4,000
7,000
25,000
16,000
15,000
20,000
6,000
10,000
5,000
11,000
10,000
5,000
10,000
5,000
15,000
5,000
10,000
5,000
12,000
10,000
10,000
5,000
10,000
2,000

$10,376.24
2,070.18
1,037.14
4,143.26
7,245.61
25,581.33
16,561.39
15,177.98
20,000.00
6,597.59
11,038.69
5,133.76
11,000.00
10,000.00
5,050.00
9,175.00
4,952.50
14,512.50
4,925.00
9,325.00
4,975.00
11,500.00
10,000.00
9,000.00
4,700.00
9,975.00
1,770.00

$8,200.00
1,100.00
550.00
2,200.00
3,850.00
13,750.00
8,800.00
10,500.00
11,000.00
4,500.00
7,500.00
3,500.00
7,700.00
10,211.60
750.00
350.00
2,575.00
5,141.25
500.00
2,450.00
500.00
120.00
1,500.00
4,400.00
250.00
500.00
100.00

Security Holdings o f the National Benefit L ife Insurance Company as o f September 9, 1931* (Continued)

Item
No.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Federal Security and Mortgage Co.—Collateral Trust 6% % Gold Bonds, 1935-1938
Potomac Joint Stock Land Bank—5%, 1954..................................................................
Saks Realty Corporation— 6% Serial Gold Bonds, 1946...............................................
Allied Packers— 1st Mortgage and Collateral Trust Sinking Fund Bonds, 1939.......
Associated Dyeing and Printing Corporation— 6% Notes, 1938.................................
City Water Power Co., Austin, Texas— 1st Mortgage 5% Sinking Fund Gold
Bonds, 1939 .........................................................................................................................
Detroit International Bridge Co.—7% Sinking Fund Gold Bonds, 1952....................
Illinois Kentucky Bridge Co.—7% 1st Mortgage Sinking Fund Gold Bonds, 1946....
New Orleans Pontchartrain Bridge Co.— 7% 1st Mortgage Sinking Fund Gold
Bonds, 1946 .......................................................................................................................
New Orleans Pontchartrain Bridge Co.— 7% Gold Debenture Bonds, 1941...............
Norfolk and Portsmouth Bridge Co.— 6% % 1st Mortgage Sinking Fund Gold
Bonds, 1947 .......................................................................................................................
Norfolk and Portsmouth Bridge Co.—7% Sinking Fund Gold Debenture Bonds,
1942 ....................................................................................................................................
Old Point Comfort Corp,j—6 % % 1st Sinking Fund Gold Bonds.................................
Pittsburgh Terminal Warehouse and Transfer Co.— 1st Refunding 5% Gold Bonds,
1936 ....................................................................................................................................
Moline Plow Co.— Series F, 7% Gold Notes, 1923........................................................
Colorado, Wyoming and Eastern Railway Co.—6% General Mortgage Bonds, 1944
Delaware, Jackson and Chicago Railway Co.— 5% Consolidated Mortgage Gold
Bonds, 1937 .......................................................................................................................
Gary, Conn. Rwy Co.— 1st Mortgage 5% Gold Bonds, 1921.......................................
Michigan Railroad Co.—6% 1st Mortgage Gold Bonds, 1924...................................
Raleigh and Charleston Railroad Co.— 4% 1st Mortgage Gold Bonds, 1956..............
Seaboard Airline— Series A, 6% 1st Consolidated Gold Bonds, 1945..........................
Union Traction Co. o f Ind.—General Mortgage Gold Bonds, 1932..........................
Drainage Dist. 17, Miss. County, Ark.— 5% Gold Bonds, 1928...................................
Franklin County, Ark.— 5% Road Improvement Dist. N o . 1, 1938............................
‘ Based on Schedules in Fackler and Breiby.
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Par
Value

Book
Value

Market
Value

7,000
50,000
2,000
1,000
5,000

7,000.00
51,750.00
1,978.60
1,000.00
4,987.50

3,850.00
23,080.00
560.00
302.50
1,100.00

3,000
15,000
10,000

None
14,975.00
•9,975.00

None
150.00
100.00

5,000
5,000

4,992.50
4,892.50

200.00
50.00

5,000

4,875.00

2,450.00

5,000
10,500

4,875.00
9,975.00

250.00
525.00

1,000
2,000
5,000

1,010.00
1,340.25
None

70.00
None
None

5,000
2,500
2,000
1,000
1,000

3,750.00
None
None
800.00
995.00
None

100.00
None
100.00

1,000
1,000

1,000

982.70
970.40

10.00

20.00
200.00
80.00
400.00
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45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Bonds
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Security Holdings o f the National Benefit L ife Insurance Company as o f September 9, 1931* (Continued)

Item
No.
52.
53.
54.

Item
No.

Par
Value

Bonds

Book
Value

Market
Value

50
50
520

50.00
50.00
520.00

50.10
51.05
225.00

Total Bonds...................... ................ $392,620

$377,567.62

$146,421.50

U. S. 1st L. L. 3% % , 1947........................................................................... ................
U. S. 4th L. L. 4% % , 1933-38....................................................................... ................
Servil Corp.—5% 1st Mortgage Gold Bonds, 1948..................................... ................

Par
Value

Stocks

None
15.00
7.50
28,200.00

6,930.00
None
None
None
None
None
4,250.00
1,000.00

None
None
None
None
None
None
12.50
640.00

$137,500

$265,180.00

$28,875.00

$530,120

$642,747.62

$175,296.50

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

C om m on ............................................................................................................................................................
24,700
L a w re n ce B a rn u m Co.— 10 S h a res P f d ..............................................................................................................
M o lin e P lo w C o.— T r u s te e s ’ C ertifica te f o r C om m on S t o c k ..................................................................
M o lin e P lo w Co.— T r u s te e s ’ C ertifica te fo r _ P fd . S to ck ..............................................................................
N itra te C orp . o f C h ile— 140 S h a res S eries B .................................................................................
N on e
O ld P o in t C o m p o rt C orp .— 100 S h a res C om m on ..........................................................................................
U n ite d A r t is t T h e a tre C ircu it— 50 S h a res C om m on ...................................................................................

66.

Real Estate Mortgage and Guaranty Corp.— 320 Shares Common.

Total,
•Based on Schedules in Fackler and Breiby, Report of Condition, Appendix D.

Market
Value

1,000.00
None
None
252,000.00

55. Allied Packers— 10 Shares Pfd........................................................................
56. Rudolph Karstadt— 60 Shares.........................................................................
57. Anglo-Chilian Consolidated Nitrate Corp.—60 Shares Common................
58. Citizens Trust Co., Atlanta—1128 Shares Common................................... ................ 112,800
59. Colorado, Wyoming and Eastern Rwy. Co., Voting Trust Certificate—247 Shares

Total Stocks

Book
Value
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Certain of the securities owned by the National Benefit were
deposited with state insurance authorities in accordance with the
laws of some of the states in which the National Benefit operated and,
therefore, were not immediately available to the company for
hypothecation or sale. Securities so deposited represented the cream
of the security holdings of the National Benefit. For, only govern
ment, state, county, municipal or other approved securities were
acceptable. In the schedule of security holdings of the National
Benefit given above items 1 to 9, inclusive, were deposited with the
Superintendent of Insurance of the District of Columbia; items 10
to 12, inclusive, with the Insurance Commissioner of North Caro
lina; and items 13 and 14 with the State Treasurer of Virginia.
Certain other of the securities listed were held as collateral against
loans made to the company. Items 15 to 20, inclusive, and the
company’s own certified check for $9,000 were held by the Union
Trust Company of Baltimore as collateral against a balance due
them of $19,076.61. The depositing of the $9,000 certified check as
collateral meant that the National Benefit owed only a net of
$10,076.61. Yet the balance due according to the books of the Union
Trust Company was $19,076.61, and it is reasonable to assume that
interest was charged on that amount. The transaction was handled
in this way, most likely, to enable the Union Trust Company to get a
bonus on the deal. On October 28, 1931, items 17, 18 and 20 were
sold at the stated market prices and the proceeds together with the
certified check were applied to settle the company’s indebtedness.
Stein Bros, and Boyce of Baltimore were stock brokers with
whom the company had an account. Fackler and Breiby state that
the account was used for two purposes: to speculate on margin and
to borrow money on securities. The cost of borrowing money
through Stein Bros, and Boyce went as high as 10 per cent a month
in 1929. The brokerage firm seems to have been accommodating
in other respects. C. B. Rollins, a representative of the firm, was
a party to one of the fictitious transactions in which the National
Benefit was involved.
t
Items 21 to 30 inclusive, 55 and 56 were held by Stein Bros, and
Boyce against a debit balance of $15,221.68. On October 30 and
December 23, 1931, Potomac Joint Stock Land Bank bonds (included
in item 29) with a par value of $36,000 were sold for $14,150 to
restore margin. The total securities held by Stein Bros, and Boyce
prior to this sale had a par value of $113,000, a book value of $113,648.60 and a market value of $34,875-00.
The only securities in the possession of the company were items
31 to 54, inclusive, and 56 to 66, inclusive. These securities had a
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par value of $225,120.00, a book value of $335,195.85 and a market
value of $35,293.65.
It is quite in accord with the principles of financial management
to value bonds amply secured and not in default on the basis of
amortization value. This is especially true in the case of an insur
ance company whose security holdings, presumably, are for invest
ment rather than speculation. This method of valuation implies
that the securities in the ordinary course will not be sold but will
be held until redeemed and that it is reasonable to believe that the
issuing corporation will not default in the payment of interest or
principal. The actuaries valuing the bonds in connection with the
receivership found that with only six exceptions the only bonds
which were amply secured and not in default were those deposited
with state insurance authorities. The securities deposited with in
surance authorities had a par value of $142,000, a book value of
$145,963.17, a market value of $102,861.60 and an amortized value
of $145,212.00. Bonds amply secured and not in default other than
those deposited with state insurance authorities were items 28, 29 and
30 with an amortized value of $60,706.00 held by Stein Bros, and
Boyce; and items 52, 53 and 54 with an amortized value of $620
which were in the possession of the company.
The only stocks held by the company which were paying divi
dends were the 320 shares of Real Estate Mortgage and Guaranty
Corporation stock (item 66). Item 58 shows that 1,128 shares of
stock of the Citizens Trust Company of Atlanta was held by the
National Benefit. The Citizens Trust Company was the National
Benefit’s subsidiary. The National Benefit owned nearly the entire
amount of its outstanding stock. Of 1,200 shares outstanding the
National Benefit owned in its own name 1,108 and possessed certifi
cates for 20 other shares not in its name but to which it claimed
ownership. The stock of the Citizens Trust Company had a par
value of $100 per share. The National Benefit carried this stock
on its books at $252,000 an excess of $139,200 over par value. How
ever, in valuing this stock actuaries for the ^receivers said that there
was no market for the stock but that it had been given a market value
of $25 per share arrived at on the basis of the statement of the
trust company. This made the market value of the National Bene
fit’s holdings $28,200.00, or $224,000 less than the figure at which
it was carried on the books of the National Benefit.
On a whole the other stocks held by the National Benefit were
purely speculative stocks. The 10 shares of Allied Packers preferred
(item 55) though carried at a book value of $1,000.00 was found to
be entirely worthless. Items 56, 57 and 60 to 64, inclusive, were
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also worthless but had been recently written off by the company.
Despite this the book value of stock, owned was $467,451.12 more
than market value.
In addition to stocks many bonds held by the National Benefit
were highly speculative in character. The United Porto Rican
Sugar notes (item 19) held by the National Benefit were part of an
issue of $3,500,000.00 originally offered at par by Stein Bros, and
Boyce in 1927. These bonds were rated by Poor’s Investment Service
as a better speculative grade (Poor’s Industrials— 1921, p. 287).
They were originally offered at par and rose to 106 in 1928. This
rise most likely was due to market manipulation to “ make a market”
for the original sale of the bonds. Since the bonds were marketed
by Stein Bros, and Boyce, who were brokers for the National Benefit,
and since a Julian S. Stein was one of the directors of the issuing
corporation, it is not unlikely that Stein Bros, and Boyce had an
especial interest in marketing these bonds and, consequently, in
selling some of them to the National Benefit. After 1928 the bonds
sank rapidly. The price range in 1930 was 89 *4 to 66. On Sep
tember 9, 1931, the bonds were valued at one-tenth of their par
value.
Item 23 shows the holdings of bonds of the 79 Madison Avenue
Corporation. These bonds were secured by the first mortgage on a
16 story office and mercantile building at 79 Madison Avenue, New
York City. Their speculative character is indicated by the fluctua
tions in the price during 1930. Their price fluctuated between a
high of 81 and a low of 57 in 1930 (Poor’s Fiscal Manual— 1931,
p. 926). On September 9, 1931, they were appraised at 15.
The holdings in Bayway Terminal Company bonds (item 15)
were carried on the books at $5,050 and they were appraised on
September 9,1931, at $750. Information concerning this company as
well as this issue of bonds is surprisingly scant. It is known, how
ever, that in September, 1926, $3,000,000 in these bonds were origi
nally offered at par. On December 31, 1930, this company had out
standing $2,771,120 in long term notes about Which no details are
available. (See Poor’s Industrials— 1931, p. 459).
The Pittsburgh Terminal Warehouse and Transfer bonds were
other speculative bonds held by the National Benefit (item 41). The
investment opinion concerning these bonds is that they were specula
tive (Poor’s Industrials— 1931, p. 870). Their price reached a high
of 92 in 1928 and ranged from a high of 32 down to bid price in
1930. In 1928 the earnings of the company were $0.37 per share.
Earnings fell in 1929 to $0.04 per share.
The Seaboard Airline was one of the railroads burdened with
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a large funded debt.
$828 per mile of system was required to pay
interest on its funded debt (Moody’s Steam Railroads— 1931). On
December 23, 1930, it was put into a receivership. On March 1,
1931, it defaulted in the payment of interest on some of its bonds.
When it entered receivership the National Benefit was caught hold
ing some of its bonds (item 48). These bonds with a par value of
$1,000 were appraised at $20 on September 9, 1931. The Seaboard
Airline controlled the Georgia, Florida, and Alabama Railroad.
When the Seaboard Airline went into receivership such, of course,
had an adverse affect upon the bonds of the Georgia, Florida, and
Alabama Railroad. Item 26 shows the status of the National Bene
fit holdings in these latter bonds.
Not all of the National Benefit’s securities were “ cats and dogs” ,
however. Saks Realty Corporation bonds (item 30), though given
a low appraisal in 1931, had been considered a good grade of invest
ment security. The crash of 1929, of course, had some effect upon
it. Its price, however, was 8 2 ^ throughout the year of 1930 (Poor’s
Industrials— 1931, p. 1784). It was one of the bonds amply secured
and not in default. Its amortized value on September 9, 1931 was
$1,991.00.
A ppendix F
THE OFFICIAL REPORT
The Annual Statement for the year ended December 31, 1930 on
the Condition of Affairs of the National Benefit Life Insurance Com
pany submitted to the Insurance Commissioner of Maryland (An
nual Statements, Volume 14, 1930) contained in addition to facts
already cited, certain other pertinent statements. The officers, on
December 31, 1930, according to the report w ere:
R. H. Rutherford, President,
S. W. Rutherford, Secretary,
R. H. Rutherford, Treasurer, and
Dr. Wm. A. Warfield, V. President.
The actuaries were Miles M. Dawson and Son. The report, however,
did not contain the signature of the actuary as was required. This
fact in addition to the fact that the schedule of compensation and
payment made to officers, directors, and employees who had received
during the year more than $5,000 from the company was not com
pleted could not be explained by the officials of the insurance depart
ment of Maryland. The schedule referred to contained merely the
names and no amounts.

145

According to the report the directors were:
J. H. Braxton
C. B. Lee
I. S. Burke
M. S. Hayes
R. H. Rutherford
Wm. A. Warfield
M. F. Smith
S. W. Rutherford
Louis Washington
Wm. E. Newman
The report said further that the company was operating in the fol
lowing states:
11. Kan.
1. Ala.
20. Ohio.
2. Ark.
12. Ky.
21. Okla.
13. La.
22. Pa.
3. Cal.
4. Del.
14. Md.
23. R. I.
15.
Mich.
5. D. C.
24. S. C.
6. Fla.
16. Miss.
25. Tenn.
7. Ga.
17. Mo.
26. Texas
8. 111.
18. Neb.
27. Va.
9. Ind.
19. U. C.
28. W. Va.
10. Iowa
The report said that the Masonic Temple had been acquired “ to
protect a collateral loan made to the Grand Lodge F. A. A. M.” and
that the cost to the company had been $569,457.49 and the book value
was $422,007.09. As to the company’s speculation on margin the
report said that $593,600 (book value) in bonds and stocks were in
the possession of Stein Bros, and Boyce as collateral “ on account of
bonds purchased on the deferred payment plan” .
Following are certain statements also a part of the report for
the year 1930.
STATEMENT OF INCOME AND DISBURSEMENTS
Amount of Ledger Assets
of previous year.............
$6,082,308.29
Income
First year’s premium on
original policies ...........
$ * 125,950.19
Renewal premiums........... $ 965,753.74
Surrender values applied to
pay renewal premiums.. 1,979,622.75 2,945,376.49
Total premium income
Gross interest on mort
gage loans .....................
Gross interest on collateral
loans

3,071,326.68
35,896.43
15,270.46
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Gross interest on Bonds
and Dividends on Stocks
Gross interest on premium
notes, policy loans or
liens ...............................
Gross interest on deposits
in trust companies and
banks .............................
Interest on surrender
value loans ...................
Gross rent from company
p roperty.........................

49,680.65

85,558.39

9,760.04
8,896.79
56,780.55
261,843.31

Misc. income .....................
Fines .................................
Increase in ledger
liabilities .......................

49,723.17
13,544.06

Gross profit on sale of R.E.
Gross profit on sale of
Bonds .............................

4,133.23

5,175.99
68,443.22

1,998.99
6,132.22

Gross increase in ledger
asset by adjustment.....
Impairment Liens ...........

57,550.20
59,232.36

116,782.56

Total Income

3,524,527.99

Amount carried
forward ......

9,606,836.28

DISBURSEMENTS
Amount carried forward....
Death claims .....................
701,237.63
Matured endowments.......
23,680.25
Sick claims .......................
288,691.67
Payments made to policy
holders during the year
6,334.70
Net amount paid for
losses and matured
endowments .............
Premium notes and policy
liens voided by lapse.

$9,606,836.28

1,019,944.25
5,824.97

Surrender values paid in
cash or applied in liquidation of notes or loans
Paid for claims on supplementary contracts ....
Expense of investigation
and settlement of policy
claims .............................
Dividend to stockholders....
Commissions to agents:
First year’s premium....
Renewal premiums .....
Industrial .....................
Compensation to managers
and agents not paid by
commission ...................
Agency supervision .........
Branch office expense.......
Medical examiners’ fees....
Salaries and all other com
pensation to officers, di
rectors, and home office
employees .....................
Rent ...................................
General office maintenance
and expense ...................
Advertising .......................
Printing and Stationery....
Telephone, postage, etc....
Books, newspapers a n d
periodicals .....................
Legal expense ...................
Repairs and expenses.......
Taxes on Real E state.......
Taxes, licenses and fees....
Misc. expense ...................
Payment to Standard Life
Conservation by transfer
expense .........................
Interest on surrender
value loans ............

1,003,053.31
1,266.64

9,451.41
19,535.64
60,507.81
29,445.80
89,953.61
359,501.58

54,230.01
44,809.95
452,565.09
40,518.61

306,027.85
51,993.20
44,438.30
3,590.30
21,957.69
27,169.34
1,171.30
53,888.63
12,332.62
55,863.45
7,999.80
77,886.00
46,844.82
35,000.00
56,815.54
8,896.79
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Borrowed money repaid....
Interest on borrowed
money ...........................
Agents’ debit balances
charged off ...................
Gross loss of sale of real
estate .............................
Gross loss of sale of bonds
Gross loss of sale of stocks
Total Disbursements..

104,435.75
21,797.87
23.38
2,134.35
11,592.50
37,001.87
4,035,627.79

Balance

5,571,208.49
BALANCE SHEET
LEDGER ASSETS

Book value of Real Estate Less $507,500
incumbrances .........................................
Mortgage loans on Real Estate.................
Collateral loa n s...........................................
Policy loa n s.................................................
Premium notes ...........................................
Book value of Bonds................................... 822,846.77
Book value of Stocks................................... 262,000.00
----------------

1,540,129.17
549,560.77
79,300.00
633,245.11
61,336.70

1,084,846.77

Deposits in Trust Companiesand Banks
256,827.99
Bills Receivable ......................................... 38,998.18
Agents’ debit balance................................. 216,463,44
---------------------------------------- 255,461.62
Leaseholds ...............................
Meter Deposits .......................
Accounts Receivable................
Furniture and Fixtures ........
Impairment L ien s....................
Impairment Liens Contingent
Auto equipment ......................
Interest due and accrued .........................
Market value of Real Estate over book
value .........................................................
Uncollected and deferred prem ium s.......

65,000.00
20.00
8,533.84
162.432.98
783.299.99
88,390.90
2,822.65
---------------

1,110,500.36
76,849.38
70,444.63
270,108.38
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Industrial premiums d u e ...........................

52,529.84

Cash surrender value of officers’ insurance

8,891.85

6,050,032.57
Non-admitted assets...................................

450,353.96

5,599,678.61

LIABILITIES, SURPLUS AND OTHER FUNDS
Reserve (Life) ......................

4,744,950.00

Disability Reserve ...............................................................

19,297.00

Reserve on account supplementary contracts...................

3,975.14

Claims due and unpaid (including claims resisted).......

63,066.53

Gross premiums paid in advance........................................

3,825.70

Accruals .................................................................................

17,218.56

Reserve for taxes .................................................................

54,947.00

Borrowed m oney...................................................................

31,076.61

Unpaid dividends to stockholders.......................................

4,362.39

Contingent liens, 1930 .........................................................

14,477.56

Deferred payments on bonds...............................................

241,664.34

Miscellaneous ................................................

13,878.90

5,212,739.73
Capital ...................................................................

250,000.00

Surplus ...................................................................

136,938.88

5,599,678.61
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GAIN AND LOSS EXHIBIT
Gain

Loss

Loading ...............................................
Interest .................................................
Mortality ............................................. ....... 124,202.00
Surrender, lapses and changes........... ....... 149,278.00
Dividends to stockholders .................
Special funds .......................................
Profit and Loss ...................................
Real Estate ......................................... ....... 61,683.00
Stocks and Bonds ............................... .......
1,999.00
Adjustment of impairment lien s....... ....... 59,232.00
Mortgages ...........................................
Miscellaneous ....................................... ....... 63,267.00
Net increase in surplus .....................

36,686.00
8,514.00

2,134.00
296,231.00
26,407.00

459,661.00

459,661.00

20,000.00
21,072.00
23.00
48,594.00

